Gunter Bombaerts

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

This article interprets design not merely as a technical activity but as a site for the realization of ethical life in Hegel’s sense. Its theoretical framework builds on Hegel’s tripartite ethical model, right (recht), morality (moralität), and ethical Life (sittlichkeit), to show how design experience, when situated in institutional roles, mediation of value tensions, and practices of mutual recognition, contributes to the actualization of freedom and responsibility in the social sphere. Methodologically, the study adopts an interpretive–analytical approach, drawing on a close reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and major commentaries, brought into dialogue with contemporary literature on design ethics. Findings indicate that the legal and institutional structuring of design, while necessary as the formal ground of freedom, remains insufficient unless complemented by the internalization of responsibility at the individual level and its further embedding within social and professional institutions. Only through this progression can design approach what Hegel conceptualized as “freedom realized in the world of human institutions.” The analysis further reveals that ethical tensions, arising from conflicting stakeholder demands or gaps between individual ideals and institutional realities, are not peripheral but constitutive drivers of moral reflection in design practice. Yet the same institutional structures that enable recognition and accountability may also impose constraints that limit the scope of freedom’s realization. The study concludes that design can serve as a formative arena of ethical life, where freedom, duty, and mutual recognition are historically and socially shaped and reinterpreted. This reframing provides a conceptual foundation for future research on how design experience both reflects and shapes moral life within diverse institutional contexts.

The article argues that mainstream value-sensitive approaches to design have been based on narrow understandings of personhood and social dynamics, which are biased toward Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic cultures and contradicted by empirical evidence. To respond to this weakness, the article suggests that design may benefit from focusing on user behaviours from the joint perspective of values and norms, especially across cultural contexts. As such, it proposes Norm Sensitive Design as a complement to value-sensitive approaches when designing and implementing new technologies. Versus values, norms serve as more accurate predictors or descriptors of behaviours and can thus support value-sensitive approaches to realize the aspiration of informing user behaviour via design. The article makes two key contributions. On the theoretical side, it promotes the consideration of norms in design. On the practical side, it offers designers and instructors prompts for reflecting on design ethics from the perspective of norms.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

This chapter addresses the need to monitor and respond to changes in values and the other core elements of a technology project or product during its lifespan—from its initial design phase through completion and into implementation and maintenance. The complexity we aim to address is that technology projects and products are situated in sociotechnical systems that undergo change in many of their parts over time. We are introducing the turn to Process Philosophy into Value Sensitive Design projects and literature to bring conceptual systems where all parts of the system undergo change over time. Values Sensitive Design (VSD) literature has traditionally applied conceptual systems called “structure and change” systems where most of the structure remains stable while some parts undergo change. We call our program of method development: Value Change Sensitive Design methods (VCSD). Our approach uses Process Ontology and Niklas Luhmann’s Social Systems Theory to develop a minimal ontological system and a diagramming tool—a schema—for marking and tracking changes in the situation of technology projects and products. The minimal ontological system focuses on values and other core elements of sociotechnical systems that affect design and outcomes of projects using Value Change Sensitive Design. The minimal framework articulates a temporal duration (window) of a change process by centering on an “event” during which a change takes place. We combine this process ontological framework and diagramming tool with the tools of historical analysis called path dependence analysis and process tracing to propose a full method for discovery and characterizations of causal mechanisms underlying changes in sociotechnical systems. This chapter is a contribution to the philosophical literature in Value Change Sensitive Design and Values Change.

In its day-to-day use, the German notion of Bildung can be translated as education. There is also a philosophical understanding of Bildung, as a concept that refers to the cultivation of human traits and capacities, as well as to the goal of this process. How can we understand Bildung as a goal of contemporary engineering education, and how does Challenge Based Learning serve as a pedagogical approach to accomplish it? To answer these questions, our contribution starts with an exploration of five interpretations of Bildung rooted in the history of philosophy, beginning with a focus on (1) self-determination, (2) self-understanding, (3) inner motivation, and (4) individual autonomy as key dimensions in the development of Bildung in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, followed in the twentieth century by a focus on (5) intersubjectivity. We proceed with a reflection on recent trends in engineering education to help us reposition Bildung both as an individual and multi-agential notion. We suggest that Challenge Based Learning can cultivate both the individual idealisation presupposed by the notion of Bildung as initially conceived and the relational focus presupposed by multi-agent interactions and collaborative endeavours witnessed currently in engineering education, which is closer to the development of Bildung as intersubjectivity. We offer three educational examples where Challenge Based Learning exposes students to real socio-technical challenges put forward by stakeholders from the local ecosystem of the university. We discuss the implications of bringing together the individual and multi-agential understandings of Bildung in engineering education in connection to these examples. The conclusion offers a reflection on the prospects and possibilities for Bildung in engineering education.

