Greg Littmann

Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. The strongest argument in favour of dialetheism is that it alone allows us to solve semantic paradoxes like the liar paradox. This chapter presents two main criticisms of dialetheism. First, it argues that semantic pathology spreads to the dialetheist theory itself, putting into question the acceptability of the theory. Second, it argues that, even though dialetheism admits true contradictions, it is nevertheless subject to a revenge liar.

How should society be organized? It is a question we cannot avoid as citizens of democracies, since the responsibility for running our society has been placed in our hands. Jonathan Swift stands in a long line of social critics who wanted to see fundamental social reform. In Western literature, this line begins with Plato (427–347 BCE), a thinker for whom Swift had a profound respect and who had an enormous influence on his thought (in The Battel of the Books (1704), Swift even used Plato as a character, presenting him as a high-ranking commander in an army of wise ancient scholars who easily trounce the foolish moderns). In Gulliver’s Travels (1726), Swift most explicitly laid out his opinion of what was wrong with his society, and of how society should ideally function. In doing so, he drew heavily on Plato’s Republic, in which Plato undertakes the same task by describing the ideal city, Kallipolis. Considering the similarities and differences between Swift’s political theory and Plato’s can help us to consider for ourselves how society should operate.

The miniseries Frank Herbert’s Dune (2000) and Frank Herbert’s Children of Dune (2003) offer a stark warning that people must think for themselves rather than relying on authority. In particular, they warn against overreliance on leaders and on religious authorities. The series tell the story of how, in the far future, Paul Atreides becomes dictator and religious leader over the human race, bringing slaughter and oppression in his wake. The chapter will consider the views of philosophers like Plato, who believed that power should be concentrated in the hands of leaders with absolute authority, along with the views of philosophers who advocated democracy, like John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey. The chapter will also examine the views of philosophers on religion, especially philosophers critical of religion, such as Locke, Thomas Paine, and Bertrand Russell. It is argued that the series present a strong case against allowing others to think for us, because the story they tell matches the historical record of the real world. When leaders have been given the power to be arbiters of truth, they have too often exploited those beneath them, using their positions to accumulate wealth, power, and glory. When too much trust has been placed in religious authority, it has likewise too often led to exploitation and repression. What is worse, the power of religion is uncontrollable, easily leading to violence and destruction. Having said that, the series fail to reflect that religion does good in the world. This chapter argues that, as maintained by W. K. Clifford, whether people should accept religious views depends on whether they have good grounds to believe that these views are true. This implies that people must not accept religious views without thinking the views through for themselves.

Science fiction fandoms tend to contain significant numbers of fans who feel angry and resentful about the handling of the franchise they are fans of, because of the stories the franchises owners have told. The paper addresses the question of when, if ever, such anger and resentment are justified. Special attention will be paid to Star Trek fandom, but other fandoms will be considered, including those for Star Wars and Doctor Who. Various proposed justifications for anger and resentment will be considered, including that franchise owners have misled fans about the stories they would tell, have wasted opportunities to produce good art, have reduced the value of older art, have engaged in a form of cultural appropriation by repurposing old characters, have caused needless offense of a sort akin to the offense of religious sensibilities, have offended against the principle of utility, and have taken advantage of unjust copyright laws. The paper does not champion a conclusion about when, if ever, fan anger and resentment are justified. However, it is concluded that, contrary to what is often assumed, it is not obvious that fan anger and resentment are always unjustified, and so fan anger and resentment cannot always be dismissed out of hand.

Utilitarianism is the theory that whether an action is morally right or wrong depends entirely on how beneficial or harmful it will be for everyone involved, only the net balance of benefit and harm matters. Most utilitarians believe that the only thing valuable in itself is happiness, and the only thing bad in itself is suffering; so, to maximize utility is to maximize happiness and minimize suffering. Utilitarians would be baffled by the common Vulcan view that emotions are best gotten rid of. According to utilitarianism, the duty to put the needs of the many ahead of the needs of the few extends even to people one has personal relationships with, like friends and family. The protagonists of the Star Trek franchise would seem to agree, as they generally place personal loyalty over public duty.

