Grzegorz Holub

The paper deals with a possible interdependence between bioethics and transhumanism. It seems that nowadays transhumanism is a separate discipline and we can say at most about bioethical aspects of that. However, a more in-depth investigation reveals that transhumanism is a rival of the contemporary bioethics and tends to take control over it. So, this paper tried to prove that this is not a necessity. There are still vital differences between bioethics and transhumanism and they justify keeping the former separate. The main difference concerns the object of investigation: bioethics is about ethical enquiry of the existing, bodily human being, whereas transhumanism is directed toward a future creature called posthuman. Thus, although there are attempts within transhumanism to replace bioethics, they are still two separate fields of investigation and hence the former is not a new and fully-fledged face of the latter.

Este artículo aborda el problema de si Karol Wojtyla puede ser considerado dualista, cosa que es ampliamente aceptada de René Descartes. Análisis detallados de las obras de Wojtyla nos llevan a la conclusión de que no se le puede clasificar de este modo, aunque sí es consciente de una dualidad que marca la existencia humana. Wojtyla nos presenta una comprensión integrada y coherente de la persona humana a partir del concepto metafísico de suppositum y una amplia exploración de la experiencia humana básica, que es captada por un método fenomenológico.

Genetic engineering promises to change the human condition by changing certain human characteristics. Why not take control of such changes and secure positive outcomes, making use of our progressing knowledge about human genetic make-up and our increasingly sophisticated skills? This paper elaborates the meanings of the word “change,” a cornerstone of the enhancement debate, focusing not on technicalities of genetic engineering but on philosophical implications of its implementation. The paper then turns to some of the complexities and difficulties of the debate. Finally, it takes up a strictly philosophical investigation of what we mean by “change” as far as a basic structure of the human being (the human person) is concerned, and examines what conclusions can be drawn for genetic enhancement. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.4 (Winter 2010): 723–740.