Hadrien Mamou

Decision problems are non-exhaustive and selective representations that raise a number of philosophical issues. Framing effects are a case in point: Differentways of framing or representing a particular decision situation may lead to different choices, in violation of the Extensionality principle. Extensionality stipulates that different descriptions of the same outcome or option should lead to identical evaluations and choices. This dissertation examines what constitutes a correct representation of a decision situation for bounded agents. Taking a Moderate Humean perspective on rationality, I argue that the literature does not offer satisfactory standards of representation and fails to address a series of selection problems such as the ones raised by framing effects. Instead, I offer an instrumental account whereby agents represent decision situations in a way to achieve the ends they care about. I examine two interpretations of irrational framing effects — as Extensionality violation and as unstable evaluation. I assess both principles and reject these two interpretations. Instead, I introduce the notion of evaluatively equivalent decision situations, and argue that illegitimate framing effects are inconsistent choices across evaluatively equivalent decision situations. The phenomenon illustrates one of the problems of selection that arise from assessing the rationality of decision-theoretic representations. I offer an alternative instrumental account of representation based on differences that the agent cares about, acknowledging that decision problems are partial, constructed, and value-driven representations.

In this essay, I will examine Broome’s argument in Weighing Goods (1991; sections 5.4 and 5.5) that aims to show that moderate Humeanism, according to which any coherent sets of preferences should be rationally acceptable, is not a sustainable view of decision theory. I will focus more specifically on the argument Broome uses to support his claim, and show that although it may get some traction, it does not undermine moderate Humeanism as we know it. After reconstructing Broome’s argument, I argue that standard decision theory supposes that the representation of a decision problem fully captures what is relevant to the agent, and therefore has nothing to say about the legitimacy of the representation in question. I argue that although Broome’s criticism does not jeopardize moderate Humeanism, it does pave the way for a new area of research in decision theory.