Guilherme oliveira

Barker’s notion of “behavior settings” has been fruitfully used in Gibsonian ecological psychology to highlight the importance of place and to account for how perception–action of affordances is socio-culturally co-constituted. The goal of this paper is to investigate the potential relation between “behavior settings” and the seemingly-related notion of “cognitive institutions” that has more recently been introduced and used in a different context, in the philosophical literature on extended cognition. Focusing on “behavior settings” and “cognitive institutions” as analytical tools we show that, despite their similarities, the two are ultimately different from each other, but that despite these differences, the two are compatible and can work together. Based on this, we offer a proposal for how “cognitive institutions” can be incorporated into the conceptual framework of Gibsonian ecological psychology, enabling a more comprehensive analysis of how cognitive practices are socio-culturally co-constituted at various spatio-temporal scales. Finally, we conclude that this synthesis contributes to the ongoing critical turn in ecological psychology, supporting the analysis of how cognitive practices are shaped by cognitive institutions for better or worse.

Recent contributions to the philosophical literature on scientific modeling have tended to follow one of two approaches, on the one hand addressing conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological questions about models, or, on the other hand, emphasizing the cognitive aspects of modeling and accordingly focusing on model-based reasoning. In this paper I explore the relationship between these two approaches through a case study of model-based research on the behavior of infant rats, particularly thigmotaxis (movement based on tactile sensation) and temperature regulation in groups. A common assumption in the philosophical literature is that models represent the target phenomena they simulate. In the modeling project under investigation, however, this assumption was not part of the model-based reasoning process, arising only in a theoretical article as, I suggest, a post hoc rhetorical device. I argue that the otherwise nonexistent concern with the model-target relationship as being representational results from a kind of objectification often at play in philosophical analysis, one that can be avoided if an alternative form of objectification is adopted instead.

Recent contributions to the philosophical literature on scientific modeling have tended to follow one of two approaches, on the one hand addressing conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological questions about models, or, on the other hand, emphasizing the cognitive aspects of modeling and accordingly focusing on model-based reasoning. In this paper I explore the relationship between these two approaches through a case study of model-based research on the behavior of infant rats, particularly thigmotaxis and temperature regulation in groups. A common assumption in the philosophical literature is that models represent the target phenomena they simulate. In the modeling project under investigation, however, this assumption was not part of the model-based reasoning process, arising only in a theoretical article as, I suggest, a post hoc rhetorical device. I argue that the otherwise nonexistent concern with the model-target relationship as being representational results from a kind of objectification often at play in philosophical analysis, one that can be avoided if an alternative form of objectification is adopted instead.