Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua

In recent years, there has been a surge in studies of populism and developmentalism. However, little attention has been paid to the ideas of Latin American thinkers who grappled with these phenomena during the Populist Republic, a democratic period of Brazil’s history that spans from 1950 to 1964. This article reassesses the writings of Brazilian philosophers Roland Corbisier (1914–2005) and Álvaro Vieira Pinto (1909–1987) published while they were affiliated to ISEB, a research centre created in Rio de Janeiro in 1955 that was closed down with the military coup d’état of 1964. Corbisier and Vieira Pinto advanced a revolutionary populism, which mobilises the people in order to bring about a national revolution, and an anticolonial developmentalism, which identified imperialism as the major obstacle to development. Analysing their works together supports three arguments that are usually overlooked: (1) Latin American developmentalism was not an uncritical reproduction of Western conceptions of progress and modernisation; (2) the distinction between dependency theory and developmentalism is not as sharp as some intellectual historians have portrayed it; (3) in countries affected by neocolonialism, populism may initially have salutary effects on democracy, but in the long run it often becomes undemocratic.

John Stuart Mill was a reader of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his defense of representative democracy can be read as a response to the critique of political representation advanced in _ The Social Contract _. To develop his theory of democratic representation, Mill had to refute the following theses that Rousseau presented to rule out the possibility of a representative democracy: (1) sovereignty consists only of the will; and (2) representation is always a form of delegation. Mill’s _ Considerations on Representative Government _ argues that (1) sovereignty encompasses will and judgment; and (2) representation does not require delegating political power from the represented to the representative. When a representative government is democratic, representation fosters, rather than inhibits, popular participation.

This submission explores the concept of aesthetic justice pedagogy, and advocates on behalf of it. In contrast to aesthetic injustice, which denotes any harm done to a person’s aesthetic capacities, aesthetic justice pedagogy aims at facilitating the development of students’ imagination, perception, and feelings, wherein narrative and story-making are prime locations to contest coloniality and oppression. We emphasize the practice of this philosophy, refusing to see it as only as metaphor or theory. In our attempt to build a praxis of philosophy, education, and art, we lean upon diverse thinkers such as Augusto Boal, John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Ursula K. Le Guin. We maintain that aesthetic justice pedagogy requires spaces of liberation whereby initiates can practice, rehearse, and perform new realities and create counter-narratives through various modalities of story-writing. Boal’s Aesthetics of the Oppressed, Dewey’s understanding of dramatic rehearsal, Freire’s work in Culture Circles, and Le Guin’s critique of the father tongue combine art, re-storying, and imagination in ways that are unique to the traditional practices of arts education. We conclude by reemphasizing the liberatory ways in which practice (aesthetic work that is done alone), rehearsal (art work with others), and performance (imagination’s accomplishment) come to identify unique qualities and practices of an aesthetic justice pedagogy.

The relationship between representative democracy and conflict in John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy has been interpreted in very different ways. While some scholars claim that Millian democracy is incompatible with political conflict, others identify in Mill a radical agonism that would offer a non-consensual model of deliberative democracy. This paper argues that neither of these views is accurate: although he highlights the centrality of conflict in political life, Mill believes that democratic deliberation presupposes a minimal level of consensus regarding the formal value of the basic principles of democracy. Initially, I reconstruct the relationship between conflict and consensus in Mill’s conception of representative democracy. I then investigate his association of representation and advocacy and show that Mill’s encomium on political conflict was influenced by Guizot's work. Finally, I explain how a democratic debate riven with conflict is conducive to individual freedom.

This article seeks to contribute to the debate on how political representation can promote democracy by analysing the Chamber in the Square, which is a component of legislative theatre. A set of techniques devised to democratise representative governments, legislative theatre was created by Augusto Boal when he was elected a political representative in 1993. After briefly reviewing Nadia Urbinati’s understanding of democratic representation as a diarchy of will and judgement, I partially endorse Hélène Landemore’s criticism and contend that if representation is to be democratic, citizens’ exchange of opinions in the public sphere should be invested with the power not only to judge, but also to decide political affairs. By opening up a space where the represented can judge, decide, and contest the general terms of the bills representatives present in the assembly, the Chamber in the Square harnesses political representation to democracy.

