Gregor Schäfer

In his commentary on Hegel, Subject-Object: Erläuterungen zu Hegel (1951), Ernst Bloch – who certainly is the most prominent philosopher of Utopia in 20th century – criticizes the closed structure of Hegel’s system as the ‘spell of anamnesis’ that makes it impossible to think something really new. At the same time, he describes the structure of Hegel’s system as the simultaneity of the presence and the absence of the whole, the totum: a structure he calls a ‘utopian presence’. Whilst Hegel - as well as Bloch criticize any abstract understanding of Utopia that opposes it to the present world in an external way, according to this interpretation, a utopian structure can be found at the very heart of Hegel’s system. Together with Bloch’s reference to Schelling’s late positive philosophy – as focusing on a drive striving beyond any abstract-identical, un-historical understanding of presence – and together with references to obvious utopian aspects in Kant’s and Fichte’s practical-moral philosophy, German Idealism plays a central systematic role in Bloch’s concept of (concrete) Utopia. Similarly, this constellation allows one to discern Utopia as a systematic – both theoretical and practical – structure present already in German Idealism itself. Although Bloch explicitly refers to these connections, the role of German Idealism as a central historical and systematic source for his concept of Utopia is still widely neglected in research on Bloch – as well as Utopia and its methodologically and systematically constitutive role are still a marginalised topic in research on German Idealism. At a time of crisis such as our present – characterised by its ongoing contradictions, uncertainty, and openness – addressing this question is particularly relevant not only theoretically but also practically. The present volume aims to respond to this desideratum by dwelling on this constellation and discussing its systematic and critical relevance from different perspectives – be it with regard to the epoch of German Idealism itself (particularly in the work of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, but also in that of other figures belonging to this tradition such as Hölderlin) or to the dialogue of post-idealist philosophy with German Idealism (such as – apart from Bloch – in Marxism and Critical Theory). Keywords: Utopia/Concept of Utopia/Utopian Thinking, Classical German Philosophy/German Idealism, Post-Idealist Philosophy, Critical Theory, Philosophical Systems.

The topic of this issue is Hegel’s account of action. To act typically means to realise one’s goals through the exercise of one’s intention – that is, one acts upon reasons that justify one’s action as true and good. If one fails to act, one’s reasons are obstructed – either by external circumstances, such as unfavourable conditions, or byone’s inertia of intelligence, the additional judgement required from the agent to translate one’s intention into concrete action. On this view, action is understood as a predicate of ability: the power to act is conceived independently of its actual conditions. In this light, whether an action is realised becomes irrelevant, since its validity is not empirically verifiable. In other words, if action is understood as mere potentiality – prior to entering into relations with the empirical world – its effects on others, or how they judge it, become entirely irrelevant. The agent, in this sense, retains the authority to insist that, regardless of what one actually does, one’s intention remains perfectly valid. Hegel criticises this model. It may turn out that, in acting from intention, the agent is mistaken. Or even if one’s reasons are sound, the outcome could still be wrong. For instance, helping others may be a valid principle, but the way it is employed could be flawed if those one intends to help are, in fact, hindered or harmed by one’s actions. In other words, knowing that an action conforms to an ability (potentia) is never enough to rule out the possibility that something about it is wrong in the particular situation. That possibility could only be excluded if the content of the action were realised in its concrete exercise – a notion that undermines the very idea of ability as such. Therefore, Hegel insists that action cannot be separated from one’s concrete doing. On Hegel’s terms: the actuality of purpose is the purpose of acting. Because the consequences of action partake within the causality of the action itself, as a result every action is, by its very concept, incongruent with the agent’s prior intention. Hegel’s prominent critique of moral action – as an action that focuses solely on intentions and, insofar as it takes place in the actual form of social and political life, comes into conflict with its consequences – is evidently connected with this structure. If no action can be separated from its actual consequences, then what distinguishes a successful action from a failed one? And if action is mediated by the