Greg Bock

In “Divine Forgiveness and Legal Pardon,” William Lane Craig compares divine forgiveness to legal pardon, claiming that this is a “more accurate” way of thinking about God’s forgiveness because of God’s status as Ruler and Judge. Craig’s analogy is an admirable attempt to provide a biblical account of divine forgiveness, but the analogy is at best incomplete because God is not simply Ruler and Judge but also loving Creator and Father. A father does not pardon his children; he loves and forgives them. In this paper, I evaluate Craig’s analogy and relate it to the atonement.

This dissertation explores conflicts between religion and medicine, cases in which cultural and religious beliefs motivate requests for inappropriate treatment or the cessation of treatment, requests that violate the standard of care. I call such requests M-requests (miracle or martyr requests). I argue that current approaches fail to accord proper respect to patients who make such requests. Sometimes they are too permissive, honoring M-requests when they should not; other times they are too strict. I propose a phronesis-based approach to decide whether to honor an M-request or whether religious beliefs are medically valid. This approach is culturally sensitive, takes religious beliefs seriously, and holds them to a high ethical standard. This approach uses a principle of belief evaluation developed by Linda Zagzebski: The Principle of Rational Belief, which is founded upon Aristotelian virtue ethics. In addition to the Principle, I propose a concrete set of conditions to assist caregivers in clinical case evaluations. In the final chapters, I apply the phronesis-based approach to well-known adult cases such as the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah’s Witnesses and requests for continued (futile) care by Orthodox Jews at the end of life. Also, I consider cases involving children such as African female circumcision and cases of faith healing. I argue that The Principle of Rational Belief should define the threshold of the kinds of M-requests for children that can be honored, but I allow a lower threshold for M-requests made by competent adult patients.

The Philosophy of Forgiveness is multi-dimensional and complex. As recent scholarly philosophical works on forgiveness illustrate, incorporating personal, relational, political, ethical, psychological, and religious dimensions into one consistent conception of “forgiveness” is difficult. As part of Vernon Press’s series on the Philosophy of Forgiveness, Explorations of Forgiveness: Personal, Relational, and Religious begins the task of creating a consistent multidimensional account of forgiveness by bringing together multiple voices from around the globe to analyze, discuss, and draw conclusions about how best to understand forgiveness. The volume’s three opening chapters examine forgiveness as a relational concept, and offer insights into the role of forgiveness in repairing, sustaining, stewarding, and healing relationships damaged by wrongdoing. Continuing with the relational theme, the next four chapters incorporate Hannah Arendt’s philosophical teachings into the discussion to offer several intriguing conclusions relating to “unforgiveable” persons and acts. The final chapters examine the nature of forgiveness from three major world religions: Buddhism, Christianity, and Confucianism.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, appeal to ridicule. An appeal to ridicule is closely related to an ad hominem argument because both attack the person. There is a similarity between an appeal to ridicule and an appeal to emotion in that both attempt to bypass rational assessment of a point of view and elicit an emotional reaction from the audience. An appeal to ridicule may be an attempt to elicit humor at another's expense, or it may be an attempt to elicit enmity, playing on the fears and prejudices of the group. The difference between a reductio ad absurdum and an appeal to ridicule is that the former uses good evidence while the latter does not. Perhaps the best way to avoid this fallacy is to cultivate an attitude of respect for other points of view.

In Black Museum, a young woman is out to take revenge on the man who imprisoned her father's digital self in a museum exhibit that allows sadistic visitors to reenact his execution. While the exhibit is morally detestable and some may think that the museum's curator gets what he deserves in the end, the woman's act of vengeance is morally disturbing. This chapter explores Martha Nussbaum's account of anger and forgiveness and considers Christian and Buddhist teachings. An argument by David Kyle Johnson for the moral permissibility of revenge under certain circumstances is considered and rejected. The authors conclude that the act of revenge in Black Museum is not morally justified.

Patients can be harmed by a religiously motivated surrogate decision maker whose decisions are contrary to the standard of care; therefore, surrogate decision making should be held to a high standard. Stewart Eskew and Christopher Meyers proposed a two-part rule for deciding which religiously based decisions to honor: (1) a secular reason condition and (2) a rationality condition. The second condition is based on a coherence theory of rationality, which they claim is accessible, generous, and culturally sensitive. In this article, I will propose strengthening the rationality condition by grounding it in a theory of intellectual virtue, which is both rigorous and culturally sensitive.

Robert Larmer critiques my view that the correct interpretation of David Hume’s argument against miracles in “Of Miracles” is that no testimony of a miracle can serve as the foundation of a religion. Larmer thinks that there is no unified argument in the section but says that Hume’s essential argument is that there can never be a justification for believing that a miracle has occurred on the basis of testimony. I raise a number of problems with Larmer’s interpretation, not the least of which is the fact that Hume explicitly contradicts such a reading.

Patient requests for “inappropriate” medical treatment based on religious beliefs should have special standing. Nevertheless, not all such requests should be honored, because some are morally disturbing. The trouble lies in deciding which ones count. This paper proposes criteria that would qualify a religious belief as medically valid to help physicians decide which requests to respect. The four conditions suggested are that the belief is shared by a community, is deeply held, would pass the test of a religious interpreter and does not harm others