H. G. Callaway

After setting out some basic elements in Henri Lauener's open transcendentalism, in comparison with related views in Quine and Davidson, the two views surveyed converge on a moderately holistic, normative cognitivism in Lauener's philosophy of science. Though resisting similar conclusions in the name of anti-naturalism, Lauener's "open transcendentalism" is plausibly constmed as a non-reductive naturalism, with important implications for the normative determination of meanings. At the last Lauener's criticism is yet to come to terms with central questions of the naturalist tradition. Crucial in this is the "principle of continuity" in Dewy's (non-reductive) naturalism, the relation of fallibilism to the pragmatic continuity of inquiry, and normative consequentialism in the scientific aims, methods, and meanings.

H.G. Callaway’s critical edition of William James's _Essays in Radical Empiricism_ evaluates this classic work of American philosophy and the pragmatist tradition partly on the basis of the functional psychology of James's magnum opus, _The Principles of Psychology_. The edition also brings in later, Darwinian-functionalist, American psychology—which James did much to inspire—and contemporary developments in functional, cognitive psychology and neuroscience. James’s own text has been annotated throughout to render his references and theoretical concerns explicit and to briefly indicate points of criticism. The edition features an expanded bibliography that includes both historical and contemporary sources, as well as a new, comprehensive index. The chief arguments of the edition center on criticism of James's claims for "radical empiricism," his doctrine of "pure experience," and the doubtful role as evidence James attributed to stand-alone introspection and Jamesian “retrospection.” Enlisting results from the logic of relations, contemporary empiricism, historical and contemporary developments in cognitive psychology, and experimental neuroscience, Callaway argues for the importance of James on functional relations—to be interpreted in the manner of the scientific naturalism prominent in _The Principles of Psychology_. Too often, James’s late philosophical views have overshadowed the accomplishments of his earlier work in psychology. Overall, this new edition indicates the scientific virtues of functionalism in cognitive psychology and shows the relevance of James’s functional psychology to contemporary cognitive theory.

Ralph Waldo Emerson's 1860 book, _The Conduct of Life_ is among the gems of his mature works. First published in the year of Abraham Lincoln's election as President, this work poses the questions of human freedom and fate. This new edition emphasizes Emerson's philosophy and thoughts on such issues as freedom and fate; creativity and established culture; faith, experience, and evidence; the individual, God, and the world; unity and dualism; moral law, grace, and compensation; and wealth and success. Emerson's text has been fully annotated to explain difficult words and to clarify his references. The Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, Index, and Chronology of Emerson's life help the reader understand his distinctive outlook, his contributions to philosophy, and his place in American culture and society.

In his 2018 book, Identity, the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford University politi­cal scientist Francis Fukuyama addresses themes which might more properly be considered matters of political philosophy and the philosophy of law: How are we to navigate between traditional, ethnic, unitary conceptions of the nation on the one hand, and the threat of identitarian fragmentation on the other? Though Fukuyama affirms the importance of the concepts of human dignity and identity, more or less as these are commonly understood, he also criticizes the contemporary phenomenon of identity politics—which he views as a danger to liberal democ­racy. “The rise of identity politics in modern liberal democracies,” writes Fukuyama, “is one of the chief threats that they face;” and moreover, “unless we can work our way back to more universal understand­ings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict.” This paper raises the question of whether the well reasoned case against identity politics as a threat to national unity and purpose leaves room for skepticism of fast-paced and more ambitious (“Wilsonian”) pursuit of internationalist goals of globalization. Greater emphasis on political consensus at home may helpfully strengthen the hand of American foreign policy in support of liberal democracy. But we now look back with well founded skepticism on neo-conservative interventionism, and there are just and needed limits on globalizing internationalism imposed by and implicit in the retreat from identity politics. Having lost the unity of purpose of Cold War liberalism, we are yet to find a “golden mean” avoiding ethnic nationalism and short of political fragmentation.

Bjorn T. Ramberg’s book focuses on Davidson’s work in the philosophy of language, published between 1984 and the appearance of the book. Recent papers provide the focus for an overview of Davidson’s philosophy of language and its relations to broader debates and influences. Still, the reader is warned: the author “cannot claim” that the book “is in every detail a faithful representation or development of Davidson’s own current theory.” Instead, what we have is a “reconstruction” of Davidson on language and meaning, an account “Davidsonian in spirit and in all its fundamental features.”1 The result is a projection of Davidson’s views, or important aspects of them, in a particular direction: Davidson and in- terpretation in process. The following critical discussion of main issues in Ramberg’s book should not dis- tract potential readers from this useful and thoughtful overview of Davidson on interpretation and meaning.

