Gregory Robson

What we may call the Normative Representativeness Requirement (NRR) is a nec- essary condition on any successful objection to a political-economic system that is decentralized and profit-oriented. This article applies the NRR to what I call “The Radical Critique” of the profit system. I argue that this critique, which is not only historically important (as reported by Marx (Capital: a critique of political econ- omy, C.H. Kerr and Company, Chicago, 1867)) but also continues to circulate (e.g., as reported by Cohen (Why not socialism?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009), as reported by Piketty (Capital in the twenty-first century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2014)), does not meet the NRR. The Radical Critique of diverse forms of the profit system (e.g., laissez-faire or a welfare-state) suffers from a fatal flaw that renders its logical force at best undiscernible.

This article addresses one of the several moral arguments for the state, the social contract argument, showing that this argument has been inadequately justified. The terms of any contract are determined by negotiation among the parties to the contract. The terms of any contract cannot be known absent actual negotiation to produce them. Social contract theorists widely believe that actual negotiation and actual agreement with a social contract did not occur, so their theories rest on hypothetical scenarios in which people would agree to the contract’s terms. Because actual negotiations did not produce a social contract, one cannot know its terms. This calls into question whether people could be obligated to abide by a social contract whose terms were not negotiated and hence are unknowable.

This article explores a Neo-Aristotelian approach to stakeholder theory grounded in the virtue of justice and the concept of the common good. While mainstream stakeholder theory integrates normative and instrumental dimensions, it faces persistent conceptual challenges—particularly concerning stakeholder identity and the lack of principled criteria for distinguishing between stakeholder types, their normative claims on a firm, and their relative importance. In response, this article takes a virtue ethical approach that proposes the virtue of justice as the key epistemological and moral foundation for stakeholder identification and corporate responsibility. In particular, it redefines stakeholder classification based on the different parts of justice, namely, distributive justice for organizational stakeholders, commutative justice for commercial stakeholders, and political justice for civic or public stakeholders. Finally, the article addresses the challenge of reasonability in stakeholder theory by showing how Aristotelian rhetorical knowledge—based on shared narratives and endoxa—connects philosophical principles with actual business practices. This justice-based framework enhances the moral coherence and practical applicability of stakeholder theory, enabling firms to navigate ethical complexity while contributing meaningfully to the development of persons, organizations, and society at large.

Elizabeth Anderson (2017) argues that many corporate bosses exercise a form of imperial governance over their employees, controlling everything from their bathroom breaks to their lives outside of work. The issue is not the use of power per se, but the considerable power employers have over others and can use at any point. Gregory Robson and James R. Otteson (2025) detail why this “dominance dynamic” of employer power over employees is, in fact, worse, for reasons connected to the workplace analyses of Adam Smith. In this Commentary, we discuss Anderson’s proposed response to the dominance dynamic and suggest instead three solutions of our own.

This essay examines the role of action-guiding theorists of justice in articulating the demands of justice. Section I discusses challenges that theorists face from epistemic and social complexity. Section II considers the idea of theorists of justice thinking of theories as maps that help them (or citizens) navigate their way out of ignorance of social facts and complexity. This part puts in one place leading accounts of moral theorizing as mapmaking by David Schmidtz and Linda Zagzebski. Section III both refines extant discussion of theorizing as mapmaking and develops a novel account of the role of theorists. Section IV explores multi-level theorizing about justice as a kind of theorizing that goes beyond guiding action either non-theoretically, based largely on intuitions, or theoretically, based on highly abstract principles of justice.

It has been 40 years since the publication of Alvin Plantinga’s highly influential “Advice to Christian Philosophers.” Our goal is to follow in Plantinga’s footsteps by setting out advice for the next generation of Christians taking up the vocation of philosophy. In the process, we seek to dramatically broaden the scope of Plantinga’s advice. He focused on thinking about how best to carry out academic research in philosophy as a Christian. We explore the life of a Christian philosopher in the context of the profession, the classroom, public philosophy, and, yes, research as well. We end by thinking about the next forty years and what Christian philosophy might look like in the future.