incongruence between intention and outcome, what does this imply for the “truth” of the entire process of the action? What is – from this perspective – a “wrong” action, what is a “true” action, and how do they relate to each other in understanding the entire process of action? Moreover, if action cannot be free from intention or validated by its outcome, but both of them can be explained only through the whole of its process, how then should we interpret the ethics of Hegel’s philosophy of action (as both a deontological and a utilitarian or pragmatist interpretation would be misleading)? The present issue aims to explore these questions and the nexus of related topics (e.g., virtuous action, political action, historical action) from varied perspectives, all of which stem from the following conceptual tension: for Hegel, action resides in one’s concrete doing – there is no action outside of what one actually does, and in this sense, action cannot be validated by one’s intention in its entirety. Yet this does not mean that its validity depends on its consequences; rather, both intention and outcome are explained in light of knowledge discerned through action. While Hegel’s understanding of action has gained growing interest in recent scholarship, this aspect remains largely overlooked and underdeveloped. Beginning with the Phenomenology of Spirit, traversing through the Science of Logic, and culminating in the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History, this question remains highly relevant for Hegel’s entire practical philosophy. Specifically, this issue aims to explore, among others, the following set of problems as articulated in Hegel’s practical philosophy: - How is practical knowledge related to action, and what grounds this relation? - In what ways do intention and outcome figure within the causality of action, and across different kinds of action (virtuous, political, historical, etc.)? - What is the relation between failed and successful action? Are these distinct or simply different aspects of one and the same concept of action? - How can we distinguish action from the notions of ability, power, or disposition? - Is action independent of, or dependent upon, other competent subjects, and does this imply that it is intersubjective and social in its origin? - What does it mean to concretely exercise action within specific forms of social and political life? Keywords: G.W.F. Hegel, philosophy of action, practical philosophy

Hegel’s original project of a new, i.e., speculative logic – as presented in his Science of Logic – is situated in a historical moment that witnesses the failure of old, dogmatist metaphysics and the loss of its both theoretical and practical relevance. Confronted with Kant’s critique – as Hegel’s diagnosis of this situation has it –, metaphysics has lost its theoretical foundation as well as, in parallel with that, its roots and being embedded in real life and real needs. By understanding itself as the “actual metaphysics (eigentliche Metaphysik),” Hegel’s speculative logic thereby is performed as a critical transformation of old metaphysics. The absolute, in this configuration, is not any more a pre-given substance or substratum but – logically – conceptualized as absolute idea and absolute method: as the process of a transformation and change that necessarily is not limited to the sphere of Science of Logic but – unleashing an overall process – becomes a driving force in the spheres encompassed by Hegel’s philosophy of reality – of nature and spirit – as well. The present essay puts forward that a Hegelian concept of emancipation should be understood within this setting of a speculative transformation of metaphysics. Becoming a logic of immanent change that replaces old metaphysics, Hegel’s new metaphysics understands the world (as a central concept of cosmology in old metaphysics) as the historical-political world in which emancipation becomes a real possibility and necessity. Instead of being a given substance, the metaphysical absolute – understood as the absolute method’s recursive movement – cannot any more be limited (according to the traditional formula) to a first philosophy (prima philosophia) but rather takes the form of a last philosophy (ultima philosophia): of a metaphysics that is what it is only at the end and as the end of the entire system’s dialectical process. Being the concise name of this liberating process and marking its visibility in the political world, emancipation thereby is a force that is both present in the world and in the multiplicity of its ongoing emancipatory movements and that, at the same time, inscribes in them an “absolute tendency” towards a ‘metaphysical’ conclusion or end as it is articulated, in Hegel’s systematic conception, by absolute spirit’s recursive systematicity. Importantly, in contrast to interpretations of Hegel’s social-political philosophy that, whilst pointing to its critical and emancipatory potential, intend to separate it from its strong ‘metaphysical’ framework – i.e., from the concepts of the absolute idea, absolute method, and absolute spirit, from the form of systematicity –, this systematic understanding of emancipation thereby rather intrinsically depends on these concepts. By transforming old metaphysics in speculative logic, Hegel does not abandon metaphysics. Metaphysics rather becomes – as being embedded in the world and its ongoing struggles and battles for liberation, as an emblematic point of reference of spirit’s work of liberation through world history – a new metaphysics: i.e., a metaphysics of the new, of emancipation. Keywords: Absolute Idea, Absolute Method, Absolute Spirit, Emancipation, Metaphysics, Old vs. New, Speculative Logic.