Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva

Psychiatrists such as Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg, and Yoshiki Ishisaka have presented the posthumous diagnosis that philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein had Asperger’s Syndrome. In this essay, I question this diagnosis by presenting evidence that Wittgenstein’s autism condition was significantly more severe than that. Taking into account this prospect, as well as the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria, I raise the possibility to be discussed by experts in Autism Spectrum Disorder that Wittgenstein had below-average intelligence or even intellectual disability, which is a common co-occurring condition associated with moderate to severe autism. Among other cognitive and behavioral characteristics that corroborate this hypothesis, I consider the fact that Wittgenstein only began to speak at the age of four, he had poor school performance, he was frequently aggressive, and he presented lifelong reading and writing difficulties.

In this book, I propose reconciling Generative Grammar, Cognitive Linguistics and Emergentism in Biolinguistics. I specifically intend to combine these three fields of research into a variant of Ray Jackendoff's Parallel Architecture, in which the semantic-conceptual structure is unfolded into a semantic structure and a pragmatic structure. To do so, I will firstly support Jackendoff's critiques of Noam Chomsky's syntacticocentrism, adding in also critiques of Ronald Langacker's semanticocentrism, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's metaphorocentrism as well as of Michael Tomasello's culturalism. Secondly, I will refute the premise that Cognitive Linguistics and Generative Grammar are incompatible and irreconcilable. Instead, I claim that cognitivism and generativism are complementary research programs since generativists and cognitivists focus on different aspects of language in their studies. Finally, I aim to contribute to the acknowledgment of greater empirical adequacy of linguistic models in Parallel Architecture in comparison to competing theoretical frameworks, such as Chomsky's Minimalist Program, Lakoff and Johnson's cognitivism, and Langacker's and Tomasello's Cognitive-Functional Linguistics.

In this master's thesis, I compare Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistics with Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. I particularly compare how these two authors made use of metaphors and analogies in the formation of their ideas, highlighting the analogy between language and a game, which both of them employed. To help clarify the different ways Saussure and Wittgenstein used metaphors and analogies in their texts, I drew on the theory of double filters by the linguist and psychologist Karl Bühler. Based on this theory, I show how Wittgenstein, on one hand, took his metaphors and analogies to the extreme, that is, disregarding disparities between the concepts employed in these metaphors and analogies, while Saussure, on the other hand, was more measured in using his metaphors and analogies. Furthermore, I detail how Wittgenstein relied on metaphors and analogies to support his ideas, while Saussure used them primarily in areas where he was not completely confident in the linguistic theories he was developing. The main objective of revisiting the comparison between Saussure and Wittgenstein, which dates back at least to the book "Ludwig Wittgenstein: His Place in the Development of Semantics," published by Tullio de Mauro in 1967, is to offer new perspectives on both Saussure's linguistics and Wittgenstein's philosophy, which greatly influenced discussions about language throughout the 20th century and still hold a prominent place in philosophy and linguistics today. [Nesta dissertação comparo a linguística de Ferdinand de Saussure com a filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Comparo particularmente os modos como esses dois autores se valeram de metáforas e de analogias na constituição de suas ideias, com destaque à analogia entre a linguagem e um jogo, à qual ambos recorreram. Para ajudar a explicitar as diferentes maneiras como Saussure e Wittgenstein utilizaram metáforas e analogias em seus textos, vali-me da teoria dos filtros duplos do linguista e psicólogo Karl Bühler. Com base nessa teoria, mostro como Wittgenstein, de um lado, levou suas metáforas e analogias às últimas consequências, ou seja, desconsiderando disparidades entre os conceitos empregados nessas metáforas e analogias, enquanto Saussure, de outro, foi mais ponderado ao empregar suas metáforas e analogias. Além disso, detalho como Wittgenstein se apoiou em metáforas e analogias para fundamentar suas ideias, enquanto Saussure as empregou essencialmente nos pontos em que não tinha total segurança das teorias linguísticas que estava desenvolvendo. O principal objetivo de retomar a comparação entre Saussure e Wittgenstein, que remonta ao menos ao livro "Ludwig Wittgenstein: his place in the development of semantics", publicado por Tullio de Mauro em 1967, é lançar novos olhares tanto à linguística de Saussure quanto à filosofia de Wittgenstein, que tanto influenciaram as discussões sobre a linguagem ao longo do século 20 e ainda hoje ocupam papel destacado na filosofia e na linguística.]