At the opening of Dune, we find humanity in a political mess, having reverted to a “feudal trade culture” with a hereditary emperor. By Heretics of Dune, the Bene Gesserit are directly ruling in the remnants of the old empire. Self‐discipline is the cornerstone of Bene Gesserit training. They distinguish two types of people: “humans” and “animals.” Considering the best role for the Bene Gesserit in the Dune universe should help to decide what to say about the real world. Over the centuries, many thinkers have wanted to see power concentrated in the hands of a guardian class of political experts, something like the Bene Gesserit. In Western philosophy, this tradition begins with Plato. Plato is right that democracy is rule by the unqualified, but the corruption of guardian classes has been so harmful that keeping power with the unqualified masses is a better bet, in general, than concentrating it in the most capable hands.

The chapter explores the question of whether humanity should give up religion, through the lens of the Dune series of novels (1965-1985) by Frank Herbert. The novels describe the future history of humanity, in which we are ruled by an oppressive theocratic emperor, first under a self-declared messiah, and finally, under a self-declared God-emperor. Numerous proposed harms of religion are considered, including that it encourages hated, violence, exploitative power hierarchies, and empire, and that it retards the progress of science and the arts. Numerous proposed benefits of religion are considered, including that it gives people solace in times of trouble, the it promotes kindness and other virtues, that it has motivated positive political change, and that it has been instrumental in establishing educational, charitable, and other social institutions. Finally, it is concluded that, as argued by W.K. Clifford in “The Ethics of Belief” (1877), whether we should hold religious view or not depends on whether we have good grounds to believe that those religious views are true. Holding false beliefs is dangerous, since it can lead to inappropriate actions in unpredictable ways.

The novel Ender’s Game is a story of brutality towards a child inflicted in the interests of the greater good for humanity. As such, it deals with one of the most divisive questions in ethics: to what degree, if any, may we treat other human beings as a means to an end? John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian doctrine makes all individual rights dependent on what is best for people in general. (Like Ender, Mill was himself subjected to an arduous program of training as a child, designed to make him a more effective tool for promoting the common good). In this chapter, It is argued that utilitarianism is correct, and that despite the intuitive appeal of the thought experiments traditionally invoked to demonstrate that utilitarianism is flawed, other thought experiments demonstrate that utilitarianism has greater intuitive appeal than the alternatives.

The fundamental conflict underlying the worlds of Dungeons Dragons is that between good and evil. Many philosophers have denied that there is any incompatibility between having free will and our actions being determined. Thorin Axebeard is nothing but a puppet controlled by Dwarven Culture and Psychology tables, dancing along to the dice. What makes the evil monsters of DD philosophically interesting is how obvious the connection often is between their evil behavior and factors entirely outside of their control.

In “The Waldo Moment,” a virtual bear becomes a successful politician through disrespecting, abusing, and dismissing his political rivals. In 2016, the presidency of the United States was won by Donald Trump, a candidate who took disrespect, abuse, and dismissal of his rivals to heights unprecedented in modern first‐world democracies. Meanwhile, Americans on different sides of the political aisle increasingly see each other as enemies to be denounced and fought, rather than allies to be listened to and engaged with. The chapter is an examination of the role of disrespect and dismissal in modern politics, with explanatory examples drawn from parallels in “The Waldo Moment.” It addresses the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate to be disrespectful or dismissive of an individual or their political views. Saying that it is never appropriate would seem to rule out legitimate political satire and protest. Yet the politics of disrespect and disengagement undermine our ability to learn from those who have a different point of view. It is concluded that on both sides of the political aisle, we too often prioritize expressing our feelings over making positive political progress through difficult engagement with those who disagree with us.