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte presents his writings in two sections: Whilst the Doctrine of Science (Wissenschaftslehre), in the sequence of its different elaborations from the early Jena period to the later Berlin period, is the central point of reference in his theoretical philosophy, the works on issues such as his conceptions of nature, anthropology, moral philosophy and ethics, politics, economy, history, or religion – including the exoteric writings addressing the general public such as the Addresses to the German Nation – obviously are part of what one rather would understand as practical philosophy. This external division, however, does not imply that one could separate these two sides in the form of an abstract dualism: It is, on the contrary, rather from the very beginning onward that, in the post-Kantian context, Fichte is concerned with the challenge of how to systematically-methodologically bring together theory and its practical ‘application,’ thinking and acting, ideality and reality. For Fichte, philosophy is not just empirically but intrinsically connected with historical time, i.e., with the present epoch facing, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the beginning of political modernity and its challenges, including all the practical needs and interests inscribed in this present time – hereby articulating, as the title of his philosophy of history prominently has it, The Characteristics of the Present Age. As well as the Doctrine of Science, strictly following the methodological path of its own logic, is characterized by a performative dimension according to which systematic thinking realizes itself, out of the very immanence of its systematicity, as a practical activity engaging ‘our’ own participation, the portions of Fichte’s philosophy that address practical interests cannot be separated from the theoretical foundation. Constituting a complex unity, the two spheres are connected throughout, resulting in an overall structure and process in which theoretical philosophy – precisely as theoretical philosophy – is practical, forced to realize itself, and in which, at the same time, practical philosophy embodies and performs the systematic core of theoretical reflection instead of being its merely external application. The contributions of this collection focuses dwell on the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy in Fichte from various perspectives, addressing topics such as: · The immanently practical, ethical-political character of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science (in any of its elaborations), resp. of his entire systematic conception. · The systematic place and function of Fichte’s conceptions of practical issues such as ethics, politics, or history and the unity and tension between ideality and reality hereby at stake. · Connections between the transcendental structure of philosophy and praxis in Fichte and/or, with a focus on Fichte, in other philosophers. · Fichte’s conceptions of nature, of body and embodiment, of moral and political acting, of history, art, or religion as constitutive links between ideality and reality. · Different aspects of the relationships between idealism and realism in Fichte and, focusing on Fichte, in German Idealism in general. · Fichte’s understanding of the present age as an integral part of his philosophy. · The multiple forms, styles, and modalities Fichte applies in presenting his philosophy and the performative and rhetoric figures of addressing and activating the ‘public’ ( Publikum) as a practical ‘us’ or of personifications such as the ‘vocation of man’ or the ‘scholar’ hereby constitutively involved. · Fichte’s understanding of the specifically performative character of thinking and of acting. · Possible dialogues between Fichte’s philosophy and other philosophers and philosophical conceptions – such as particularly, in German Idealism, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling or, in the post-idealist context, the Marxist, phenomenological, or existentialist traditions – related to the question of the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy. · The critical potential of this overall theme and its possible impact on contemporary discussions and debates.