This paper examines the ongoing challenges of interdisciplinary collaboration in Machine Ethics (ME), particularly the integration of ethical decision-making capacities into AI systems. Despite increasing demands for ethical AI, ethicists often remain on the sidelines, contributing primarily to metaethical discussions without directly influencing the development of moral machines. This paper revisits concerns highlighted by Tolmeijer et al. (2020), who identified the pitfall that computer scientists may misinterpret ethical theories without philosophical input. Using the MACHIAVELLI moral benchmark and the Delphi artificial moral agent as case studies, we analyze how these challenges persist. Our analysis indicates that the creators of MACHIAVELLI and Delphi “copy” ethical concepts and embed them in LLMs without questioning or challenging these concepts themselves sufficiently. If an ethical concept causes friction with the computer code, they only reduce and simplify the ethical concept in order to stay as close as possible to the original. We propose that ME should expand its focus to include both interdisciplinary efforts that embed existing ethical work into AI, and transdisciplinary research that fosters new interpretations of ethical concepts. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches are crucial for creating AI systems that are not only effective but also socially responsible. To enhance collaboration between ethicists and computer scientists, we recommend the use of Socratic Dialogue as a methodological tool, promoting deeper understanding of key terms and more effective integration of ethics in AI development.

System thinking is widespread in technology development approaches such as “system engineering” and “system design.” We argue that postphenomenology, as a broadly accepted and essential philosophy of technology, has individual intentionality as a core foundational concept and, therefore, struggles to describe system thinking. We start by indicating that some contemporary postphenomenology scholars discuss system-related concepts such as intentional structures of human experience. We then turn to the fundamentals of postphenomenology to better understand how individual intentionality can be related to system thinking via consciousness. We discuss the classical system thinking concept of autopoiesis as an intentionality structure relevant to individual consciousness of psychic systems and communication for social systems. However, the relation to the world is underdeveloped in these classical system theories, so we turn to contemporary thinkers who stress both the systemic and world aspects of phenomenology in sympoiesis. This helps us formulate three system-thinking recommendations for system phenomenology related to system-environment difference, structure versus process, and sympoiesis. We provide two illustrations of how system phenomenology can help understand technological design. We conclude with a plea for further conceptual development and practical application of system phenomenology in postphenomenology, system design, and system engineering.

Virtue accounts of innovation ethics have recognized the virtue of creativity as an admirable trait in innovators. However, such accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the way creativity functions as a collective phenomenon. We propose a collective virtue account to supplement existing virtue accounts. We base our account on Kieran’s definition of creativity as a virtue and distinguish three components in it: creative output, mastery and intrinsic motivation. We argue that all of these components can meaningfully be attributed to innovation groups. This means that we can also attribute the virtue of creativity to group agents involved in innovation. Recognizing creativity as a collective virtue in innovation is important because it allows for a more accurate evaluation of how successful innovation generally happens. The innovator who takes a collective virtue account of creativity seriously will give attention to the facilitation of an environment where the group can flourish collectively, rather than only nurturing the individual genius.