A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM, PRUDENCE, MODERATION AND TRADITION, by Ferenc Hörcher. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2020. vi + 210pp. Hardback: $103.50; Paperback: $35.96. ISBN: 978-1-350-06718-9. Reviewed by H.G. Callaway, Department of Philosophy, Temple University. Email: HG1Callaway (at) gmail (.) com Ferenc Hörcher is Head of the Research Institute of Politics and Government of the National University of Public Service, Hungary. His new book, A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM, appears in the Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition. Hörcher aims to understand, elucidate and develop political conservatism in the long Aristotelian-Stoic tradition, emphasizes the role of character formation for statesmanship and political actors, the constraints implied by specific cultural traditions and the details of factual context, and addresses the contemporary standing and revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics and the specifically political virtue of prudence or “practical wisdom.” The book comes recommended by Harvard University historian James Hankins, who, on the back cover, recommends it for readers “disturbed by the collapse of statesmanship in the contemporary world.”

This book is a new scholarly edition of Lincoln Steffensâ classic, â oemuck-rakingâ account of Gilded Age corruption in America. It provides the broader political background, theoretical and historical context needed to better understand the social and political roots of corruption in general terms: the social and moral nature of corruption and reform. Steffens enjoyed the support of a multitude of journalists with first-hand knowledge of their localities. He interviewed and came to know political bosses, crusading district attorneys and indicted corruptionists spanning a cast of hundreds. He also benefited from the support of a large-scale, nationally prominent network of anti-corruption specialists and luminaries, including President Theodore Roosevelt. Steffens explored in detail the high Gilded Age corruption of New York City, Chicago, â oecorrupt and contentedâ Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis and Minneapolis. His work culminated in a well-documented record of Gilded Age corruption in the cities; and, with the addition of the editorial annotations, Chronology and Introduction of this edition, the reader is placed in a position to gain an overview and considerable insight into the general, moral and social-political phenomenon of corruption. This book will be of interest for students and professionals in political philosophy, political science, American history and American studies.

In his new book, IDENTITY, THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT, Stanford University political scientist Francis Fukuyama addresses themes which might more properly be considered matters of political and legal philosophy. In particular, though he affirms the importance of the concepts of human dignity and identity, more or less as these are commonly understood in contemporary political debates and judicial decisions, he also sets himself against the contemporary phenomenon of identity politics which he views as a danger to liberal democracy. “The rise of identity politics in modern liberal democracies,” writes Fukuyama, “is one of the chief threats that they face;” and moreover, “unless we can work our way back to more universal understandings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict” (p. xvi). Readers learn in the Preface that “This book would not have been written had Donald J. Trump not been elected president in November 2016” (p. ix). Fukuyama warns of “political decay,” though he holds it had set in well before the shocks of Brexit and Trump in 2016, “as the state was progressively captured by powerful interest groups” viz. vetocracy, “a rigid structure that was unable to reform itself” (p. ix). In the Preface, Fukuyama also draws lines to his earlier works, including his essay “The End of History?” (1989), his related book, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) and his impressive recent volumes, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER (2011) and POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY (2014).

A chief aim of this paper is to provide common ground for discussion of outstanding issues between defenders of classical logic and contemporary advocates of intuitionistic logic. In this spirit, I draw upon (and reconstruct) here the relationship between dialogue and evidence as emphasized in German constructivist authors. My approach depends upon developments in the methodology of empirical linguistics. As a preliminary to saying how one might decide between these two versions of logic (this issue is most closely approached in Section V. discussing the constructivist approach), it is well worth the effort to look closely at how logic is (or might be) learned and at questions concerning logic in translation, i.e., the question of how we might detect the variety of logic actually employed in a given speech community.

Reconciliation of semantic holism with interpretation of individual expressions is advanced here by means of a relativization of sentence meaning to object language theories viewed as idealizations of belief-systems. Fodor's view of the autonomy of the special sciences is emphasized and this is combined with detailed replies to his recent criticisms of meaning holism. The argument is that the need for empirical evidence requires a holistic approach to meaning. Thus, semantic realism requires semantic holism.

Book Description Edmund Burke (1730-1797) was a friend and advocate of America during the political crisis of the 1760s and the 1770s, and he spoke out eloquently and forcefully in defense of the rights of the colonial subjects of the British empire—in America, Ireland and India alike. However, he is often best remembered for his extremely critical Reflections on the Revolution in France. The present volume is based on classic Burke, including his most famous writings and speeches on the American Crisis. Though his efforts at conciliation with the American colonies ultimately failed, Burke is widely remembered, studied and venerated by liberal and conservative thinkers alike, for his elucidation and criticism of the excesses of empire and political excesses generally. Irish-born, Burke made his career as a British Whig statesman and Member of Parliament, but he was also a powerful writer of philosophical works in high literary style. In the present volume, Burke’s ideas, ideals and arguments are explored and set in their original historical and political context. The volume places the reader in a position to understand the similarities and contrasts between the political philosophy of the Whig ascendancy in British politics and the republican political philosophy of the American founders. What comes to the fore is Burke’s twin emphasis on continuity and justice, the anti-rationalism of his opposition to directly applying abstract political theory to policy decisions, the pluralism of peoples and public mores within the empire, the crucial roles of political representation in good government, and the fundamental importance of the consent of the governed. Was Burke a friend of a foe of revolution? Was he a “liberal” or a “conservative”? To what degree did he accept the political ideals of the American founders? How could he both defend the American protests and reject the claims of the French Revolution? Thomas Jefferson’s “Summary View of the Rights of British America” is included in the volume for comparison and contrast. This book presents a deeper understanding of Burke’s political thought by exploring the similarities and contrasts with founding ideals of America’s republican tradition.

