Grégori de Souza

O presente artigo pretende demonstrar como, para Hans Jonas, o poder se constituiu, na modernidade, como um elemento central da subjetividade humana, fato que se efetiva na caracterização da nossa como uma civilização tecnológica, principalmente no que diz respeito à pretensa reforma do ser humano, tal como ela se tornou o elemento central do projeto melhorista e transhumanista. A partir daí, demonstraremos como Jonas substitui o poder pela responsabilidade, para efetivá-la como elemento subjetivo central, quando associada à ideia de autenticidade da vida humana. Abordar as exigências éticas ligadas à responsabilidade presentes no avanço dos poderes tecnológicos, portanto, significa também levar em conta os seus impactos sobre os processos de subjetivação que, em última instância, estão ligados à própria ideia de uma “natureza” - ou “condição” - humana.

O presente dossiê, generosamente acolhido pela Revista Natureza Humana, trata de um tema não apenas urgente, como central para o pensamento filosófico contemporâneo: a relação entre poder e justiça. Aqui estão alguns dos textos que foram apresentados no V Colóquio Luso-Brasileiro de Ética e Filosofia Política, cujo tema foi “Caminhos da Justiça - Diálogos Contemporâneos”, realizado entre os dias 29 e 30 de julho de 2024, na Sala 131 do Colégio do Espírito Santo, na Universidade de Évora, em Portugal. Esse colóquio é organizado anualmente e em 2024 consolidou uma parceria muito fortuita entre o PRAXIS - Centro de Filosofia, Política e Cultura, o Instituto de Investigação e Formação Avançada da Universidade de Évora, o Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná e o Centro Hans Jonas Brasil, com o apoio da FCT. Nessa ocasião, diferentes pesquisadores e pesquisadoras do Brasil e de Portugal tiveram oportunidade de apresentar e discutir suas pesquisas em um clima fraterno e amigo, como é adequado quando se fala de um evento filosófico. O pensamento, além disso, foi favorecido pela acolhida dos colegas de Évora, pelo encanto da cidade e pelo ambiente daquela universidade, cujos famosos azulejos remontam ao século XVIII e traduzem com imagens o que é a vida universitária e o espírito desse colóquio: um lugar de estudo e produção do conhecimento na forma de um diálogo rigoroso e bemintencionado.

This article intends to analyze the main theses of Hans Jonas’ ontological approach to plant life in his phenomenology of life. To do so, we will start with the hypothesis that plant life must be thought of as a carrier of mind (inwardness) and that this guarantees plants’ ethical status. From there, we will analyze the two approaches Jonas developed, which, according to him, demonstrate the ontological superiority of plants in relation to animals and simultaneously their greater vulnerability: material immediacy (represented by their nutritive activity) and spatial proximity (linked to the problem of movement). From these two aspects derives the indistinction between acting and the objective of acting (which makes metabolism a process intrinsic to the vegetable being itself). We will conclude by suggesting that such a position brings Jonas closer to the post-humanists, insofar as he questions humanist anthropocentrism, opening the way for the recognition of plants not only as moral subjects but as legal entities.

The severity of the climate emergency contrasts sharply with the ongoing omission and inaction of most individuals and governments, despite overwhelming evidence. This paradox raises an urgent question: why does humanity continue to choose paralysis and procrastination in the face of existential threats? While acknowledging the complexity of the issue, this article examines four of the most common — and, we argue, spurious — ‘justifications’ used by climate deniers to evade responsibility: [1] ‘The science is still up for debate,’ [2] ‘We don’t owe justice to distant strangers,’ [3] ‘We don’t owe justice to future generations,’ and [4] ‘Not my fault, not my job.’ In response, we present counterarguments based on key principles of the ethics of responsibility developed by German philosopher Hans Jonas (1903–1993). By confronting these evasive claims, the article not only exposes their inconsistency but also revisits Jonas’s work as a valuable ethical resource to understand the gravity of our current situation. Ultimately, we argue that the climate crisis constitutes an urgent ethical and political challenge that demands immediate and comprehensive action grounded in responsibility toward life — present and future, near and distant.

This article aims to analyze the perspective of the philosopher Hans Jonas with regard to the rights of animals to life. We will show how, according to Jonas, the ethical significance of animals emerges as they reveal nature’s vulnerability and underscore the moral duty of humans, whose responsibility intensifies as their capacity to cause harm increases. Within this framework, it is essential to recognize that (1) Jonas supports the criterion of maximum benefit when it comes to animal experimentation for scientific purposes; (2) his theory reflects a concern for the conditions of animals within the meat industry, advocating for moderation in consumption; and (3) his ethical approach is particularly focused on the protection of endangered animal species, a concern that has become increasingly urgent with the rise of new powers of technology. For Jonas, an ethical theory that seeks to address the challenge of species preservation must begin with a theoretical redefinition that acknowledges animals as ‘ends in themselves’, a shift that would necessitate a re-evaluation not only of ethics but also of underlying ontological and metaphysical assumptions. Finally, as we will discuss, Jonas’s ongoing debate on the rights of animals to life brings to the forefront the central concern of his ethics of responsibility: maintaining the balance of the cosmic whole against the destructive impact of human activity, which has led to the extinction of animal species with which humans share a ‘solidarity of interests’. It is within this context that Jonas’s stance on animal rights should be understood, and it is precisely here that his position stands out as both innovative and urgent in the defense of animal life.

In this article we intend to analyze the relationship between science and values from the philosophy of Hans Jonas. It starts with an analysis of the change identified by the author with regard to the new status of knowledge in modernity, which gives rise to the so-called technobioscience, born from the articulation between knowing and doing, in view of a new power. It is about showing how the old formulation of knowledge as contemplation gave way to the utilitarian idea of knowledge as exploration, although in such a version, the claim of neutrality and absolute freedom is maintained, characteristic of the old moral island represented by knowledge pre-modern. Jonas argues in favor of an articulation of technobioscience with ethics, in order to provide the values capable of guiding knowing, doing and power in technological civilization.