The metaphysical assumption that nature is perfect has been one of the foundations of modern physics since the 17th century. Because of the success of this discipline, researchers in other fields of knowledge have followed its principles, including the idea that nature is perfect. A fascinating case of this epistemological transposition occurred in the 20th century with Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar, especially in his Minimalist Program. In it, Chomsky takes to its ultimate consequences what he called ‘the Galilean intuition that “nature is perfect,”’ proposing that language is also perfect. Since it is also assumed in generativism that language is a biological system, the conjecture that it is perfect results in the highly improbable wager that it is unique from a biological point of view. This is because, being the result of evolutionary accidents, biological systems are characteristically imperfect. Given this almost paradoxical situation reached in Chomsky’s minimalism, I argue in this paper that it makes no sense to adopt the metaphysical assumption that language is perfect. I also suggest that a parallel architecture model of language such as Ray Jackendoff’s seems to have a good chance of becoming the main research program of biolinguistics because it is more consistent with the typical features of a mental system such as language than Chomsky’s minimalism.

In The Principles of Mechanics, Heinrich Hertz argues that, instead of trying to answer the question “what is force?,” as physicists and philosophers had unsuccessfully been doing, Newtonian physics should be reformulated without using “force” as a basic concept. Decades after the publication of Hertz’s book, Ludwig Wittgenstein would consider this proposal a perfect model for how to solve philosophical problems, to the point of adopting it as the basis for his way of doing philosophy. Considering this scenario, this article discusses not only Wittgenstein’s method of doing philosophy but also why he failed in his attempt to solve philosophical problems – just as Hertz had failed in his project to reformulate Newtonian physics without using the concept of “force.” To illustrate Wittgenstein’s failure, his disputes with mathematicians Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing over the foundations of mathematics are examined.

In the essay ‘Wittgenstein on mathematics’, Michael Potter offers not only an analysis of why Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is so controversial among philosophers and mathematicians but also justifies such controversy. For that purpose, Potter emphasizes that Wittgenstein’s discussions on math are unfinished. In contrast to this position, this paper sheds light on some inconsistencies and contradictions in Wittgenstein’s mathematic thoughts that, although reinforcing the decade-long criticism of the author, did not interest scholars as much as Wittgenstein’s comments on Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

In his philosophy of mind, Ludwig Wittgenstein repeatedly states we do not think with our heads or in our heads. However, he does not offer clear arguments to sustain such an opinion. Furthermore, his readers do not focus appropriately on this aspect of his philosophy. Therefore, this paper questions why Wittgenstein insisted on the idea that we do not think with our heads or in our heads. The proposed explanation is that through this statement Wittgenstein was trying to justify his conceptual method, to the detriment of scientific methods used in psychology. In addition, this work analyzes some implications of Wittgenstein’s statement in his critique of G. E. Moore’s refutation of philosophical skepticism and his attacks on psychology and psychoanalysis.

Psychiatrists such as Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg, and Yoshiki Ishisaka diagnosed Ludwig Wittgenstein posthumously with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Taking into account this diagnosis, as well as the fact that people with ASD tend to have fixed, concrete, literal ways of talking and thinking, I analyze in this paper how Wittgenstein’s pictorial thinking is reflected in his texts, including the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – the book that represents Wittgenstein’s first philosophy, which is based on a picture theory of language – and the Philosophical Investigations – the book that synthesizes Wittgenstein’s second philosophy, in which he presents a critical review of the Tractarian conception of language.