In the film Black Panther (2018), the nation of Wakanda is by far the most powerful on Earth. Assuming that superheroes don’t intervene, Wakanda has the ability to impose its will on any other nation. The Wakandans are aware that there is great injustice in the world outside their utopia. Yet they don’t simply take over the world and put things to rights. Should they? And if not, how far should they go In trying to influence the course of other nations? As things stand, their secrecy and isolationism prevents them from even applying diplomatic pressure. The chapter is an examination of the ethics of nations using their power to influence other nations. It is argued that while the Wakandans are right not to take over the world, they should take a more interventionist approach internationally. The Wakandans were right not to ultimately follow Jadaka’s plan for a world dictatorship founded on an ethnic hierarchy. The Wakandans also have good grounds to be wary about interfering in the affairs of other nations in general, given world history, particularly colonial history, and above all, the history of colonial and post-colonial Africa. However, some dangers are so great, and some evils so bad, that intervention, and even intervention by force, is justified. Wakanda provides a useful thought experiment for considering our relationship with other nations. The way that we would want Wakanda to treat other nations, including ours, can help to show us how our own nation should be acting. We should avoid dominating other nations, and our actions should be informed by an understanding of the harms done by empires and colonial powers. However, there are some dangers so great, and some evils so bad, that intervention, even intervention by force, is justified.

In many ways, the values SAMCRO holds dear reflect those of the “warrior” ethic typified by the heroes of Homer's epics. Such values include positive qualities, and less desirable qualities, such as ruthlessness, brutality, and a drive for vengeance. Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle promoted alternatives to these warrior values, some of which may provide a way out of the troublesome life of mayhem that J.T. and Jax seek to leave behind. The desire for freedom is strong in humans. Aristotle believes that friendship is one of the most important things in life. The first kind of friendship is based on enjoying pleasurable things together‐riding Harleys, drinking beers, or whatever a person likes to do with others. But we need to recognize our duties beyond the circle of our friends, family, or motorcycle club and have duties even to people who mean nothing to us personally.

Despite the modern trappings the values of the Sons of SAMCRO and their old ladies are even more traditional than those of mainstream society. The parallels between the culture depicted in Sons of Anarchy and the one depicted by Homer's epics make the show philosophically interesting, because moral philosophy in Greece began as a reaction against Homeric values. Just as the Sons bear the Reaper on their cuts, Homeric warriors often decorated their armor with violent images to make clear their status as killers. Those who have drawn blood for the club wear the “Men of Mayhem” patch. There are many ways in which the Homeric heroes outstrip the brutality of SAMCRO. The parallels between SAMCRO's and Homer's conceptions of a good life show us both what is commendable and condemnable about life in the MC.

The chapter examines the questions of how far our duty to be self-sacrificing extends, drawing for examples on the popular television series The Good Place. Various demanding views regarding the extent of our obligations are considered, along with objections against them. Special attention is paid to utilitarianism, and to the objection that it requires us to become "happiness pumps". It is concluded that our duty to be self-sacrificing extends much further than is usually supposed. The chapter discusses the life of Doug Forcett who's famous in the afterlife as the human who most closely guessed the afterlife's true nature in the episode Don't Let the Good Life Pass You By of the show The Good Place. In this episode, Michael and Janet visit Doug. They find him living a life of self‐denial and sacrifice. Michael and Janet had hoped that Doug's life would provide a template for how people should live. One of the reasons that Michael and Janet's rejection of Doug's lifestyle is philosophically interesting is that there is a long tradition of regarding people who sacrifice for the sake of others as heroes. To be fair to utilitarianism and other theories demanding great sacrifice, Doug's self‐sacrifice goes further than merely treating everyone else's interests as being as valuable as his own.

The Daily Show is simultaneously one of the funniest television programs ever made and one of the most earnest voices calling for political change in the United States. Why engage in political mockery like that seen on The Daily Show? Obviously, we like to be entertained, and The Daily Show is very funny; but like the work of other political satirists throughout history, The Daily Show also serves to promote a political agenda. Yet it's precisely The Daily Show's ability to make us laugh that makes it politically useful—people are reminded about important political issues as a side effect. Jon Stewart and the team behind The Daily Show may not be warriors in anybody's army, but signing up to take and give orders in the regular army isn't the only way to contribute to a war effort.

