Guido Gorgoni

While the legal concept of a subject of rights is eminently an abstraction, Ricoeur’s philosophical challenge seeks to rethink its identity within the philosophy of action, in correlation with the ideas of capacity, attestation, and recognition. The terminology Ricoeur employs presents some significant marks of this theoretical stance, as he speaks of a “veritable” or a “real” subject of rights as distinguished from the purely formal one. I argue that Ricoeur’s approach to the legal subject attains its highest meaning in connection with the renewal of the semantics of responsibility in a prospective sense. In particular, I contend that Ricoeur’s idea of a “veritable” subject of rights deploys its full theoretical potential in relation to a prospective idea of responsibility in contrast to the “static” perspective of the ascription of rights and duties. Reciprocally, a prospective idea of responsibility deploys its full meaning in relation to a subject of rights not reduced to a legal abstraction since, as far as narrative identity is implied, this subject is and has to be an embodied one. I shall show that the thesis advocating a projection of responsibility towards the future may have some significant theoretical implications, in particular in relation to the effect of techno-scientific development in areas such as Artificial Intelligence.

Cette contribution entend examiner la place que la référence au droit, et plus largement au phénomène juridique, occupe dans la dernière phase de la réflexion de Ricœur autour du sujet capable. Le droit joue en effet un rôle d’une importance croissante dans l’articulation de l’anthropologie capacitaire définie dans la “petite éthique” à travers une reconfiguration profonde de ses catégories fondamentales, notamment celle de sujet de droit et celle de responsabilité. Les implications d’un tel renouveau théorique seront prises en compte, tant pour l’articulation interne de la pensée du dernier Ricœur que pour leurs potentielles retombées dans la théorie du droit contemporaine.

This article aims to explore the debate on human enhancement from the perspective of the evolutions of responsibility paradigms, and in particular from the perspective of the so-called Responsible Research and Innovation approach. The aim is not to explore the arguments pro or contra the ethical legitimacy and/or technical feasibility of human enhancement, but rather exploring if, and how, the RRI perspective can shape the debate on human enhancement.In particular, the human enhancement debate will be read through the lenses of four main responsibility paradigms that we sketch by examining both, the historical and conceptual evolution of the responsibility idea and the dynamics of its ascription. In order to provide a useful scheme for interpreting human enhancement, RRI will be characterised as a distinctive responsibility model that can subsequently be used to frame the debate on HE with a particular emphasis on its normative implications, as well as on its social and political significance.

The notion of Responsible Research and Innovation has increasingly attracted attention in the academic literature. Up until now, however, the literature has focused on clarifying the principles for which research and innovation are responsible and on examining the conditions that account for managing them responsibly. Little attention has been reserved to exploring the political-economic context in which the notion of RRI has become progressively more prominent. This article tries to address this aspect and suggests some preliminary considerations on the connections between the specific understanding of responsibility in RRI and the framing of responsibility in what has been synthetically defined as ‘neoliberalism’. To do so, we try to illustrate how the idea of responsibility has evolved over time so that the specific characteristics of RRI can be better highlighted. These characteristics will then be discussed against the features of neoliberalism and its understanding of responsibility. Eventually, we reaffirm a view of RRI centred on fundamental rights as a possible point of departure between these two perspectives on responsibility.