This article investigates the uses that Ferdinand de Saussure made of metaphors, analogies, and comparisons both in the manuscripts collected in the Writings in General Linguistics and in the Course in General Linguistics. The aim is to show that, more than the erasures and gaps in the manuscripts, it is the images and figures that Saussure employs in his texts that reveal his doubts and hesitations in the pursuit of a theory of general linguistics. With this reanalysis of the analogies, metaphors, and comparisons made by Saussure, the intention is to cast a new light not only on his legacy but also on the fact that he did not publish the results of his reflections on language.

In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein reveals that he owed “the most fruitful ideas” of the work to the “stimulus” of the economist Piero Sraffa. Curiously, however, according to Amartya Sen (2003), Sraffa considered his point of view – which emphasizes the relationship between language and the sociocultural environment in which it is used – “rather obvious,” found it tedious to talk to Wittgenstein, and was never excited about having decisively influenced his later philosophy. To justify Sraffa’s behavior, Sen (2003) argues that his former professor considered his social approach to language trivial – which contrasts with the logical approach of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – basically due to his Marxist background. In contrast to this explanation by Sen (2003), I argue in this article that Sraffa’s point of view is indeed “rather obvious,” having a long list of precursors that goes back to Ancient Greece. To prove this statement, I revisit here both the works of philosophers with whom Wittgenstein engages in his texts, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Augustine, as well as esteemed authors he apparently did not know, among them the linguists William D. Whitney, Hermann Paul, and Ferdinand de Saussure.

Since the mid-20th century, the so-called analytic philosophy has been considered the dominant philosophical tradition in English-speaking countries, especially England and the United States. Despite this, there is still no clarity or the slightest consensus on what analytic philosophy means. Given this scenario, I argue in this paper that analytic philosophy has never really constituted itself as a philosophical school. My objective is to show how the criticisms that have been made of philosophy in recent centuries – including the obscurantism of philosophical texts, the lack of methodological rigor of philosophical investigations, and the lack of attention of philosophers to scientific advances – have not really been eliminated by analytical philosophers but only “pushed” by them to what they began to call, a few decades ago, in a vague way, continental philosophy.

In his preface to the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein sets forth the book as a work with the intent to draw a limit to the expression of thoughts. He further argues that such a limit could only be drawn in language and, therefore, only nonsense would lie on the other side of it. However, as Wittgenstein himself accepts in his work, the very Tractatus, and the entire philosophy alike, are beyond the limit drawn for the expression of thoughts. Given such a paradox, contemporary readers carry on the debate concerning what Wittgenstein understood as the limits of language. In this paper, I state that regardless of how the limits to expression are understood, Wittgenstein has never respected them before or after writing the Tractatus. Besides, against the common opinion concerning the existence of genuine philosophical progress between Wittgenstein’s first and second philosophies, I highlight how the main issue in Wittgenstein’s first philosophy is also the main issue in his second philosophy: the fact that Wittgenstein has never followed his own methods.