The chapter is an examination of our competing duties to society and to those we have close personal relationships, such as friends and family. Particular attention is paid to the views of Plato and Aristotle on our social and personal responsibilities. It is maintained that the Greek philosophers are right that we should sometimes place our civic duty over the interests of those closest to us. This doesn’t mean that we should never treat our friends and family better than people with whom we have no connection. But it does mean that even apparently heroic acts of personal loyalty can really be acts of moral failure. If we want to do right, it isn’t enough to do well by the people we care about most. We must ask how our actions affect everyone. In some ways, the moral views of these early philosophers move us too far toward civic duty and away from traditional values of loyalty to friends and family. Plato and Aristotle are wrong to turn the citizens into something akin to state property. People are happiest when they are allowed to be in charge of their own lives. Plato is especially wrong that we should encourage loyalty to the state by abolishing the family for the guardians in favor of raising their children in state institutions. The love of a family is good for children’s development. On the other hand, in some ways, the philosophers don’t take us far enough from traditional values in their notions of how to balance family and civic loyalties. Such loyalties raise the possibility of letting family interests get in the way of important civic duties.

George Orwell wondered why oppressed proletariats in the communist and capitalist worlds did not rise up and replace the governments that oppressed them with something better for them. This is a puzzle we still face today, wherever a majority faces exploitation. The chapter examines the question of why exploited peoples don’t replace exploitative governments in their own best interest, whether through revolution or through the ballot box. The question is examined through the lens of the political philosophy and political fiction of George Orwell, with special attention to how his philosophy applies to the modern USA and the Trump administration. It is argued that in the modern US, there are many reasons why the masses are exploited, but the most important is that they don’t understand the nature of their exploitation. Citizens are often isolated in reality bubbles. Our basic human irrationality, hypocrisy, and willingness to rewrite the past, are harnessed and used against us. International conflicts stoke nationalism and prevent the masses from finding a common identity with the masses worldwide. Within the US, conflicts between different social groups pit the masses against one another, and prevent them from recognizing their common condition.

The paper is an examination and critique of the philosophy of science fiction horror of seminal American horror, science fiction and fantasy writer H.P. Lovecraft (1890-1937). Lovecraft never directly offers a philosophy of science fiction horror. However, at different points in his essays and letters, he addresses genres he labels “interplanetary fiction”, “horror”, “supernatural horror”, and “weird fiction”, the last being a broad heading covering both supernatural fiction and science fiction. Taken together, a philosophy of science fiction horror emerges. Central to this philosophy is the juxtaposition of the mysterious, unnatural and alien against a realistic background, in order to produce the emotion that Lovecraft calls “cosmic fear”. This background must not only be scientifically accurate, but must accurately portray human psychology, particularly when humans are faced with the weird and alien. It will be argued that Lovecraft’s prescriptions are overly restrictive and would rule out many legitimate works of science fiction horror art. However, he provides useful insights into the genre.

One reason why the continued popularity of the film Alien (1979) is philosophically interesting is that it bears out the aesthetic theories of seminal American horror-writer H.P. Lovecraft (1890-1937) about what makes good science-fiction horror. Lovecraft never directly offers a philosophy of science-fiction horror. However, at different points in his essays and letters, he address genres he labels “interplanetary fiction”, “horror”, “supernatural horror”, and “weird fiction”, the last being a broad heading covering both supernatural fiction and science fiction. Taken together, a philosophy of science-fiction horror emerges. The chapter is an examination of the philosophy of science fiction horror of H.P. Lovecraft, illustrated using examples drawn from the film Alien.

Graham Priest has argued that changes occur at a moment of change in which objects are in a contradictory state, being in both the state changed from and the state changed to. In “Moments of Change,” the current author rejected this model on the grounds that every change would require an infinite number of other changes, and that for similar regress problems, the model is not compatible with the Leibniz Continuity Condition that Priest appeals to in the model’s support. In “Contradiction and the Instant of Change Revisited,” Priest rightly points out in response that any regress can be stopped by allowing that some changes can occur without a moment of change and that there are some exceptions to the lcc in the case of change. It is argued here that while the regress can be stopped by allowing for exceptions to the rules, the more exceptions that must be allowed and the more similar the excepted cases are to cases of supposed contradiction, the less attractive both the contradictory account of change and the lcc should be. Secondly, it is argued that the intuitions that make the contradictory account of change seem appealing are likely to disappear if we adopt an eternalist model of spacetime, which we should do in any case in order to best accommodate the special theory of relativity. In particular, eternalism undermines our intuitions that there must be a moment of change in order for change to occur, that contradictory moments are required to allow for a Laplacian universe, that motion must be intrinsic to an object at a time, and that change obeys the lcc.