Responding to the need for a timely and authoritative volume dedicated to this burgeoning and expansive area of research, this handbook will provide readers with a map of themes, topics, and arguments in the field of engineering ethics education (EEE). Featuring critical discussion, research collaboration, and a team of international contributors of globally recognised standing, this volume comprises six key sections which elaborate on the foundations of EEE; teaching methods; accreditation and assessment; and interdisciplinary contributions. Over 100 researchers of EEE from around the globe consider the field from the perspectives of teaching, research, philosophy, and administration. The chapters cover fast-moving topics central to our current understanding of the world such as GDPR, AI, biotechnology, and ChatGPT; new insights into best practices research to equip programme leaders and instructors delivering ethics content to students. This Open Access volume will be of interest to researchers, scholars, postgraduate students, and faculty involved with engineering education, engineering ethics, and philosophy of education. Curriculum designers, staff developers teaching pedagogical courses to faculty, and engineering professionals may also benefit from this volume.

Current societal changes and challenges demand a broader role of technological universities, thus opening the question of how their role evolved over time and how to frame their current responsibility. In response to urgent calls for debating and redefining the identity of contemporary technological universities, this paper has two aims. The first aim is to identify the key characteristics and orientations marking the development of technological universities, as recorded in the history of engineering education. The second aim is to articulate the responsibility of contemporary technological universities given their different orientations and characteristics. For this, we first provide a non-systematic literature review of the key pedagogical orientations of technological universities, grounded in the history of engineering education. The five major orientations of technological universities presented in the paper are technical, economic, social, political, and ecological. We then use this historical survey to articulate the responsibilities of contemporary technological universities reflecting the different orientations. Technological universities can promote and foster the development of scientific, professional, civic, legal, or intra- and inter- generational responsibility. We argue that responsibility is not specific to any particular orientation, such that the concept is broadened to complement each orientation or mix of orientations of a technological university. Our contribution thus serves as a call for technological universities to self-reflect on their mission and identity, by offering a lens for identifying the orientations they currently foster and making explicit the responsibility arising from their current orientation or the ones they strive to cultivate.

This paper examines the ongoing challenges of interdisciplinary collaboration in Machine Ethics (ME), particularly the integration of ethical decision-making capacities into AI systems. Despite increasing demands for ethical AI, ethicists often remain on the sidelines, contributing primarily to metaethical discussions without directly influencing the development of moral machines. This paper revisits concerns highlighted by Tolmeijer et al. (2020), who identified the pitfall that computer scientists may misinterpret ethical theories without philosophical input. Using the MACHIAVELLI moral benchmark and the Delphi artificial moral agent as case studies, we analyze how these challenges persist. Our analysis indicates that the creators of MACHIAVELLI and Delphi “copy” ethical concepts and embed them in LLMs without questioning or challenging these concepts themselves sufficiently. If an ethical concept causes friction with the computer code, they only reduce and simplify the ethical concept in order to stay as close as possible to the original. We propose that ME should expand its focus to include both interdisciplinary efforts that embed existing ethical work into AI, and transdisciplinary research that fosters new interpretations of ethical concepts. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches are crucial for creating AI systems that are not only effective but also socially responsible. To enhance collaboration between ethicists and computer scientists, we recommend the use of Socratic Dialogue as a methodological tool, promoting deeper understanding of key terms and more effective integration of ethics in AI development.

Slavoj Zizek’s criticism of Western Buddhism (2014) for being a late capitalist opiate of the people is partly unwarranted and partly of undeniable relevance. His implicit assumption is that Buddhism is an internalist path that only looks into the individual inner world, leaving harmful societal systems in peace. This article offers a response to Zizek’s analysis, by interpreting the chariot simile in the Buddhist Pali Canon. Even though Pali chariot similes indeed support an internalist perspective, some of them also allow for a reading that opens up to two “externalist” complements: the social outer world and the technological environment. In this way, while acknowledging Zizek’s criticism, we point at Buddhist philosophy’s inherent potential for developing a social-technological critical stance, for instance by linking it to mediation theory.