This article examines how and how far distributism is compatible with socialism and capitalism and how distributist political economy might enhance the holiness of society. After preliminaries on Christianity and political economy, I describe distributism in the light of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) and suggest that distributism is incompatible with traditional socialism. After this I consider the potential compatibility of distributism and a version of capitalism, first indicating inadequacies in G. K. Chesterton’s and Hilaire Belloc’s understandings of capitalism. The article then argues that distributist capitalism is achievable if and because holiness in a life is often supported by wealth, but that wealth need not include productive property. A wealth-based conception of distribution that is fit for modern commercial society, which I call Distributism 2.0 (or “distributalism”), emphasizes attending to God’s will in the day-to-day decisions that together constitute the bulk of the life of any person or business.

Political philosophers old and new have defended the twin claims that (i) traditions embody wisdom, and (ii) transforming tradition based on aprioristic theory threatens to disregard that wisdom. This article argues that while a priori theorizing about justice is indeed epistemically valuable, a priori theories of justice usually tend to merit moderate to low credences. The article develops an account of what I call the “A Priori Theorizing Thesis,” which holds that such theses are likely to be false and dangerous when implemented, and the “Non-substitution Thesis,” which holds that theorists should generally be disinclined to substitute their judgment for the wisdom of social traditions and norms. Along the way, Burke's positive contributions are emphasized and his hyperbole ignored.

:According to an influential argument in business ethics and economics, firms are normatively required to maximize their contributions to social welfare, and the way to do this is to maximize their profits. Against Michael Jensen's version of the argument, I argue that even if firms are required to maximize their social welfare contributions, they are not necessarily required to maximize their profits. I also consider and reply to Waheed Hussain's ‘personal sphere’ critique of Jensen. My distinct challenge to Jensen seems to me fatal to any view according to which firms are normatively required to maximize their profits.

Challenging popular and philosophical views, I argue for three main claims. First, political leaders’ worldviews have a deep and underappreciated influence on their official conduct. Second, citizens have a robust claim right to inquire into leaders’ worldviews, and leaders have a corresponding moral duty to provide responses to such inquiries. Third, it is worthwhile for citizens to engage in such inquiry. A citizenry that took this argument seriously would engage in far more searching political inquiry.

This article introduces the Normative Representativeness Requirement (NRR) on any moral objection to a decentralized, profit-oriented system of political economy. I develop and defend the NRR and then show why the most important recent critique of the profit system—which I call The Moderate Critique (developed by, for instance, Elizabeth Anderson)—fails to meet the NRR. This article also defends the radical claim that no objection to the profit system itself, rather than just key aspects or salient instances of it, succeeds in meeting the NRR. Critics of the profit system should not seek an alternative to the profit system, but, at most, an alternative within it.

Elizabeth Anderson claims that the prevailing culture of business is one of domination. “Most workplace governments in the United States are dictatorships, in which bosses.. don’t merely govern workers; they dominate them” (2017, p. xxii; italics in the original). If this diagnosis is correct, then the culture of business poses a significant threat to human liberty, as each year millions of people in the employ of businesses spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the job. This essay provides a further argument supporting Anderson’s analysis, by extending her treatment of Adam Smith and drawing on his claim about the potentially mind-numbing effects on workers of extreme division of labor. Smith’s analysis, though consistent with Anderson’s, implies that the problem is more worrisome than she allows, and accordingly that Anderson’s own remedy might be insufficient. Our Anderson/Smith argument suggests that worker unfreedom might warrant more aggressive institutional remedy.

The consequences of correctly implementing a normative political theory arguably bear on its acceptability. A theory whose correct implementation permits slavery is highly implausible. We defend a claim about incorrect implementation. We argue that normative political theories that will predictably be put to bad use deserve harsher assessments than theories that will predictably be put to better use. Theories that key political actors will predictably invoke to justify bad policy recommendations are bad theories, even if those recommendations are not logical consequences of the theories (even in conjunction with well-established factual propositions). However, standard discussions of political theories ignore such “misapplications” when it comes to assessing the principles and values proclaimed by those theories. We reject this view because the action guidance that a normative political theory effectively provides is mediated by political actors’ prior beliefs. At the limit, these actors may regard public policies as specifying principles that the theory proclaims, as something different from regarding such policies as causally effective in achieving the ends or enforcing the rights proclaimed by those principles. As a result, political actors see themselves as exempted from the need to undertake careful causal analysis. Morally defensible action guidance requires, then, that those principles be qualified by empirically-grounded policy constraints. Normative political theories qualified in those ways constitute theoretical improvements, that is, improvements on the action guidance that the theories provide on their own.