O artigo busca elaborar um conceito de liberdade democrática como desenvolvimento de si, resistência à opressão e à injustiça epistêmica mediante engajamento crítico com as obras de Paulo Freire, Amílcar Cabral e Augusto Boal. No pensamento dos três autores, democracia, liberdade e desenvolvimento de si constituem uma tríade de mútua influência, de sorte que o pleno exercício de quaisquer desses itens é impossível na ausência de qualquer um dos outros dois. Trata-se de mostrar, além disso, a maneira pela qual a opressão é compreendida nos trabalhos dos três pensadores como o oposto da liberdade, e a injustiça epistêmica, como uma dimensão psíquica da opressão.

Relativamente difundida na teoria democrática contemporânea, a dicotomia entre democracia epistêmica e democracia agonística é endossada por autores como Luis Felipe Miguel, Chantal Mouffe e Nadia Urbinati. De acordo com eles, a ideia de que a deliberação democrática possa funcionar como uma troca de argumentos racionais que visa à verdade é incompatível com o reconhecimento do conflito como um componente basilar da política. Tudo se passa, pois, como se a abordagem epistêmica estivesse fadada a obliterar a dimensão agonística da política. A fim de problematizar semelhante entendimento, este artigo reconstrói a associação entre democracia e compromisso feita por John Stuart Mill, John Morley e Hans Kelsen e conclui que a conceitualização da democracia como compromisso oferece uma alternativa à dicotomia democracia epistêmica vs. democracia agonística.

Trata-se de relacionar as duas posições concorrentes que pautaram o debate sobre representação e democracia na filosofia moderna. Em um primeiro momento, reconstruiremos a crítica à representação, feita por Jean-Jacques Rousseau, no Contrato social (1762). A incompatibilidade entre democracia e representação postulada neste livro apoia-se nos seguintes pressupostos: 1) a soberania consiste unicamente na vontade; 2) a representação é uma forma de delegação. Em um segundo momento, investigaremos a defesa da democracia representativa, feita por John Stuart Mill, em Considerações sobre o governo representativo (1861) e destacaremos como Mill busca rebater a crítica à representação feita por Rousseau. Para que pudesse elaborar o conceito de representação democrática, Mill precisou problematizar os dois pressupostos do Contrato social. Como resultado deste esforço, Mill postulou as seguintes teses: 1) a soberania engloba não só a vontade, mas também o juízo; 2) a representação não pressupõe a delegação do poder político do representado para o representante. Daí a possibilidade de uma democracia representativa e participativa.

Mill’s socialism and democratic theory have led some scholars to accuse him of trying to eliminate conflict from political life. Whereas Graeme Duncan has averred that Mill’s socialism aims to institute a completely harmonious society, James Fitzjames Stephen has contended that Millian democracy sought to evacuate conflict from political discussion. This article reconstructs both critiques and argues they are imprecise. Even if disputes motivated by redistribution of material goods would no longer exist in an egalitarian society, conflicts driven by resentment over social reputation would keep the flame of conflict burning in a Millian socialist community. Moreover, a close reading of Considerations on Representative Government shows that Mill knew that no amount of political discussion is able to make conflicting opinions disappear. According to him, conflict is unavoidable in democratic politics because citizens analyse political issues from different social perspectives. Mill’s goal was not to eliminate conflict, but rather to regulate it in such a way as to bring about its attendant benefits, namely, progress and self-development.

The agonistic vs. epistemic dichotomy is fairly widespread in contemporary democratic theory and is endorsed by scholars as outstanding as Luis Felipe Miguel, Chantal Mouffe, and Nadia Urbinati. According to them, the idea that democratic deliberation can work as a rational exchange of arguments that aims at truth is incompatible with the recognition of conflict as a central feature of politics. In other words, the epistemic approach is bound to obliterate the agonistic and conflictive dimension of democracy. This article takes this dichotomized way of thinking to task by reconstructing the association between democracy and compromise made by John Stuart Mill, John Morley, and Hans Kelsen. It concludes that the conceptualization of democracy as compromise offers an alternative to the agonistic vs. epistemic divide that disconcerts a significant part of political philosophy today.