Gustavo Ortiz-Millan

This article explores the relationship between zoonotic outbreaks and the interconnected nature of globalization through the lens of the One Health framework. It argues that global ecological changes driven by climate changes, deforestation, intensified agriculture, wildlife trade, and urban expansion have significantly elevated the risk of zoonotic disease transmission. It emphasizes how globalization has intensified some of the factors that contribute to the emergence of zoonotic outbreaks, and has also facilitated the spread of infectious diseases. Drawing on recent examples, such as the emergence of H1N1, COVID-19 and Nipah virus outbreaks, the article emphasizes the need for robust, interdisciplinary collaboration among human, animal, and environmental health sectors. The article advocates for a comprehensive global strategy rooted in the One Health approach to mitigate future zoonotic threats. It argues that this approach is based on an ethical principle of solidarity, which refers to the enacted commitment to support others based on the recognition of shared vulnerabilities or similarities. This principle is essential for collective responses to global challenges like zoonotic diseases. The One Health approach requires reinvesting in multilateral governance, enhancing wildlife and livestock surveillance, and addressing socio-environmental drivers of disease emergence, thereby promoting planetary health and global biosecurity. However, it also highlights the vulnerabilities created by nationalistic and populist policies, based on a distrust of multilateral organizations and international cooperation, and that have underfunded global health institutions, particularly affecting low-resource regions where early detection systems are lacking.

Do healthcare workers have a duty to treat contagious patients, even when it poses risks to their own health and lives during a pandemic? This article explores various justifications proposed in the literature to support such a duty. However, it contends that none of these provides a strong enough basis for establishing an absolute duty to treat—although it acknowledges that the bar of justification may be raised when working on more clear and explicit conditions in contracts and codes of ethics, among others. Furthermore, even if such a duty were acknowledged, it must be weighed against healthcare workers’ other duties toward their families, co-workers, and personal well-being. Moreover, the duty to treat is argued to be contingent on the circumstances in which healthcare professionals operate, including access to adequate personal protective equipment provided by their institutions. It would have to be balanced against their right to safe working conditions. Within this context, the duty to treat is inherently tied to the preparedness of the State, healthcare systems, or institutions to effectively respond to emergencies.

Do healthcare workers have a duty to treat contagious patients, even when it poses risks to their own health and lives during a pandemic? This article explores various justifications proposed in the literature to support such a duty. However, it contends that none of these provides a strong enough basis for establishing an absolute duty to treat—although it acknowledges that the bar of justification may be raised when working on more clear and explicit conditions in contracts and codes of ethics, among others. Furthermore, even if such a duty were acknowledged, it must be weighed against healthcare workers’ other duties toward their families, co-workers, and personal well-being. Moreover, the duty to treat is argued to be contingent on the circumstances in which healthcare professionals operate, including access to adequate personal protective equipment provided by their institutions. It would have to be balanced against their right to safe working conditions. Within this context, the duty to treat is inherently tied to the preparedness of the State, healthcare systems, or institutions to effectively respond to emergencies.

This work is a characterization and a criticism of the Belief-Desire Model , and of the way in which recent debates about the nature of value judgments have revolved around it. I propose a characterization of the BDM unifying parts of the theory that appear spread in different theories of philosophers holding the model. The BDM is a model for the explanation of mental states and actions that takes the concepts of belief and desire as its basic components. Unlike previous theories of actions, the BDM is an explanatory model: it claims that explanations of actions and mental states in terms of reasons are causal explanations. It also differs from previous models in that it tries to extend explanations in terms of beliefs and desires to other mental states, such as intentions, emotions, and judgments of value, among others. In this way, it is a reductionistic model. In this essay I take distance from its causally explanatory nature, emphasizing the normative character of mental states---something that dispositional accounts of mental states seem to have trouble explaining. But primarily I focus on the reductivistic nature of the model, and on how it extends explanations in terms of beliefs and desires to other mental states and to value judgments in particular. Initially, I use the notion of direction of fit, used by supporters of the model, to differentiate not only between beliefs and desires, but also between these two and other mental states, such as imagination or intention. Then I analyze whether value judgments can be reduced to either beliefs or desires. In meta-ethical debates, cognitivists have claimed that value judgments are forms of beliefs, whereas many non-cognitivists have claimed that they are actually forms of desires. I present arguments against both positions: difficulties that anybody aiming at the extension of the vocabulary of beliefs and desires would have to face. Since I deny that value judgments are forms of beliefs, I finish by analyzing some of the implications that this would have in terms of the objectivity of our value judgments. My basic claim here is that truth and objectivity must be disassociated in the area of evaluative judgments

