Haicheng Zhao

Proponents of modal knowledge accounts (safety and sensitivity) concur that one crucial advantage of their accounts is that they solve the so-called lottery problem—the problem of explaining why “lottery beliefs” based merely on statistical evidence do not constitute knowledge. Contra this claim, I argue that epistemic judgments about lottery beliefs do not consistently track what occurs in a specified set of nonactual possibilities. Thus, modal knowledge accounts cannot properly explain beliefs based merely on statistical evidence. Finally, I argue that these beliefs can be better accommodated by a rival theory of modal accounts—namely, explanationism.

One influential approach to distinguishing individual evidence from statistical evidence in legal epistemology is the sensitivity account, proposed by Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (3): 197–224). More recently, Günther (2024. “Epistemic Sensitivity and Evidence.” Inquiry 67 (6): 1348–1366) has advanced a revised version – the epistemic sensitivity account – claimed to improve upon Enoch et al.’s original proposal. In particular, it is argued that the account not only distinguishes between statistical and individual evidence, but also, unlike Enoch et al.’s account, accommodates the possibility of acceptable erroneous verdicts. In this paper, I present three objections against epistemic sensitivity and conclude that it fails on both counts.

Many agree that Gettier cases have refuted the traditional, tripartite analysis of knowledge. In a recent article, de Grefte (Erkenntnis 88(2):531–549, 2023) offers an interesting and novel defense of the tripartite analysis. As he argues, Gettier cases necessarily involve ‘veritic luck’ and a plausible modal version of reliabilism can exclude such luck. Thus, insofar as the justification condition is understood along this reliabilist line, Gettier cases do not refute tripartite analysis, as the justification condition is unsatisfied in these cases. I argue that Gettier cases do not necessarily involve veritic luck, so an anti-veritic luck justification condition does not succeed in explaining these cases. In the end, I sketch an alternative and more plausible diagnosis of Gettier cases.

Compatibilists aim to solve the causal exclusion problem by arguing that a physical cause and a mental cause are compatible with each other without involving the problematic overdetermination. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I target at Karen Bennett’s (2003, 2008) influential compatibilist strategy—one that rests on the assumption that a mental cause is sufficient for bringing about a physical effect, just as a physical cause is. I argue that, on a plausible physicalist picture, this assumption cannot be established. Second, I propose a weaker and more plausible interpretation of the mental efficacy, which takes a mental cause to be necessary (but not sufficient) for a physical effect in a counterfactual sense. The resulting picture of mental causation avoids the difficulties engendered from Bennett’s assumption and delivers fresh resources to solve the exclusion problem.

One interesting and potentially attractive feature of the sensitivity account of knowledge is that it not only preserves knowledge of ordinary propositions, but also concedes the skeptic's intuition that we do not know skeptical hypotheses do not obtain. This paper challenges the sensitivity‐based reply to the skeptic, advocated by Robert Nozick, among others. Sensitivity generates an implausibly bizarre result that although we do not know we are not brains in vats (because a belief to this effect is insensitive), a real BIV who is in a much worse epistemic situation can sensitively believe that it is not in the good case. This result reveals a fundamental problem with the sensitivity conditional: its antecedent is not suitable for picking out possibilities that are relevant for our epistemic evaluation. I then offer a systematic explanation of why it is the safety account—the main competitor of sensitivity—that picks out a more suitable set of possibilities. A consequence of this comparison is that the safety account delivers an overall more satisfying reply to the skeptic than sensitivity does.

Can a reliabilist theory of justified belief be extended to account for justified credence? In exploring this question, this paper first takes as its target Tang’s reliabilist account of justified credence, which is inspired by William Alston’s “indicator reliabilism” about justified belief. I point out a neglected shortcoming in Tang’s account, which concerns its failure to properly explain degrees of justification. Fortunately, Alston’s epistemology contains the resources which can be developed to remedy this defect. The central idea here is that the justificatory status of a credence can not only be defeated by a subject’s own perspective, but also be enhanced by that. Finally, it is argued that this idea applies to beliefs as well.

According to the sensitivity account of knowledge, if one knows that p, then (roughly) were p false, one would not believe that p. One important issue regarding sensitivity is whether or not it preserves inductive knowledge. Critics including Jonathan Vogel, Ernest Sosa, and Duncan Pritchard argue that it does not. Proponents including Kevin Wallbridge insist that it does. In this paper, I first draw attention to an often-neglected distinction between two different versions of sensitivity—a distinction that has important implications for the debate regarding inductive knowledge. In particular, I distinguish between the sensitivity principle originally defended by Robert Nozick and another version that has been the focus of many recent discussions. With the distinction in place, it is shown that a sensitivity theorist cannot preserve inductive knowledge while being unscathed. For neither account can simultaneously preserve inductive knowledge while properly handling the Gettier problem. Overall, sensitivity theorists are in trouble.