Falsas definições, má exemplificação e diversidade de conceituação e multiplicidade de análise. Em 1983, no livro Da necessidade de uma gramática-padrão da língua portuguesa, Amini Boainain Hauy aponta esses três problemas-chave das gramáticas tradicionais de língua portuguesa, argumentando ser necessário produzir uma gramática “objetiva, coerente e uniforme” a fim de que o ensino gramatical nas escolas de nível fundamental e médio deixe de ser “deficiente e improdutivo”. Seria isso possível? Nesta obra, Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva evidencia que, quase 40 anos depois de esse alerta ter sido feito, ainda não se elaborou no Brasil uma gramática aos moldes daquela idealizada por Hauy. Para isso, analisou gramáticas lançadas nas últimas décadas no país por autores como a própria Hauy, Maria Helena de Moura Neves, José Carlos de Azeredo, Ataliba Teixeira de Castilho, Marcos Bagno, Mário Alberto Perini e Lorenzo Vitral, apontando que as mesmas falhas e divergências teóricas das gramáticas tradicionais são encontradas nessas publicações. Para compreender por que os conceitos gramaticais, de modo geral, não têm limites rígidos nem podem ser coerentemente definidos, ele se baseia nos textos do filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre “semelhanças de família” e nos trabalhos clássicos da psicóloga Eleanor Rosch sobre categorização. Por conseguinte, à luz da pedagogia humanizante, libertadora e problematizadora de Paulo Freire, o autor propõe uma metodologia de ensino dos conceitos gramaticais que, em vez de apresentar respostas prontas – e muitas vezes insatisfatórias –, visa estimular os alunos a produzir suas próprias classificações e definições gramaticais, em diálogo com os gramáticos e linguistas. Com isso, busca auxiliar os professores de língua portuguesa a levar os alunos a reinventar a gramática em sala de aula – especialmente no ensino médio.

Ray Jackendoff understands that Noam Chomsky’s linguistic models distort the nature of language due to its ‘syntactocentrism.’ Coined by Jackendoff, this term means Chomsky’s assumption that the syntactic component of language is central while the phonological and semantic components are merely interpretive. Jackendoff also states that since the 1970s many researchers have made a mistake opposite to Chomsky’s, by denying that syntax has a relevant role in grammar. Considering such a scenario, this paper analyzes Ronald Langacker’s cognitive grammar, in which syntax is replaced by semantics as the central linguistic component. The goal is to show how Langacker misrepresented language structure by doing so.

In the essay “Cognitive Linguistics and Autonomous Linguistics,” published in 2007 in the Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, John R. Taylor suggests the dialogue and even the integration of cognitive linguistics with other strands of language studies. Following this line of argument, I reanalyze George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors in this paper. I aim to make explicit the empirical and rhetorical excesses of these authors since the publication of the book Metaphors We Live By, 45 years ago, as a consequence to a large extent of their attack on Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar. With this, I hope to facilitate the approximation between generativism and cognitivism in biolinguistics.

In the last decades, psychologist Michael Tomasello became a leading critic of Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar. Within the framework of his cognitive-functional linguistics, which is associated with emergentism and cognitive linguistics, Tomasello challenges the central pillars of generativism, including the innateness thesis, autonomy of syntax hypothesis, and language module alike. Considering the influence of Tomasello’s ideas, this paper rediscusses the theoretical foundations of his work. The objective in doing so is to reaffirm the validity of generativism’s theoretical assumptions. Notwithstanding this, it is argued that it seems possible, and even necessary, to integrate many aspects of emergentists’ discussions regarding language acquisition and Tomasello’s cognitive-functional linguistics into a research program grounded in a modular conception of language.

Em 27 de janeiro de 1937, o filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) anotou em seu diário, enquanto viajava para Skjolden, um vilarejo norueguês à beira do fiorde Sogne, onde havia construído em 1913 uma cabana para viver isolado: “Certamente sou singular em muitas coisas & por isso, muitas pessoas se comportam de maneira comum quando comparadas comigo; mas em que consiste minha singularidade?” De acordo com psiquiatras contemporâneos como Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg e Yoshiki Ishisaka, a singularidade de Wittgenstein decorria de ele ter autismo. Considerando-se o diagnóstico póstumo feito por esses especialistas em transtorno do espectro autista, este livro tem dois objetivos básicos: (1) detalhar como se refletem na obra de Wittgenstein tanto as suas particularidades comportamentais quanto as suas dificuldades cognitivas, inclusive aquelas relacionadas à linguagem, e (2) mostrar que Wittgenstein “dissolveu” em sua segunda filosofia, especialmente nas Investigações filosóficas, problemas que não são problemas para ninguém valendo-se de conhecimentos linguísticos e filosóficos básicos acumulados no Ocidente desde a Grécia Antiga que ele havia ignorado no Tractatus logico-philosophicus, livro de sua primeira filosofia.