Marxism understood its relationship to Hegel’s absolute idealism – following re-spective programmatical formulas in Marx, Engels, and Lenin – as the procedure of a materialistic “reversal” (“Umkehrung,” or “Umstülpung”). Taking, however, the complex structure of Hegelian idealism seriously the question arises as to how such a “reversal” – and the separation between system and method hereby implied – is systematically and methodologically possible at all, going beyond a mere meta-phor. Among the philosophically most ambitious projects intending to clarify this question and its theoretical and practical implications is the German Marxist philos-opher’s Hans Heinz Holz (1927-2011). By taking Hegel’s speculative philosophy and its systematic framework – and, along with it, the entire pre-Hegelian tradition of speculative metaphysics – as seriously as, both from part of the Marxist tradition and of non-Marxist philosophy, hardly anyone does, he puts forward that Marxism ultimately remains structurally dependent on Hegel’s entire system and should be understood, based on an elaborated understanding of the “speculative” nature of philosophy, as its “materialistic reading” or “translation.” It is the aim of the present paper to outline and – from a Hegelian perspective – critically discuss the program of this “materialistic reading.” By so doing the paper points to the relevance of this subject not only for Marxism but – as its particular focus – for interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy that are interested both in its strong systematic claims and in its – specific – metaphysical function in terms of our practical-political orientation in the world.

Situated in the constellation of post-Kantian philosophy, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and Hegel’s absolute idealism certainly belong to the most elaborated systematic conceptions of the epoch of Classical German Philosophy. Marking the bifurcation of two distinctive ways after Kant, up to our very present, Fichte and Hegel are often interpreted as two alternatives between which one would have to choose: Whilst, from a Fichtean perspective, Hegel’s speculative philosophy may be rejected as a metaphysics that disregards the strict criteria of transcendental foundation, from a Hegelian perspective, Fichte’s transcendental idealism may be seen as just a link in the genealogy between Kant and Hegel that, in a limited way, indeed may have its legitimacy, but that, at the same time, also should be overcome at the end. These settings, however, tend to oversee the much more complex ongoing dynamics and possible connections in the tension-filled process between Fichte and Hegel. One thereby should not only take into consideration that Hegel’s critique of Fichte – as outlined starting from Hegel’s Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (1801) and, as a critique of the Kantian-Fichtean conception of right and morality, the Essay on Natural Law (1802/03) – points to Fichte’s early Jena period. A critical re-evaluation of Fichte’s entire philosophical work, including his later Berlin period – with its more and more relevant emphasis on the terminology of the absolute instead of that of the I’s subjectivity as well as on intersubjectivity – never has taken place from Hegel’s part. It also is worth noting that Fichte’s critique of objective idealism focuses on early Schelling (who, at this time, was accompanied by Hegel). However, from its part as well it has never had the opportunity to criticize Hegel’s mature overall conception, which was developed only after Fichte’s death in 1814. Notwithstanding its rejection of subjective idealism, it is characteristic for Hegel’s absolute idealism that, in it, subjectivity and finitude – as ascribed to Fichte’s position – are not just overcome, but play a constitutive role as a persistent moment without which speculative infinity could not be thought at all. Furthermore, Hegel’s turn towards a speculative logic, with all the differences hereby at stake, indeed shares many motives and concerns with Fichte’s particular conception of transcendental logic as the critique of a merely formal and static logic. And for both of them, in their practical philosophy, the overcoming of a formalist morality towards a concrete material ethics, combined with the systematic relevance of a philosophy of history, becomes more and more central after 1800. Even if a closer reading of this consellation, finally, must re-confirm a profound difference between the two conceptions – of Hegel’s speculative logic and ethical conception on the one hand, of Fichte’s transcendental philosophy and the pertinent role of the moral ‘Ought’ and a more utopian dimension in his practical philosophy (as harshly criticized by Hegel) on the other hand –, it surely can provide a much more specified, subtle, and complex picture. According to this, Fichte and Hegel may not that much operate as the representatives of two fix positions but rather as the participants of an ongoing dynamic project – constitutive for the entire epoch