Guy Schuh

Is being virtuous good not only for others, but also for the virtuous person herself? Call the “yes” answer to this question “the eudaimonistic thesis.” In this essay, I argue that the most prominent explanation for why Confucius accepts the eudaimonistic thesis should be rejected; this explanation is that he accepts the thesis because he also accepts “naturalistic perfectionism” or that for something to be good for oneself is for it to realize one’s nature and that being a virtuous person realizes human nature. In its place, I propose two alternative explanations: the “hedonistic explanation,” which justifies the eudaimonistic thesis in terms of pleasure, and the “desirability explanation,” which provides a justification rooted in the claims that virtuous people function as normative measures and that they desire that they themselves be virtuous. Finally, I discuss what may have motivated later Confucian philosophers to adopt naturalistic perfectionism.

Aristotle tells us that the Nicomachean Ethics is an “inquiry” and an “investigation” (μέθοδος and a ζήτησις). This paper focuses on an under-appreciated way that the work is investigative: its employment of an exploratory investigative strategy—that is, its frequent positing of, and later revision or even rejection of, merely preliminary positions. Though this may seem like a small point, this aspect of the work’s methodology has important consequences for how we should read it—specifically, we should be open to the possibility that some contradictions in the text are the result of his employment of this investigative strategy. In the paper, I describe this investigative strategy, discuss what motivates Aristotle to employ it in the work, and go through three contradictions that are plausibly identified as examples of its use—specifically, his claims that courageous people do and do not fear death, that friendship is and is not mutually recognized goodwill, and that virtuous people do and do not choose noble actions for their own sake.

Aristotle holds that the ultimate goal of our action is our own happiness (“psychological eudaimonism”). Though this position is controversial, it’s widely thought that he never attempts to defend it. I argue, to the contrary, that he does. I begin by pointing out that in Nicomachean Ethics 9.8 Aristotle raises an endoxic challenge to psychological eudaimonism—namely, that virtuous people act selflessly, especially in relation to their friends—and that he responds to this challenge by declaring that the (observable) “facts” disagree with these popular “speeches.” I then argue that some of the facts that he has in mind can be found in his surrounding discussion of friendship. Specifically, I point to two observations in the Nicomachean account of friendship that suggest that friendship isn’t a source of selfless motivation for virtuous people—that friendship dissolves with distance and that friends do not wish their friends to become gods—and one observation that suggests that virtuous friends do not benefit each other selflessly tout court—that friendship requires an equal return of benefit in order to preserve itself.

I argue that Eudaimonism was not Ancient Greek common sense. After dividing Eudaimonism into Psychological and Normative varieties, I present evidence from Greek literature that the Ancient Greeks did not commonsensically accept Eudaimonism. I then review, and critique, evidence that has been offered for the opposite claim that Eudaimonism was Ancient Greek common sense. This claim is often called on to explain why Ancient Greek philosophers embraced Eudaimonism; the idea is that they did so because it was the ethical common sense of their day. But, according to the case I make in this paper, this explanation cannot stand. Those looking to explain the Eudaimonistic character of Ancient Greek ethical thought must turn to other explanations.