Both sensitivity and safety theorists concur that their accounts should be relativized to the same method that one employs in the actual world. However, properly individuating methods has proven to be a tricky matter. In this regard, Nozick (Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981) proposes a Same-Experience-Same-Method Principle: if the experiences associated with two method tokens are the same, they are of the same type of method. This principle, however, has been widely rejected by recent safety and sensitivity theorists. In this paper, I raise an argument in favor of Nozick: not endorsing the principle leads to some rather implausible consequences when certain skeptical scenarios are considered—i.e., scenarios in which skeptical possibilities are ‘close’. Additionally, this argument reveals some important lessons about skepticism in general and the place of modal accounts of knowledge in the internalism/externalism debate.

Sensitivity account of knowledge states that if one knows that _p_ (via method M), then were _p_ false, one would not believe that _p_ via M. This account has been highly controversial. However, even its critics tend to agree that the account enjoys an important advantage of solving the Gettier problem—that is, it explains why Gettierized beliefs are not knowledge. In this paper, I argue that this purported advantage of sensitivity is merely illusory. The account cannot, in principle, solve the Gettier problem. Moreover, another formulation of sensitivity—which is fully in line with Nozick’s original account—is not unscathed either.

Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's recent solution to the problem and argue that it fails. More importantly, the problem reaches deeper and poses a threat to any current safety accounts that require a belief's modal stability in close possibilities (as well as safety accounts that appeal to ‘normality’). We end by arguing that ways out of the problem require substantial reconstruction for a safety‐based account of knowledge.

According to the safety principle, if one knows that p, one's belief that p could not easily have been false. One problem besetting this principle is the lottery problem – that of explaining why one does not seem to know that one will lose the lottery purely based on probabilistic considerations, prior to the announcement of the lottery result. As Greco points out, it is difficult for a safety theorist to solve this problem, without paying a heavy price. In this paper, I first reject three existing safety-based solutions to the lottery problem, due to Pritchard, Sosa, and Broncano-Berrocal. Failure of these accounts reveals that there is something crucial missing in the safety principle. By way of remedying this, I propose to integrate a safety principle with a condition regarding one's own awareness of (nearby) error-possibilities. The resulting account, as I argue, enjoys a number of theoretical advantages, including its capacity to handle the lottery problem.

In a recent paper, Helton and Nanay, 415–423, 2019) present a new argument against two modal accounts of knowledge—safety and sensitivity. Their argument is based on the phenomenon of amodal completion. According to them, amodal completion experience can ground knowledge; but in some instances, such knowledge is neither sensitive nor safe. Thus, they conclude that neither sensitivity nor safety is a necessary condition for knowledge. This paper pushes back. In particular, I defend the following three theses. First, Helton and Nanay’s argument for the claim that amodal completion itself can ground knowledge is unsound. Second, their objection against sensitivity is best construed as merely another instantiation of the old objection against sensitivity regarding inductive knowledge. Thus, sensitivity theorists have nothing to worry about over and above the old objection. Third, safety theorists can plausibly defend their account, insofar as they acknowledge that one’s ‘awareness’ of error-possibilities can affect the epistemic status of one’s belief. My conclusion is that reflections on the phenomenon of amodal completion fail to generate any new objections against modal accounts of knowledge.

According to the safety principle, if one knows that p, then one’s belief in p could not easily have been false. In this paper, I pose a dilemma for safety theorists by asking the following question: In evaluating whether or not a belief is safe, must we only examine the error-possibilities of the same belief as formed in the actual world? If ‘yes’, safety meets a familiar objection regarding necessary truths and the objection also extends to contingent propositions. If ‘no’, however, there is no necessity of safety for knowledge. It is argued that this dilemma poses a threat for a number of safety principles from the recent literature. In the end, I draw implications of my arguments for the debate between robust and anti-luck virtue epistemologies. The result is that anti-luck virtue epistemology suffers from the difficulty with the safety principle whereas the robust variant remains intact.

The safety principle is the view that, roughly, if one knows that p, p could not easily have been false. It is common for safety theorists to relativize safety to belief-formation methods. In this paper, I argue that there is no fixed principle of method-individuation that can stand up to scrutiny. I examine various ways to individuate methods and argue that all of them are subject to serious counterexamples. In the end, I conclude by considering some alternative ways to preserve the insight behind safety without invoking a fixed principle of method-individuation.