of Classical German Philosophy and the common problems and questions it faces – full of tensions, convergences, and possible bridges. Against this background, the present special issue of the journal Fichte-Studien focuses on approaches that critically re-examine the connections between Fichte and Hegel both in their differences and in their similarities and possible dialogues - including topics such as: - Re-examinations of Fichte’s and Hegel’s overall systematic conceptions and frameworks of transcendental idealism/logic and speculative idealism/logic as well as of the differences and/or similarities between specific portions and concepts in them – such as (transcendental/logical) subjectivity, the status of the absolute and the idea (resp. ideality) in both conceptions, or the understanding of system/systematicity, method, nature, or religion. - Re-examinations of the status of reality/the real in both conceptions, resp. of the relationships between idealism and realism at stake. - Comparisons between Fichte’s and Hegel’s practical philosophy with regard to their, in each case, constitutive systematic functions – i.e., the fundamental role of praxis – and both to their differences and common interests – such as the status of morality, ethics, practical reason, and ideality, the struggle for a material ethics and a philosophy of history in its systematic relevance, or the concerns with other practical issues such as the French Revolution and its contradictory process and global impacts (including, particularly, its impacts on Germany), economy, political acting/subjectivation, or the problem of war and peace. - Settings that relate the process between Fichte and Hegel to other important figures of Classical German Philosophy – such as Kant, Schelling, or Jacobi. - Propositions for how we should deal with the constellation between Fichte and Hegel with regard to our own present – both in its theoretical and practical debates and challenges – and for what actually could be the critical potential and relevance of this constellation.

In spite of Kant’s rigorous critique of the Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics, questions about the systematical role central configurations of Leibniz’ philosophy play not only in early Kant but also in the idealist systems of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling cannot be neglected. What connections can be traced, e.g., between Leibniz’ Monadology on the one hand and Fichte’s Doctrine of Science, Schelling’s conception of a philosophy of nature, Hegel’s speculative logic, or the overall idealist claim for systematicity on the other hand? And what continuities can be identified between the metaphysical-theological problem of a theodicy and the philosophies of religion and history in German Idealism? What common issues can be found between Leibniz’ search for an encyclopedic philosophy and Hegel’s project of an Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences? In what respect are Leibniz’ – also politically relevant – conceptions of perspectivity and of an ontologically founded reflexivity and (inter-) subjectivity present in central configurations of German Idealism? Keynotes: G.W. Leibniz, J.G. Fichte, G.W.F. Hegel, I. Kant, F.W.J. Schelling; Classical German Philosophy / German Idealism, Metaphysics, Monadology, Philosophy of the 18th Century, Rationalism, System.

Fragestellungen zur politischen Theologie finden in der akademischen und philosophischen Diskussion der Gegenwart zunehmend wieder Interesse. Der Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts sieht sich mit einer Wiederkehr – oder Permanenz – religiöser Phänomene und Symptome konfrontiert, wie sie im Bereich des politischen und sozialen Lebens überwunden schienen. Über eine oberflächliche Beschreibung hinausgehend provoziert diese Diagnose ein kritisches Nachdenken über den Status und die Perspektiven des Zustands der «säkularisierten» Moderne und der Gegenwart und über das Wesen der «Säkularisierung» überhaupt. Welches sind die Bedingungen, von denen die – scheinbar – säkularisierte Moderne und ihre politisch-moralischen Ansprüche abhängen? Inwiefern sind Figuren der politischen Theologie, zumal in der Linie der jüdisch-christlichen Tradition, für die Deutung und das begriffliche Erfassen der Moderne und der Gegenwart hilfreich, inwiefern bilden sie gar deren notwendige – geschichtsphilosophische oder normative – Voraussetzung? Während diese Fragestellungen in der philosophischen Diskussion des 20. Jahrhunderts prominent etwa bei Carl Schmitt oder Erik Peterson, beim jungen Georg Lukács, bei Ernst Bloch, Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin oder Jacob Taubes, bei Karl Löwith, Eric Voegelin oder Hans Blumenberg oder, in der Gegenwart, bei Michael Walzer oder Giorgio Agamben ihre Formulierungen finden, ist ihr historischer und systematischer Ursprung in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie bisher nur wenig erforscht. Probleme und Konstellationen aber, die sich – in einem weit verstandenen Sinne – als «politisch-theologisch» bezeichnen