This paper explicates and defends a social-naturalist conception of internationality and intentions, where internationality of scientific expressions is fundamental. Meanings of expressions are a function of their place in language-systems and of the relations of systems to object-level evidence and associated community activities-including deliberation and experiment. Naturalizing internationality requires social-intellectual reconstruction exemplified by the scientific community at its best. This approach emphasizes normative elements of pragmatic conceptions of meaning and their function in orientation. It requires social conditions and intellectual practices making knowledge of intentions possible. Scientific ends, methods, and meanings, together, constitute culturally evolved instruments of adaptation to, and reconstruction of, physical and cultural environments. (Reprinted in Meaning without Analyticity.)

This book presents the author’s many and varied contributions to the revival and re-evaluation of American pragmatism. The assembled critical perspective on contemporary pragmatism in philosophy emphasizes the American tradition of cultural pluralism and the requirements of American democracy. Based partly on a survey of the literature on interest-group pluralism and critical perspectives on the politics of globalization, the monograph argues for reasoned caution concerning the practical effects of the revival. Undercurrents of “vulgar pragmatism” including both moral and epistemic relativism threaten the intellectual and moral integrity of American thought – and have contributed to the present sense of political crisis. The text chiefly contributes to the evaluation of the contemporary influence of the philosophy of John Dewey (1859–1952) and his late development of the classical pragmatist tradition. In comparison to Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), William James (1842–1910), and earlier currents of American thought, Dewey’s philosophy, dominated by its overall emphasis on unification, is weaker in its support for the pluralism of cultural and religious contributions which have lent moral self-restraint to American policy and politics, both foreign and domestic. With all due homage to Dewey’s conception of philosophy, centered on human problems and the need for our ameliorative efforts, the argument is that in the contemporary revival, Dewey’s thought has been too often captured by “post-modernist” bandwagons of self-promotion and institutional control. This work defends democratic individualism against more collectivist and corporatist tendencies in contemporary neo-pragmatism, and it draws upon up-to-date political analysis in defense of America’s long republican tradition. Pragmatism will not and cannot be removed from, or ignored, in American intellectual and moral history; and its influence on disciplines from law to politics, sociology and literary criticism has been immense. However, pragmatism has often been weak in commitment to cultural pluralism and in its accounts of truth.

We are currently witnessing a renewal of broad public interest in the life and career of Alexander Hamilton – justly famed as an American founder. This volume examines the possible present-day significance of the man, noting that this is not the first revival of interest in the statesman. Hamilton was a major background figure in the GOP politics of the Gilded Age, with the powerful US Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. drawing on Hamilton to inspire a new, assertive American role in the world. Hamilton was first prominent as a soldier and aide to General Washington, and believed in centralization of power in the federal government and an energetic presidency. He founded the American financial system as the first Secretary of the Treasury, and was a great moving force of America’s first nationalist-conservative party – the Federalists. As shown here, close scholarly attention to Lodge’s biography brings out the darker sides of the celebrated hero. Hamilton’s deeper conviction was the need of an elitist “aristocratic republic,” and he was an advocate of military-commercial empire. The Gilded Age Hamilton revival helped inspire the Spanish-American war of 1898 and an American overseas empire. This book will be of interest for students and professionals in political philosophy, political science, American history and American studies.

This book appears in The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Technology, edited by Don Ihde. Hickman emphasizes Dewey as a philosopher of technology and aims to make Dewey's perspective and contributions available to specialists. Still, as claimed on the book jacket, Hickman aims at a "comprehensive yet accessible overview of Dewey's instrumentalism," in light of "each major aspect of Dewey's philosophical work." The link between the two projects is the interpretation of Dewey's instrumentalism as "a critique of technology" (p. xi).

In J. A. Fodor's Psychosemantics, contemporary cognitive science and the computer model of the mind begin to come to grips with their semantic presuppositions and the philosophical problem of meaning as bequeathed by Quine. This confrontation has been threatening for some years now, and it promises to continue brewing for a considerable time to come. However much Quine's influence has been resisted in the past - usually in the name of the Chomskian rationalism - it seems clear that the central focus of this book has been engendered by Quine's skepticism and critique of traditional philosophic theories of meaning. Fodor's aim here is to sketch an exposition and defense of his Representational Theory of Mind and draw out a semantic theory to meet its needs. We find little sign of the old comfortable reliance on the analytic/synthetic distinction here. Rather, the can of worms of semantic theory and its relevance to empirical psychology has been opened in earnest. With some typical expressions of distaste, Fodor sets about the task of taming semantic theory in the interest of empirical psychology. All in all, these efforts are to be applauded, though doubtlessly they will also be disputed.