Haley Burke

This article is the first English translation of Gadamer's early essay “On the Idea of a System in Philosophy” (“Zur Systemidee in der Philosophie”) from 1924. Influenced by Marburg Neo-Kantianism and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, Gadamer is concerned with the problems that arise with the idea of systematicity in philosophy. In particular, he focuses on conceiving of an idea of a system that does justice to the historical variability of philosophical thoughts. He shows that systematicity and history are, in fact, not in tension but deeply intertwined because of the foundation philosophy has in factical and historical human life. Gadamer, therefore, already anticipates some of the most characteristic ideas of his later magnum opus Truth and Method. The translator's Introduction contextualises this essay in both its relation to Marburg Neo-Kantians and Heidegger's thought, highlights the most significant continuities to Gadamer's mature philosophy, and provides an overview of the essay's main arguments.

I argue that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic phenomenology accounts for the social dimension of factical life. In my view, Gadamer is able to do so through an appropriation of Martin Heidegger’s early phenomenological developments. My argument is centered on Heidegger’s early formal indicative method, especially as it emerges in his 1923 “hermeneutics of facticity” lecture course. Gadamer’s 1924 publication “On the Idea of a System in Philosophy” provides evidence that Gadamer follows Heidegger in many ways but not down a path of methodological destruction by way of formal indications. Instead, for Gadamer, understanding occurs through conversation and always with reference to the self, other, and tradition. My article clarifies the role of formal indication in hermeneutic phenomenology and contributes to scholarship concerned with the relationship between Heidegger and Gadamer.

Hans-Georg Gadamer criticizes Friedrich Schiller for inaugurating a merely aesthetic disposition toward reality. Such an aesthetic disposition, on Gadamer's account, is overly subjective. It also robs one of a genuine encounter with beauty that contributes to one's understanding. In my view, Schiller's position is not reducible to Gadamer's critique of it. Indeed, following scholars like John Pizer and Nathan Ross, I affirm that Gadamer does not fully appreciate the practical, political, and theoretical aspects of Schiller's aesthetics. In the following, I focus on Schiller's political thought as it is developed in response to the French Revolution. In addition to contextualizing his political thought, I illuminate his account of the mediating play impulse, his conception of the beautiful, and his systematic understanding of freedom to argue that Schiller resists Gadamer's charge of aesthetic differentiation. By returning to Gadamer's critique, we can more fully appreciate Schiller's political invocation of the aesthetic domain.

In Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement, Ian Alexander Moore investigates Martin Heidegger’s use of releasement (Gelassenheit). Moore argues that this conceptual development was greatly influenced by Meister Eckhart’s thought. In addition to their shared use of releasement, Moore suggests, both Heidegger and Eckhart share similar philosophical strategies. The task of Moore’s monograph is to illuminate how releasement functions in Heidegger’s work and to argue that Eckhart was one of Heidegger’s central influences. This review examines Moore’s method for assessing the function of releasement in Heidegger and Eckhart’s thought, while noting the distinctive and compelling aspects of this monograph.

In Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement, Ian Alexander Moore investigates Martin Heidegger’s use of releasement. Moore argues that this conceptual development was greatly influenced by Meister Eckhart’s thought. In addition to their shared use of releasement, Moore suggests, both Heidegger and Eckhart share similar philosophical strategies. The task of Moore’s monograph is to illuminate how releasement functions in Heidegger’s work and to argue that Eckhart was one of Heidegger’s central influences. This review examines Moore’s method for assessing the function of releasement in Heidegger and Eckhart’s thought, while noting the distinctive and compelling aspects of this monograph.

In her groundbreaking text Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker evaluates types of harms incurred by individuals undergoing unrecognized and inarticulable oppression. At issue in epistemic and hermeneutic injustice are prejudicial comportments to and evaluations of reality. In the following, I focus on hermeneutic and epistemic injustice in relation to the formation of intellectual and ethical virtues. When reading Fricker and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics together, there is a clear pathway to improve ethical development. In particular, ethical development ought to cultivate the proper virtues that promote understanding. Gadamer’s emphasis on the qualities of a researcher and the epistemic virtues that Fricker highlights reveal an educative path for addressing injustice. In other words, cultivating these virtues counteracts injustice wherein recognition and articulation of reality is challenged or at issue.