lassen, bestimmen die thematischen Gegenstände und die innere Struktur des nachkantischen Idealismus in vielfältiger Weise: Angefangen beim Ältesten Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus lassen sie sich – im komplexen Spannungsfeld von Religions-, Geschichts-, Moralphilosophie und politischer Philosophie, doch auch von Metaphysik und Ästhetik – nicht nur beim frühen Hegel und in dessen reifem System, sondern auch bei Fichte und Schelling finden. Die Frage, welche Verbindungslinien sich von diesem Ursprung her zu den prominenten späteren Positionen politischer Theologie und deren gegenwärtigen Verhandlungen und (Re-)Artikulationen nachzeichnen lassen und wie diese sich von hier aus allenfalls ergänzen oder kritisch befragen ließen, drängt sich daher auf. Die Beiträge des Bandes denken über diese Problematik unter verschiedenen Aspekten nach. Welche sachliche Tragweite haben Figuren politischer Theologie bei Fichte, Hegel und Schelling und in deren (wirklichem oder möglichem) Dialog mit der jüdisch-christlichen Tradition oder anderen früheren und späteren philosophischen Positionen? Welches kritische, emanzipatorische oder utopische Potential lässt sich mit diesen Figuren in Zusammenhang bringen und welche systematischen Funktionen üben sie aus? Auf welche Herausforderungen geben die politisch-theologischen Konzepte und religionsphilosophischen Entwürfe des Deutschen Idealismus in der Moderne – und angesichts der Komplexität ihrer mannigfaltigen Herausforderungen und Krisen – eine Antwort? Wie ließe sich im Rückgang auf diese Konzeptionen die Gegenüberstellung von «säkular» und «nicht-säkular», von «theologisch» und «politisch» womöglich grundsätzlich in Frage stellen? Ferner: Welche Differenzierungen im Begriff «politischer Theologie» könnten von hier aus – in Auseinandersetzung mit späteren Interpretationen und Bestimmungen – vorgenommen werden? Und was, schließlich, könnte damit im Blick auf eine kritische Durchdringung unserer Gegenwart und auf ihre Ansprüche und Anforderungen zuletzt auf dem Spiel stehen?

Having its historical base in the discussions about the legacy and possible future of Hegel’s philosophical system after his death in 1831, Left Hegelianism became one of the most dynamic and influential strands in 19th century philosophy and public-intellectual life. Initially focused on the question of how to interpret Christian religion and its dogmata, it soon became a very practical issue addressing urgent socio-economic, political-ethical, and cultural-aesthetic problems in the post-Hegelian moment and its multiple crises and challenges in the explosive pre-1848 period. The originally religious concerns of Left Hegelianism – starting from the book Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet (1835) written by David Friedrich Strauß, who, in the defense of his book, coined the term “Left” / “Young” Hegelianism as opposed to both the “Right” / “Old” Hegelianism (around, e.g., Philipp Konrad Marheineke, Carl Friedrich Göschel, or Georg Andreas Gabler) and to the Hegelian “center” (around Karl Rosenkranz) – hereby opened up the complex field of philosophical-political debates including, influencing, and provoking, through manifold bifurcations and mediations, figures such as Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner, David Friedrich Strauß, Karl Friedrich Köppen, Bruno Bauer, Gustav Julius, Moses Hess, Mikhail Bakunin, August Cieszkowski, Edgar Bauer, or Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. At stake here are issues such as the concept of critique and its possible impact on society, the relationship between philosophy and extra-philosophical reality, the engagement for democratic progress, equal rights, and human emancipation, or – prompting more radical answers such as can be found in Marxism and anarchism – the necessity of revolutionizing the entire existing world and overcoming its institutions (such as, ultimately, the state). Beyond this historical embedding of Left Hegelianism in the post-Hegelian situation, the systematic question arises as to what Left Hegelianism in fact is and whether it is still relevant in our present. As Jürgen Habermas once stated, the socio-political and intellectual predicament of our time is to some extent still rooted in the split between Left and Right Hegelianism and the main questions and concerns at stake. Furthermore – not least against the background of recent receptions and actualizations of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly his practical philosophy – the question becomes relevant as to how Left Hegelianism could be characterized in terms of Hegel’s own conceptions. What can – in the light of an immanent interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy – be understood as “left-wing,” as critical, emancipatory, or revolutionary? Is the historical opposition between the critical impetus of Left Hegelianism and the rather conservative intentions of “orthodox,” Right Hegelianism (supposedly closer to Hegel himself) still valid? Or could it be appropriate to decipher a Left Hegelian core already in Hegel himself – given the notoriously difficult problem of how to interpret the relationship between reason and present actuality (which in Hegel, obviously, cannot be interpreted as an immediate identity but rather may imply an ongoing contradiction and unresolved crisis within the present)? This special issue aims to address these and related questions and invites, for this purpose, contributions from different perspectives.

