Gunnar Schumann

Es gehört zu den Aufgaben und Problemen der Kulturphilosophie, die Wichtigkeit und den Einfluss der Kategorie „Kultur“ zu bestimmen. Immer wieder taucht in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage auf, ob das Angehören zu einer bestimmten menschlichen Kultur einen Einfluss auf das Denken habe. Und vor allem, ob nicht die jeweilige Sprache einer Kultur- oder Sprachgemeinschaft einen gewissen Einfluss auf das Denken habe. Dieser Frage scheint nicht nur von Philosophen, sondern auch von Wissenschaftlern, wie Linguisten, Ethnologen und Psychologen und auch von Laien großes Interesse entgegengebracht zu werden. Ist das Denken selbst kulturell relativ oder nicht?

Is the appropriate form of human action explanation causal or rather teleological? While this is a central question in analytic philosophy of action, it also has implications for the question whether there are differences in principle between the methods of explanation in the sciences on the one hand and in the humanities and the social sciences on the other. The question bears on the problem of the appropriate form of explanations of past human actions, and therefore it is prominently discussed by analytic philosophers of historiography. This volume comprises contributions from causalists and anti-causalists who address enduring philosophical problems of this debate, as well as their implications for the practice of historiography. Part I considers the quarrel between causalism and anti-causalism in recent developments in the philosophy of action. Part II presents chapters by causalists and anti-causalists that are more narrowly focused on the philosophy of historiography.

I critically discuss Gerhard Schurz’ improved version of Hempel’s covering law model as the model appropriate for human action explanation in the historical sciences. Schurz takes so-called “normic laws” as the best means to save Hempel’s covering law model from the objection that there are no strict laws in historiography. I criticize Schurz approach in two respects: 1) Schurz falsely takes Dray’s account of historical explanations to be a normic law account. 2) Human action explanation in terms of goals and means-ends-beliefs are not based on normic laws at all, for the explanandum in an explanation follows from the volitional and doxastic premises alone. To show this, I argue that there is a conceptual connection between volition and action, rooted in our actual usage of volitional concepts. Ultimately, a difference in principle between the methods of explanation in science and historiography has to be acknowledged.