This report aims to offer insights into cutting-edge research on digital well-being. Many of these insights come from a 2-day academic-impact event, The Future of Digital Well-Being, hosted by a team of researchers working with the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in February 2024. Today, achieving and maintaining well-being in the face of online technologies is a multifaceted challenge that we believe requires using theoretical resources of different research disciplines. This report explores diverse perspectives on how digital well-being can be actively cultivated, while also emphasising the importance of considering individual differences, societal contexts, and nuanced cultural factors. We aim to offer a holistic view of the future of digital well-being, one that will inspire the next generation of designers of online tools, as well as policymakers who will regulate these tools. We start by asking what digital well-being is – how we can best define a concept that is used by diverse stakeholders and researchers from many disciplines in various ways. To do this, we explore the classic ethical theories of well-being, showing how they can give us insights into how the term digital well-being is currently deployed. We then move to look at the existing strategies that have been proposed to actively cultivate digital well-being, exploring the business models that threaten digital well-being and the relative advantages of the digital and non-digital solutions that are currently proposed. On the one hand, digital tools – such as Apple’s Screen Time and app blockers such as Opal and Forest – integrate seamlessly with the digital lifestyles of users. They also create precise metrics for digital well-being, which facilitates their solutions to reduce screen time. On the other hand, non-digital solutions, including mindfulness practices, digital detoxes, and digital well-being coaching, offer a new set of tools to reconnect individuals to their natural rhythms and help to actively promote offline activities. We then move to discuss diversity and how various groups of users have strikingly different digital well-being needs. Embracing neurodiversity in digital well-being is crucial as it strongly impacts the users’ experience of online technologies. When designing for diversity, organisations and designers alike need to prioritise customization for people with physical disabilities, mitigate harmful content for users with mental well-being conditions, address gender stereotypes and online harassment, and be designed in ways that recognize the very real risks of online technologies. This report closes by examining cultural differences. We believe that non-Western conceptions of well-being offer rich sources for enhancing digital well-being insofar as these traditions can inform and inspire the designers of future online technologies. We focus on East-Asian and South-Asian traditions, although in further work we recognise it would be useful to investigate conceptions of well-being that are influential in the Gulf region, Africa, and South America. Each of these areas have ethical frameworks that discuss well-being in depth as well as a rich cultural heritage. In conclusion, this report’s insights underscore the imperative of recognizing diversity in digital well-being, both in terms of cultural contexts and disciplinary perspectives. It emphasises the need for culturally responsive design methodologies and the integration of non-Western philosophical perspectives into current digital well-being research. Embracing this diversity, we believe, offers the best chance to create digital environments that prioritise well-being for users and the societies they live in across the world. Ultimately, we believe that it is not only about designing better online products; it’s about shaping a digital landscape that promotes well-being and flourishing for everyone.

The article argues that mainstream value-sensitive approaches to design have been based on narrow understandings of personhood and social dynamics, which are biased toward Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic cultures and contradicted by empirical evidence. To respond to this weakness, the article suggests that design may benefit from focusing on user behaviours from the joint perspective of values and norms, especially across cultural contexts. As such, it proposes Norm Sensitive Design as a complement to value-sensitive approaches when designing and implementing new technologies. Versus values, norms serve as more accurate predictors or descriptors of behaviours and can thus support value-sensitive approaches to realize the aspiration of informing user behaviour via design. The article makes two key contributions. On the theoretical side, it promotes the consideration of norms in design. On the practical side, it offers designers and instructors prompts for reflecting on design ethics from the perspective of norms.

The three-tenet model, which focuses on ‘distributional justice’, ‘procedural justice’, and ‘justice as recognition’, has emerged as the most influential framework in the field of energy justice. Based on critical reviews of the three-tenet model, we identify three challenges that the model currently still faces: (i) a normative challenge on the grounding of the three-tenet model in philosophical theories; (ii) an ‘elite’ challenge on the justification of the use of power in energy-related decision; and (iii) a practical challenge on the application of the three tenets in situations of conflicting justice demands. In this article, we provide the basic contours of a three-step pluralist and pragmatic dialogue model for questions of energy justice that addresses the three challenges, based on the ‘commonwealth model’ of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. The model proposes to create moral legitimacy in the face of plural demands for energy justice by engaging actors in an inclusive dialogue based on an explicit recognition of Boltanski and Thévenot’s commonwealth model. We thereby make three contributions to the existing literature on energy justice. First, the commonwealth model’s rootedness in normative political theory provides a stronger philosophical underpinning than was available up till now in the literature (challenge 1). Second, it allows one to go beyond the (almost exclusive) focus on injustices perpetrated on disempowered or marginalised groups, to include questions on the justified exercise of power (challenge 2). Third, the commonwealth model shows us practical ways out of situations where conflicting demands for justice are being made (challenge 3).

