Gualtiero Lorini

Il testo si propone di ricostruire e valutare il contributo sistematico della riflessione pedagogica allo sviluppo di alcuni temi cruciali della filosofia pratica di Kant. Dopo aver delineato lo sfondo antropologico in cui si inquadra la riflessione kantiana sull’educazione, si pongono in rilievo alcune caratteristiche peculiari della pedagogia kantiana. L’obiettivo è quello di mostrare come esse possano contribuire, seppur con limiti ben precisi, ad arricchire il dibattito su alcune questioni molto controverse del pensiero morale di Kant. In particolare, il fatto che l’adozione stabile di un certo habitus comportamentale possa influenzare l’edificazione di una Gesinnung autenticamente morale, pur rimanendo quest’ultima insondabile. Infine, le ipotesi formulate nei primi quattro paragrafi vengono messe alla prova attraverso l’analisi dei luoghi della Dottrina della Virtù della Metafisica dei costumi in cui sembra possibile scorgere un chiaro ruolo sistematico dell’educazione.

The goal of the present essay is to underscore that Kant’s anthropological reflection does not acquire its most accomplished value when it is forcefully placed within the architectural project of the critique, but rather when we question the way in which it can accompany the critical reflection. This possibility becomes almost a necessity in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Here, by virtue of reflecting judgment, Kant illustrates the agreement between reason, as the universal horizon of judgment, and the singularity of the subject, which conveys any judgment. In doing so, Kant deals with subjectivity according to a perspective that is significantly influenced by Baumgarten’s conception of the I, insofar as it differs from Wolff’s positions. Thus, in the first section of this paper, we will outline the extent to which Baumgarten’s treatment of the relationship between empirical and rational psychology marks a departure from the Wolffian one. In the second part, we will show how Baumgarten’s perspective influences Kant in the 1770s by analyzing Kant’s lectures on metaphysics and anthropology, the basis of which is represented precisely by Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. Then, we will focus on the most original elements of Kant’s anthropological reflection, and finally, we will propose some remarks, aiming at assessing the extent of Baumgarten’s presence in Kant’s anthropological framework.

A.G. Baumgarten is usually studied either as the founder of modern aesthetics or as the author of the Metaphysica, the text used by Kant for his lectures on metaphysics. However, the latter point deserves special attention since Baumgarten’s influence on Kant - both positive and negative - on some keyconcepts like that of apperception is particularly relevant. Indeed, although apperception is addressed only marginally in the Metaphysica, it is presupposed by the identification of consciousness with inner sense (§535). Conversely, apperception is explicitly addressed in the Acroasis logica (1761), which is useful for tracing the origin of Baumgarten’s positions in the Metaphysica. In the light of these premises, this essay first investigates Baumgarten’s approach to the concept of apperception. By analyzing the role played by the „inner sense“ in this context, we will then attempt to show whether, how and to what extent Baumgarten’s position may have influenced Kant’s critical account of apperception.

Scholars are prone to emphasize A.G. Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics as a discipline in its own right and Kant’s use of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as a handbook for his lectures on metaphysics. Nonetheless there are some further and deeper reasons for Baumgarten to mark a division between the so called Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition and the Kantian transcendental revolution. The goal of this paper is to take into account these reasons and to analyze them in order to show that they are rooted in psychology as it is treated in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. The paper’s aim is to highlight Baumgarten’s methodological approach, that is, the use of Leibnizian doctrines, which are exposed through the Wolffian order. The radical originality of this procedure can be adequately assessed only by virtue of its Kantian development.

In the last decades, scholars have aptly pointed out the limits of J.N. Tetens’ contribution to the rise of Kant’s critical theory of knowledge. Less attention has been paid to the possibility of recognizing a further, possibly more consistent, contribution by Tetens to Kant’s thought, namely, to the development of Kant’s anthropology. The present paper aims to test some possible research lines in this direction. After an overview on the observational method shared by Tetens’ gnoseological framework and Kant’s anthropological approach, we will more specifically dwell on some topics that seem to allow a continuity-claim between Tetens’ psychological analysis of the human cognitive faculties and Kant’s anthropological project. The main issues at stake in this investigation are the faculty of empirical productive imagination, the figure of the genius, and the relationship between language and Denkungsart.

The present paper aims to provide an overview on Kant’s dealing with the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, he has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in second-scholastic sources, but has always tried to develop an original position. Starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the “physical influx”, Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. This emendation is carried out through elements coming from the Leibnitian tradition. But neither in this field Kant totally embraces the Wolffian, as well as the Baumgartenian model. The paper tries also to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfill his original theory of causality as an amended version of the physical influx.

This volume sheds new light on Immanuel Kant’s conception of anthropology. Neither a careful and widespread search of the sources nor a merely theoretical speculation about Kant’s critical path can fully reveal the necessarily wider horizon of his anthropology. This only comes to light by overcoming all traditional schemes within Kantian studies, and consequently reconsidering the traditional divisions within Kant’s thought. The goal of this book is to highlight an alternative, yet complementary path followed by Kantian anthropology with regard to transcendental philosophy. The present volume intends to develop this path in order to demonstrate how irreducible it is in what concerns some crucial claims of Kant’s philosophy, such as the critical defense of the unity of reason, the search for a new method in metaphysics and the moral outcome of Kant’s thought.