No prefácio do Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein afirma que a pretensão do livro era traçar um limite para a expressão dos pensamentos e que esse limite só poderia ser traçado na linguagem, sendo um contrassenso o que estivesse além desse limite. No entanto, como o próprio Wittgenstein admite na obra, o Tractatus mesmo, assim como toda a filosofia, está além desse limite traçado para a expressão dos pensamentos. Dada essa situação paradoxal, ainda hoje os intérpretes do texto debatem sobre o que Wittgenstein realmente entendia como sendo os limites da linguagem. Tendo em vista essa questão, o objetivo central deste artigo é mostrar que, independentemente do modo como tais limites sejam entendidos, Wittgenstein não os respeitou nem antes, nem depois de ter escrito o Tractatus. Feito isso, passa-se à análise do fato pouco discutido pelos wittgensteinianos de que, se os limites da linguagem traçados no Tractatus fossem obedecidos, não haveria matemática.

Em sua filosofia da mente, Ludwig Wittgenstein afirma repetidas vezes que não pensamos com as nossas cabeças ou nelas. No entanto, não apresenta argumentos claros em favor desse posicionamento. Para piorar, os comentadores de sua obra não dão a esse aspecto de sua filosofia a atenção devida. Em vista disso, neste artigo investiga-se por que Wittgenstein tanto insistiu em dizer que não pensamos com as nossas cabeças ou nelas. A explicação que se oferece é que Wittgenstein o fez visando a justificar seu método conceitual, em detrimento dos métodos científicos utilizados na psicologia. Além disso, são analisadas algumas implicações da afirmação de Wittgenstein de que não pensamos com as nossas cabeças ou nelas a suas críticas à refutação de G. E. Moore ao ceticismo filosófico e a seus ataques à psicologia e à psicanálise.

No artigo “Wittgenstein: universalismo, lógica, gramática y lenguaje”, Alejandro Tomasini Bassols afirma que o problema com que Wittgenstein se depara ao fim do Tractatus ”“ as proposições do livro serem elucidações e contrassensos ”“ teve origem em seu erro de considerar a lógica, e não a linguagem, como o mais universal. Bassols afirma ainda que o assim chamado “paradoxo do Tractatus” não foi uma ameaça à segunda filosofia wittgensteiniana porque nela Wittgenstein não cometeu o mesmo erro. Neste artigo argumenta-se que as proposições do Tractatus são contrassensos como consequência direta da teoria pictórica do significado, independentemente da ontologia tractatiana. Além disso, divergindo da opinião de Bassols de ter havido “genuíno progresso filosófico” entre a primeira e a segunda filosofia de Wittgenstein, ressalta-se como o mais sério problema que marca a primeira filosofia wittgensteiniana também marca a segunda: o contrassenso de que Wittgenstein nunca seguiu os próprios métodos filosóficos.

No prefácio das _Investigações filosóficas_, Ludwig Wittgenstein revela que ao “estímulo” do economista Piero Sraffa devia “as ideias mais fecundas” da obra. Curiosamente, porém, segundo Amartya Sen, Sraffa considerava seu ponto de vista – que enfatiza a relação entre a linguagem e o meio sociocultural em que ela é empregada – “um tanto óbvio”, achava tedioso conversar com Wittgenstein e nunca se entusiasmou por ter influenciado decisivamente sua filosofia tardia. Para justificar o comportamento de Sraffa, Sen argumenta que seu ex-professor julgava trivial a sua abordagem social da linguagem – que se opõe à abordagem lógica do _Tractatus logico-philosophicus_ – basicamente devido à sua formação marxista. Em divergência a essa explicação de Sen, sustenta-se neste artigo que o ponto de vista de Sraffa é realmente “um tanto óbvio”, tendo uma longa lista de precursores que remonta à Grécia Antiga. A fim de comprovar essa afirmação, são retomadas aqui tanto as obras de filósofos com os quais Wittgenstein dialoga em seus textos, como Platão, Aristóteles e Santo Agostinho, quanto autores prestigiados que ele aparentemente desconhecia, entre os quais os linguistas _William D. Whitney, Hermann Paul e Ferdinand de Saussure._