The first of its kind, this anthology in the burgeoning field of technology ethics offers students and other interested readers 32 chapters, each written in an accessible and lively manner specifically for this volume. The chapters are conveniently organized into five sections: I. Perspectives on Technology and its Value II. Technology and the Good Life III. Computer and Information Technology IV. Technology and Business V. Biotechnologies and Enhancement A hallmark of the volume is multidisciplinary contributions both in analytic and continental philosophy and across several hot-button topics of interest to students, including the ethics of autonomous vehicles, psychotherapeutic phone apps, and bio-enhancement of cognition and in sports. The volume editors, both teachers of technology ethics, have compiled a set of original and timely chapters that will advance scholarly debate and stimulate fascinating and lively classroom discussion. An online eResources site provides a glossary of all relevant terms, sample classroom activities/ discussion questions relevant for chapters, and links to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries and other relevant online materials. Key Features: Examines the most pivotal ethical questions around our use of technology, equipping readers to better understand technology's promises and perils Explores throughout a central tension raised by technological progress: maintaining social stability vs. pursuing dynamic social improvements Provides ample coverage of the pressing issues of free speech and productive online discourse.

On a standard Aristotelian account, the moral virtues and vices stand in an asymmetric relationship to one another. To help explain this asymmetry, I argue that the vices share significantly less common structure than many think. That there are many ways for agents to get it wrong gives us prima facie reason to think that the vices lack a robust common structure. Further, the most promising candidates for a common structure of the vices fall short. These are that (a) the vices have the common structure of being excesses and deficiencies, (b) the vices result from agents' unreflectively taking their inclinations as their ends, and, relatedly, (c) the vices result from rational corruption. Argument (b), which Terence Irwin and others endorse, is the most promising one, so I focus on it. But it, too, faces weighty objections. I conclude that none of these important arguments establishes the existence of a robust common structure of the moral vices. The great variety of moral vices is a puzzling phenomenon that continues to stand in need of explanation.

Political liberals on the left (e.g., Rawls) and right (e.g., Nozick) have long been concerned with the moral justification of coercive legal structures. I argue that anyone who publicly advocates a new coercive law is under a moral duty to those whom the law might negatively affect. The duty is to say that the law would be impactful and why its impacts (e.g., its coerciveness and welfare effects) are worth having all-things-considered. This is a defeasible duty of transparency and disclosure. By doing their duty, citizens would better respect each other and even transform public discourse as we know it.

I defend convergentist realism from counterarguments that appeal to apparently deep and widespread moral disagreement. Pace recent claims by antirealists, I first argue that scenarios such as the prominent “Magistrate and the Mob” case betray cognitive defects in subjects, such as partiality, that we would not find in ideal agents. After this, I defend three reasons to expect cross-cultural disagreement on moral cases even if convergentist realism is true. These defusing explanations concern individual and group moral development and the moral models on which agents rely. While developing my defense of moral realism, I aim for comprehensive engagement with responses to arguments by Doris, Plakias, and others that have been dispersed across several related articles.

Surprisingly few articles have focused on Aquinas’s particular conception of necessary beings in the Third Way, and many scholars have espoused inaccurate or incomplete views of that conception. My aim in this paper is both to offer a corrective to some of those views and, more importantly, to provide compelling answers to the following two questions about the necessary beings of the Third Way. First, how exactly does Aquinas conceive of these necessary beings? Second, what does Aquinas seek to accomplish in the third stage of the Third Way? In answering these questions, I challenge prominent contemporary understandings of the necessary beings of the Third Way.