Der Aufsatz votiert gegen eine bloß historisierende Hegel-Rezeption und fordert in Anknüpfung an Adorno, die Radikalität von Hegels Philosophie als kritisches Korrektiv in Bezug auf unsere Gegenwart ernster zu nehmen. Hierbei deutet er Hegels Idealismus als ein dynamisches Konzept, das seine realbegriffliche Entwicklung über sich hinaus in eine Verwirklichung der Philosophie fortsetzt. Zudem zeigt er an den Epochenübergängen in Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie sowie an dessen Bestimmung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft Bruchstellen auf, die eine Öffnung sowie die Entwicklung von Neuem gewähren, womit bei Hegel eine Verschränkung von systematischer Geschlossenheit und geschichtlicher Offenheit zu konstatieren sei.

In 1923 Hungarian-German philosopher Georg Lukács published his early opus magnum History and Class Consciousness. Being situated at the very intersection of practical issues – vis-à-vis the deep crisis of World War I and in the middle of the revolutionary movements in its aftermath – on the one hand and sophisticated theory on the other hand the book marks an event not only in revolutionary politics – provoking a harsh critique from part of the official communist movement as well as an intensive reception particularly within the trajectories of the political-intellectual life of the 1960s – but also in philosophy. Within what one often, together with Gramsci’s and Korsch’s contemporary projects, refers to as “Hegel-Marxism”, History and Class Consciousness surely is the most systematic conception. The critique of reification – as elucidating the very structure of modern capitalist society and the forms of its thinking – the book centrally elaborates had a profound and prominent impact on the formation of later Critical Theory around Horkheimer and Adorno. Furthermore, one even may read, in some aspects, Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) as an indirect answer to the challenge of History and Class Consciousness – and, clearly, find its traces in French existentialism around Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Lukács explicitly articulates History and Class Consciousness, whose ‘over-Hegelianization’ of Marxism he will criticize in his later work himself, as an interpretation of Marxism in the light of post-Kantian German Idealism – mostly of Hegel but also of Schiller, Fichte, or Schelling as well as of post-idealist philosophers rooted in the idealist tradition such as Lask. Whilst the concept of reification often has been discussed in its constellation with Marxist critique of capitalism and with German sociology, particularly in Weber and Simmel, despite the label of ‘Hegel-Marxism,’ the references to Classical German Philosophy still mark an important desideratum in terms both of historical and systematic examinations. Concepts not only such as “reification” but also “totality,” “method,” “dialectics,” “nature,” “(class) consciousness,” “history,” “revolution,” or “subject-object” Lukács extensively applies in his early work, however, cannot be separated from their origin in central systematic problematics of German Idealism. At the very same time, when it comes to contemporary discussions of the reception of Classical German Philosophy, Lukács remains a rather marginal figure despite his important role within post-idealist confrontations with the theoretical and practical impact of idealism and its possible actuality. In a line with this dominant setting, it hardly has been analyzed in detail that Lukács’ interpretation of the entire sequence of post-Kantian idealism starting from the problematic of the “thing-in-itself” (Ding-an-sich) in Kant is a very original and productive one – and it hereby is neglected that, following a semantic hint, “reification” (Verdinglichung) may stand in an internal relation to this very problematic instead of being just a sociological term or the descriptive name of a social pathology. On the occasion of the centennial of the publication, the present collection presents original submissions that aim at filling this gap by examining and discussing History and Class Consciousness’ dialogue with Classical German Philosophy and its aftermath. The contributions focus on this interconnection by dwelling on central concepts in Lukács and Classical German Philosophy and its tradition systematically and by (re-)discovering relevant historical lines of reception. Of particular interest hereby is the potential this configuration has in terms of a critical thinking of – and within – our own present and its ongoing multiple crises and struggles.