No ensaio “Wittgenstein on mathematics”, publicado no Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Michael Potter procura não apenas analisar por que a filosofia da matemática de Wittgenstein é tão controvertida entre filósofos e matemáticos como justificar essa situação. Com esse intuito, Potter enfatiza o caráter inacabado das reflexões de Wittgenstein sobre a matemática. Neste artigo, tem-se por objetivo explicitar algumas inconsistências e contradições no pensamento matemático de Wittgenstein que ratificam as críticas que esse autor vem recebendo há décadas, mas que não tiveram a mesma atenção dos especialistas que os comentários de Wittgenstein sobre os teoremas da incompletude de Kurt Gödel e suas discussões com Alan Turing sobre os fundamentos da matemática.

In The Principles of Mechanics, physicist Heinrich Hertz argues that instead of replying to the question “what is force?” like physicists and philosophers had been doing unsuccessfully, Newtonian physics should be reformulated without considering “force” a basic concept. Decades after Hertz’s book, Ludwig Wittgenstein considered the physicist’s proposal a perfect model for how philosophical problems should be solved, to the point that he made it the foundation of his way of doing philosophy. This article addresses Wittgenstein’s way of doing philosophy, while it also proposes the reason why he failed in solving the philosophical problems — as did Hertz in his project on reformulating Newtonian physics without considering the concept “force”. And to illustrate Wittgenstein’s failure, it examines his disputes with mathematicians Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing on the foundations of mathematics.

Em sua segunda filosofia, Ludwig Wittgenstein apresenta um método por exemplos com o intuito de resolver de vez os problemas filosóficos. De acordo com Wittgenstein, em vez de buscar a essência definidora dos conceitos, como Sócrates demandava de seus interlocutores, caberia aos filósofos dar exemplos dos conceitos a fim de responder às questões tradicionais da filosofia, como “O que é o conhecimento?”, “O que é a amizade?”, “O que é o justo?”. Neste artigo, não apenas se argumenta que o método por exemplos de Wittgenstein nunca poderia resolver de vez os problemas filosóficos porque diferentes pessoas dão diferentes exemplos de um conceito, sendo impossível decidir objetivamente quais são os exemplos certos e quais são os exemplos errados, como se analisa o fato de que Wittgenstein desconsiderou esse empecilho ao sucesso de seu método ao elaborá-lo. Além disso, reitera-se neste texto o dever dos filósofos de buscar a essência definidora dos conceitos.

Psychiatrists such as Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg and Yoshiki Ishisaka diagnosed Ludwig Wittgenstein posthumously with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Taking this diagnosis into account, the present paper discusses how Wittgenstein's philosophy reveals his cognitive difficulties. Wittgenstein's grammatical inquiries are particularly investigated here, highlighting his misunderstandings concerning the use of words – specially, his misunderstandings concerning analogies, which he tended to interpret literally.

Em Meu pensamento filosófico, Bertrand Russell afirma que a segunda filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein lhe parecia inteiramente ininteligível e constituída de doutrinas positivas triviais e de doutrinas negativas infundadas. Essas críticas ainda hoje são largamente consideradas como decorrentes do fato de Russell não ter compreendido as ideias tardias de Wittgenstein. Em oposição a esse julgamento, neste artigo argumenta-se que o diagnóstico póstumo de que Wittgenstein era autista suscita uma nova interpretação tanto de suas doutrinas positivas quanto de suas doutrinas negativas, levando a uma revalorização do parecer de Russell sobre elas.