The “attention economy” refers to the tech industry’s business model that treats human attention as a commodifiable resource. The libertarian critique of this model, dominant within tech and philosophical communities, claims that the persuasive technologies of the attention economy infringe on the individual user’s autonomy and therefore the proposed solutions focus on safeguarding personal freedom through expanding individual control. While this push back is important, current societal debates on the ethics of persuasive technologies are informed by a particular understanding of attention, rarely posited explicitly yet assumed as the default. They share the same concept of attention, namely an individualistic and descriptive concept of attention that is a cognitive process, an expendable resource, something that one should control individually. We step away from a negative analysis in terms of external distractions and aim for positive answers, turning to Buddhist ethics to formulate a critique of persuasive technology from a genuinely ethical perspective. Buddhist ethics points at our attention’s inescapable ethical and ontological embeddedness. Attention as practice requires “the right effort” to distinguish desirable and undesirable states, the “right concentration” to stop the flow we are caught in, and the “right mindfulness” to fortify the ability to attend to the present situation and keep in mind a general sense of life’s direction. We offer input for further philosophical inquiry on attention as practice and attention ecology. We put forward comfort/effort and individualism/collectivism as two remaining central tensions in need of further research.

Energy justice literature generally treats its three tenets, distributional justice, procedural justice and recognition justice, as separate and independent issues. These are seen as separate dimensions by which criteria can be formulated for a just state of affairs. And a just state of affairs regarding energy should fulfill all criteria. However, we show, using empirical research on six European energy communities that the tenets of energy justice are interdependent and negotiated in practice. We show this interdependency using three core concerns of justice—risk, effort and power—which we identified through our empirical work. Our findings reveal that community members are often willing to take risks and put in effort, if they are compensated with more power within the community. Similarly, members are willing to compromise power if no effort or risk-taking is required from them. This demonstrates the interdependency of the tenets “procedural justice” and “distributional justice” within energy communities. We reflect on the need for energy justice theory and policymakers to recognize the significance of this interdependency.

The convergent development of distributed electricity sources, storage technologies, ‘big data’ devices, and novel ICT infrastructure matching energy supply and demand enables new local and collective forms of energy consumption and production. This socio-technical evolution has been accompanied by the development of citizen energy communities that have been supported by EU energy governance and directives, adopting a political narrative of placing the citizen central in the ongoing energy transition. But to what extent are the ideals that motivate the energy community movement compatible with those of neoliberalism that have guided EU energy policy for the last four decades? Using a framework inspired by Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality, we analyze the two political forms from three dimensions: ontological, economic and power politics. For the ontological and the economic dimensions, neoliberal governmentality is flexible enough to accommodate the tensions raised by the communitarians. In the dimension of power politics however, the communitarian logic does raise a fundamental challenge to neoliberal governmentality in the sense that it explicitly aims for a redefinition of the ‘common good’ of society’s energy supply based on democratic premises.

This paper aims to open up high-level waste management practices to a political philosophical questioning, beyond the enclosure implied by the normative ethics approaches that prevail in the literature. Building on previous insights derived from mediation theory, Foucault and science and technology studies, mediation theory’s appropriation of Foucauldian insights is shown to be in need of modification and further extension. In particular, we modify Dorrestijn’s figure of “technical determination of power relations” to better take into account the aspects of imagination, and complement Dorrestijn’s work with the figures of techno-scientific mediation, and the inherently political figures of socio-technical and state-technical mediation, both based on Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Our analysis implies that the practical implementation of a high-level nuclear waste management strategy will require the “stitching together” of these different mediations, which is an inherently political task.