“The Urphänomen”—as it says on the drinking glass that Goethe gave Hegel in April 1821—“very humbly begs the Absolute to give it a cordial welcome.” On the one hand, the relationship between Hegel and Goethe (as this present attests) is marked by a deep mutual acknowledgement or even veneration. On the other hand, central concepts in both of their thinking—such as we see in the Goethean Urphänomen or the Hegelian Absolute—demonstrate deep tensions. While Goethe’s Urphänomen emphasizes an immediate intuition of nature, for Hegel’s speculative thinking the mediation of conceptual reflection proves constitutive. These tensions do not, however, negate the significant closeness of their interests: the question of the mediation of the singular, particular, and general, that stands at the center of Hegel’s speculative logic is also continually determinative for Goethe’s poetic production and—both aesthetic and political-ethical—thinking. Thus Goethe writes in conjunction with his completion of the first part of Faust—whose structural and thematic proximity to Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit has been frequently noted—that there are no individuals, who are not related to something general: “All individuals are also general: that is, this one or that one, whichever you wish, is the representative of an entire genre.” And here, for Goethe just as for Hegel, the individual can only become not only a general but also an actual individual when it acts and realizes itself in the concrete fullness of the real world, in order to arrive at itself. Similarly, for both the reality that opens up through this world-relation connected to activity is essentially characterized by contradiction and conflict, by the critical development of reshaping and transformation: the concrete fullness of the universe shapes itself not only for Hegel but also for Goethe only in passing through the “regulated, methodically cultivated spirit of contradiction” as Hegel summarizes the dialectic in conversation with Goethe. Such an inherently contradictory and tension-filled reality thus contains, for both Hegel and Goethe, a focus on the political and social present in the midst of the French Revolution and its consequences: how the upheavals and crises of the Revolution could lead—in the Age of Napoleon—to the founding of a new social order proves to be, for both, a central task of not just theoretical but also practical importance. Both Hegel and Goethe emphatically experience their time as a time of deep contradictions and tensions, characterized by the ongoing transition to a new epoch—modernity—, to an epoch whose outlines are still open and uncertain—and both of them reflect this historical experience in their work. This aspect is not least responsible for the enduring modernity of Hegel and Goethe and it inscribes itself in the leading question (for both) of the conditions and possibilities of classical art in the modern age. The aim of the thematic focus is to college original contributions that investigate and discuss both the commonalities and differences in the relationship between Hegel and Goethe across the field of philosophy, aesthetics, political theory, and their complex interactions. Although many aspects of the relationship between the two thinkers have been thoroughly studied in classical research, the importance and timeliness of the perspectives addressed here still represent a desideratum in both contemporary Hegel and Goethe studies. It is particularly the intriguing connection between philosophical, aesthetic, and socio-political aspects involved in this constellation that deserves a careful reconsideration and re-actualization.