Para muchos filósofos y poetas, la poesía es una forma de conocimiento. A esta tesis la llamo cognoscitivismo poético. Aquí analizo qué podemos entender por esta tesis, proponiendo diferentes interpretaciones y tratando de responder a las preguntas acerca de qué conocemos y cómo lo conocemos. Argumento que hay formas de conocimiento que difícilmente pueden ser cuestionadas y que, tal vez por lo mismo, han hecho aparecer la tesis como trivial. Sin embargo, tradicionalmente esta tesis se ha tratado de extender a objetos que nos darían tipos discutibles de conocimiento: aquí el cognoscitivismo poético debe ser seriamente cuestionado. Finalmente, argumento que el modo en que la poesía puede ser fuente de conocimiento es a través de las perspectivas que nos da de la realidad, y en este sentido también puede tener un impacto cognoscitivo sobre nosotros y sobre nuestra comprensión del mundo

El presente trabajo investiga las tesis sobre el poder civil de Alonso de la Veracruz que buscan incorporar en la comunidad política española a los habitantes autóctonos del Nuevo Mundo, tesis que suelen relacionarse con F. de Vitoria y el tomismo español, y que últimamente son consideradas parte del republicanismo novohispano elaborado desde la periferia americana. Se busca demostrar que su propósito era aplicar una teoría de derechos naturales, sin que ello implique participación política de los indios americanos. Se analiza la postura del fraile frente a la diversidad cultural y la guerra contra los indios. The paper explores Alonso de la Veracruz's theses on civil power, which sought to integrate the native inhabitants of the New World into the Spanish political community. These theses, which have usually been associated with F. de Vitoria and Spanish Thomism, have recently come to be considered part of a Novohispanic republicanism developed in the American periphery. The article seeks to show that the purpose of such theses was to apply a theory of natural rights that did not entail the political participation of the indigenous population, as well as to analyze Veracruz's position regarding cultural diversity and the war against the indigenous peoples

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a posi-tion to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two charac-teristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a position to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two characteristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value.Neste artigo eu argumento que o modo pelo qual nós revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças é diferente daquele pelo qual revisamos e mudamos nossos juízos de valor; isto se dá porque juízos de valor, ao contrário de crenças, não possuem nenhum valor de verdade. Mudanças de juízos de valor não estão sujeitas às mesmas restrições que se aplicam às mudanças de crenças e que são determinadas pelas normas que governam estas. Eu argumento que, primeiro, quando revisamos e mudamos nossas crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de suspender juízos e, ao tentarmos suprimir dúvidas, deveríamos tentar evitar a falsidade e, segundo, ao mudarmos as crenças, nós deveríamos ser capazes de atribuir probabilidades àquelas conjecturas sobre as quais nós estamos em dúvida. Estas duas condições se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de atitudes com valores de verdade, tais como crenças; eu argumento que estas duas características não se aplicam aos casos de mudanças de juízos de valor

The 2016 Royal Society of Chemistry’s report Future of the Chemical Sciences presents four different scenarios for the future of chemistry: chemistry saves the world; push-button chemistry; a world without chemists; and free market chemistry. In this paper we ethically assess them. If chemistry is to solve many of the greatest challenges facing the contemporary world, prioritization of research topics will need to be done explicitly on the basis of moral values, ​​such as solidarity and equity, but also environmental justice, which will have to be central in determining a research agenda for chemistry. The decentralization of chemistry will also present ethical challenges to the research standards established by the scientific community. Ethical education in chemistry may help counteract these risks. We also argue that if chemistry and its subdisciplines are to fulfil their goal of generating knowledge and helping us solve the great challenges of the contemporary world, then it is ethically imperative that scientists from different disciplines be more open to interdisciplinary work. Finally, if the future of chemistry is in free market forms, then it is necessary that we pay more attention to the possible risks that this model has. We call attention to two: first, it is likely that problems that affect the lowest income countries or the most disadvantaged sectors of society, who do not have the means to pay for some of the goods and services, will not be addressed; second, the free market tends to foster unsustainable forms of development.