Research on the effectiveness of case studies in teaching engineering ethics in higher education is underdeveloped. To add to our knowledge, we have systematically compared the outcomes of two case approaches to an undergraduate course on the ethics of technology: a detached approach using real-life cases and a challenge-based learning approach with students and stakeholders acting as co-creators. We first developed a practical typology of case-study approaches and subsequently tested an evaluation method to assess the students’ learning experiences and outcomes and staff interpretations and operationalizations, seeking to answer three questions: Do students in the CBL approach report higher basic needs, motivation and competence development compared to their peers in the detached approach? What is the relationship between student-perceived co-creation and their basic needs, motivation and competence development? And what are the implications of CBL/CC for engineering-ethics teaching and learning? Our mixed methods analysis favored CBL as it best supported teaching and research goals while satisfying the students’ basic needs and promoting intrinsic motivation and communication competences. Competence progress in other areas did not differ between approaches, and motivation in terms of identified regulation was lower for CBL, with staff perceiving a higher workload. We propose that our case typology model is useful and that as a method to engage students as co-creators, CBL certainly merits further development and evaluation, as does our effectiveness analysis for engineering ethics instruction in general and for case-study approaches in particular.

This chapter discusses how a comparative philosophical model can contribute to both substantive and procedural values in energy policy. We discuss the substantive values in the mainstream light-emitting diodes debate and Taylor Stone’s alternative plea for darkness. We also explore Value Sensitive Design as a procedural approach. We conclude that the comparative philosophical model of Ulrich Libbrecht can appropriately broaden the set of substantive values used in VSD. We discuss the values of ‘by-itself-so’ and ‘alter-intentionality’, which come with the unforeseen necessity of accepting elements from other worldviews and of normativity in the procedural VSD approach.

Our energy systems are truly international, and yet even now, our energy policies tend to be grounded at the national level and in many instances, remain ill-equipped to tackle transboundary energy issues. Our energy policy systems are also largely detached from the concerns of ethics or justice. It follows that we must find new and innovative ways of not conceptualising these normative issues, but of operationalising response to them. This book stems from the emergent gap: the need for comparative approaches to energy justice, and for those that consider non-Western ethical traditions. Opening the edited volume, this chapter begins by giving context to the concept of “energy justice” itself and outlines our comparative philosophical approach to it, focusing specifically on “global philosophy” for its role in dialectically engaging with philosophies from around the world. We then show how the different chapters of the volume contribute to this purpose in four parts: setting the scene, practice, applying theory to practice and theoretical approaches. The final section of this chapter concludes with reflections on the contribution of global philosophy approaches to energy justice as with a set of future research recommendations. Through these recommendations, and all of those within, we position the book as one that contributes to energy justice scholarship across borders of nations, borders of ways of thinking and borders of disciplines.

This paper makes a conceptual inquiry into the notion of ‘publics’, and forwards an understanding of this notion that allows more responsible forms of decision-making with regards to technologies that have localized impacts, such as wind parks, hydrogen stations or flood barriers. The outcome of this inquiry is that the acceptability of a decision is to be assessed by a plurality of ‘publics’, including that of a local community. Even though a plurality of ‘publics’ might create competing normative demands, its acknowledgment is necessary to withstand the monopolization of the process of technology appraisal. The paper presents four ways in which such an appropriation of publicness takes place. The creation of dedicated ‘local publics’, in contrast, helps to overcome these problems and allows for more responsible forms of decision-making. We describe ‘local publics’ as those in which stakeholders from the different publics that are related to the process of technology implementation are brought together, and in which concerns and issues from these publics are deliberated upon. The paper will present eight conditions for increasing the effectiveness of such ‘local publics’.

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. We must find new and innovative ways of conceptualizing transboundary energy issues, of embedding concerns of ethics or justice into energy policy, and of operationalizing response to them. This book stems from the emergent gap; the need for comparative approaches to energy justice, and for those that consider ethical traditions that go beyond the classical Western approach. This edited volume unites the fields of energy justice and comparative philosophy to provide an overarching global perspective and approach to applying energy ethics. We contribute to this purpose in four sections: setting the scene, practice, applying theory to practice, and theoretical approaches. Through the chapters featured in the volume, we position the book as one that contributes to energy justice scholarship across borders of nations, borders of ways of thinking and borders of disciplines. The outcome will be of interest to undergraduate and graduate students studying energy justice, ethics and environment, as well as energy scholars, policy makers, and energy analysts.