Since the time of Charles Darwin, there has been concern that the theory of evolution provides fuel for skepticism. This paper presents new arguments that humanity's evolutionary origins are grounds for accepting that the universe is not as it appears to be to us. Firstly, it is argued that we should expect to have an incomplete capacity to comprehend the universe: both the mental limitations of all non-human life and the narrow interests of most humans provide evidence for this. Secondly, it is argued that we should expect the universe as it appears to us to have nothing more than a relationship of correlation to the universe as it actually is: both simplicity and the huge number of ways in which the universe may be represented provide reason for evolution to produce such a correlative system

Ever since it was first unleashed in 1818 the story of Victor Frankenstein and his reanimated, stitched-together corpse has inspired intense debate. Can organic life be reanimated using electricity or genetic manipulation? If so, could Frankenstein’s monster really teach itself to read and speak as Mary Shelley imagined? Do monsters have rights, or responsibilities to those who would as soon kill them? What is it about music that so affects Frankenstein’s monster, or any of us? What does Mel Brook’s Frau Blucher say to contemporary eco-feminism? Why are some Frankenstein’s flops and others historic successes? Is there a true Frankenstein? Why are children, but not adults, drawn to Shelley’s monster? And what is a “monster,” anyway? Frankenstein and Philosophy calls 25 philosophers to stitch together these and other questions as they apply to history’s greatest horror franchise. Some chapters treat the Frankenstein films, others the original novel, and yet others the many comic books, novels, and modern adaptations. Together they pay tribute to perhaps the most enduring pop culture icon and the fundamental fears, hopes, and puzzles it raises.

There is a strong intuition that for a change to occur, there must be a moment at which the change is taking place. It will be demonstrated that there are no such moments of change, since no state the changing thing could be in at any moment would suffice to make that moment a moment of change. A moment in which the changing thing is simply in the state changed from or the state changed to cannot be the moment of change, since these states are respectively before and after the change; moreover, to select one of these moments over the other as the moment of change would be arbitrary. A moment in which the changing thing is neither in the state changed from nor in the state changed to cannot be the moment of change, since there are changes for which it is impossible for something to be in neither state. Finally, the moment of change cannot be a moment in which the changing thing is in both the state changed from and the state changed to, as suggested by Graham Priest and others. Even if, like proponents of this view, we are willing to accept the contradictions that the account entails, it is demonstrated that on such a model, every change would require an infinite number of other changes, every change would take an infinite amount of time, and some changes would occur without occurring at any time. Further, the model is grossly counterintuitive, with the exact nature of the counterintuitive element depending on what model of time and space one endorses. Finally, it is demonstrated that this model is incompatible with the Leibniz Continuity Condition

The chapter is a comparison of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of artistic value in literature, with particular focus of the appropriate role of the divine and supernatural. The issue is explored through the lens of Neil Gaiman's popular fantasy novel, American Gods. It is argued that Aristotle’s less restrictive model of literary value better allows literature to benefit us as human beings. In particular, Aristotle's appreciation of the need for dark themes and counter-factual portrayals of the universe allows for much richer art. The discussion of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of art is demonstrated to be relevant to modern artistic debate though consideration of how their views apply to modern fantasy literature.

A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider L If we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L is an example of a Liar sentence. Several philosophers have proposed that the Liar paradox, and related paradoxes, can be solved by accepting the contradictions that these paradoxes seem to imply (including Priest 2006, Rescher and Brandom 1980). The theory that there are true ..

Writing philosophy to be read by people who are not professional philosophers ought to be central to the work of professional philosophers. Writing for the public should be central to their work because their professional end is to produce ideas for use by people who are not professional philosophers. Philosophy is unlike most disciplines in that the ideas produced by professional philosophers generally have to be understood by a person before they can be of any use to them. As a tool for delivering philosophical ideas to the public, writing philosophical works is invaluable. The need to write philosophy directly for the public should be clear regardless of one’s conception of the value of philosophy, since writing directly for the public is in the spirit of all the most popular modern philosophical movements.