Gregory P. Floyd

I argue that Jean-Louis Chrétien’s account of beauty and Bernard Lonergan’s account of art and aesthetic experience complement one another and, when taken together, offer an illuminating philosophical account of the ontological, ethical, intellectual, and transcendent aspects of art and aesthetic experience. Chrétien draws out with particular perspicacity the ontological dimension of aesthetic experience as that of ‘call and response’. His analysis of the evocative character of beauty helps thematise a foundation which is implied but not thematised in Lonergan’s account. The latter’s reflection on art and aesthetic experience is characterised by its distinct emphasis on the ethical, intellectual, and transcendental aspects of aesthetic experience. He introduces a set of distinctions that draw out these aspects with force and clarity.

"Why is it that so many Catholics continue to find Continental Philosophy attractive? This volume by leading philosophers and theologians explores the reception of continental philosophy, and its history within Catholic Institutions in the twentieth century. From its earliest days in North America, Catholic philosophers and theologians have been the strongest supporters of continental philosophy; in turn, this has contributed to the intellectual enrichment of Catholic universities, making an important mark on Catholic thought. By taking a stance towards the evolving relationship between Catholics and Continental Philosophy, many of the contributors to this volume serve as living demonstrations that this engagement is far from over. Exploring the mutual interests that made this alliance possible as well as their underlying tensions, contributors provide, for the first time, a sustained account of the historical, institutional, and intellectual relationship between Catholicism and Continental Philosophy."--

This paper examines Kant’s metaphor of reason as an island in the Critique of Pure Reason in order to suggest an unresolved tension at the heart of his critical project, which is addressed in a different way in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. That tension is between the transcendental circumscription of pure reason and reason’s on persistent pretensions to transcendence. Kant’s model of transcendence is contrasted with two phenomenological models that attempt to articulate the desiderative nature of reason. Yet, precisely on this question of motivation differences between Husserl and Heidegger become clear and instructive. The paper concludes, in view of these differences, with a proposal for conceiving of transcendence in non-topological categories, but instead as the activity of questioning.

This paper examines Kant’s metaphor of reason as an island in the Critique of Pure Reasonin order to suggest an unresolved tension at the heart of his critical project, which is addressed in a different way in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. That tension is between the transcendental circumscription of pure reason and reason’s on persistent pretensions to transcendence. Kant’s model of transcendence is contrasted with two phenomenological models that attempt to articulate the desiderative nature of reason. Yet, precisely on this question of motivation differences between Husserl and Heidegger become clear and instructive. The paper concludes, in view of these differences, with a proposal for conceiving of transcendence in non-topological categories, but instead as the activity of questioning. Keywords: Transcendence, Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, Phenomenology.