This article aims at raising awareness about the intersection of populism and bioethics. It argues that illiberal forms of populism may have negative consequences on the evolution of bioethics as a discipline and on its practical objectives. It identifies at least seven potential negative effects: (1) The rise of populist leaders fosters “epistemological populism,” devaluing the expert and scientific perspectives on which bioethics is usually based, potentially steering policies away from evidence-based foundations. (2) The impact of “moral populism” is evident in legislative prioritization of the “morality of common people,” often solicited through popular consultations on issues like abortion, drug legalization, or LGBT issues. (3) Populist distrust in autonomous governmental agencies and advisory bodies, including national bioethics commissions, can compromise expert advice, challenging both their authority and decisions. (4) Populists may erode transparency by undermining institutions responsible for it, hindering access to vital information for bioethical research. (5) “Medical populism” creates adversarial dynamics, prompting politicians to make simplistic healthcare policy decisions based on political rather than informed criteria, adversely affecting vulnerable populations. (6) Radical-right populist parties’ “welfare chauvinism” may shape healthcare policies, impacting service access and resource allocation, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups such as migrants, but indirectly affecting the rest of the population. (7) Nationalist sentiments associated with populism may obstruct international collaborations, posing challenges for global bioethics that seeks to address ethical concerns beyond national borders. In summary, these dynamics raise significant bioethical concerns encompassing evidence-based decision-making, transparency, healthcare equity, and global collaboration. How bioethicists may respond to these challenges is discussed.

En este artículo analizo los principales argumentos del libro Tauroética de Fernando Savater. Él afirma que existen argumentos morales a favor de las corridas de toros, por lo que ser taurino es una opción ética legítima. Aquí sostengo que está en un error y que los argumentos morales no tienen la fuerza que él les adjudica; puede haber razones económicas, políticas o de otro tipo a favor de las corridas, pero no hay razones morales. Afirmo, en cambio, que sí hay razones morales fuertes en contra de las corridas que se basan en que los toros son objeto de consideración moral, es decir, tienen un estatus moral independiente de nuestros intereses. A partir de esta premisa examino y objeto, bajo una perspectiva ética, otros argumentos de Savater.

Hay ocasiones en que los valores que un agente sostiene entran en conflicto, tiene una presión para decidir y actuar y no sabe qué hacer. En ese momento se encuentra en un aprieto. De hecho, nuestros valores entran en conflicto constantemente, a veces es fácil decidir qué hacer porque tenemos una jerarquía de valores bien establecida, tenemos criterios que nos ayudan a decidir y preferimos cosas que valoramos más por sobre otras que valoramos menos. Todo el tiempo estamos tomando este tipo de decisiones y nos resolvemos fácilmente por un curso de acción entre muchos otros que incesantemente se nos presentan. No obstante, en otras ocasiones la situación es más difícil ya sea porque tenemos que elegir entre dos o más cosas que valoramos mucho o porque existen dos obligaciones que nos demandan actuar en sentidos opuestos, no podemos satisfacer ambas demandas, no tenemos criterios o procedimientos que dirijan claramente nuestras decisiones y, con frecuencia, tenemos que sacrificar alguna de las opciones. Para la persona que se encuentra en este tipo de situaciones, estas no son agradables, sin embargo, para la filosofía son precisamente este tipo de situaciones difíciles las que son más atractivas. Y lo son porque nos revelan mucho acerca de nuestros sistemas normativos, de nuestros juicios de valor, de nuestras experiencias evaluativas y también de los sacrificios que a veces se demandan de nosotros.