Halvor Kvandal

Humans have produced countless narratives about world-ending calamities, whether in the form of punishing floods, Earth-destroying conflagrations, or endless winters. In this article, we show that a version of such a narrative emerges from groups engaged with climate change, such as Extinction Rebellion. We call this narrative the Green Apocalypse. Applying a biocultural perspective, we explore the biological underpinnings of this narrative in a human disposition to simulate adversity. Such simulations could be beneficial since they prepare subjects for real-world adversity. We argue that the Green Apocalypse can be seen as a simulation-device that lets social activists experience the end of the world virtually. Since simulating the end of the world threatens their sense of agency and triggers anxiety, social activists need ways to resolve the psychological tension that arises. We argue that social activists resolve some of this tension through ritualistic behavior, including the use of symbolic acts.

How is the cognitive science of religion (CSR) relevant to the science and religion debate? Moreover, in what ways can philosophy bring clarity to this debate? This chapter presents a new philosophical methodology for investigating the relationship between CSR and religion in terms of normative implications for theist religion. By this is meant relevance in appraisal of the probability of theism, the soundness of theistic arguments, and the justification of theistic beliefs. This methodology also provides a map to navigate debates about science and religion. Scholars in the broad debate about science and religion discuss general models such as “conflict”, “independence”, and “reconciliation”. But in narrow debates about CSR and religion the main views are often described as “debunking”, “neutrality”, and “positive relevance”. This chapter offers a detailed presentation of these debates, showing how they relate. The presentation looks closely at the underlying premises that inform these views. In particular, the chapter examines internalist and externalist versions of the neutrality view, the view that CSR fails to have relevance to the epistemological status of belief in God.

This chapter evaluates the epistemic status of the theistic disposition and its doxastic outcomes from the perspective of a species of virtue epistemology known as “agent-reliabilism”. The chapter starts with a discussion of a challenge for reliabilism known as the “generality problem”. The challenge is to identify the relevant type for the process or disposition we aim to evaluate and to appropriately limit its range. We must avoid specifying a type which is too narrow or too broad and we must find the right range of conditions and circumstances for its operation. To achieve this, we should scrutinize what sort of psychology is the most salient aspect of its operation. Building on empirical work on the memorability and mental stickiness of religious concepts, I argue that the most salient sort is “relevance-enhancing psychology”. Once we have the right type and the right range for the theistic disposition, the stage is set for finding out whether it is reliable. The chapter argues that it is not reliable. I present two arguments to show how CSR undermines the theistic disposition and the theistic beliefs it leads to. The chapter in this way provides new support for the debunking-view concerning CSR and religion.

Where does religion ultimately come from? How did this complex, universal feature of human societies come about and why does it persist? Moreover, how did religion make the transition to the large-scale, institutionalized systems of the late Holocene? There are today lively debates about these issues. This chapter introduces some central views on the origins of religion in CSR, focusing on early contributions and some recent criticisms of these. The chapter explores the views that religion is a biological adaptation, a cultural adaptation, or a by-product. It then looks in detail at some central theories related to the by-product view, such as anthropomorphism, the HADD-theory, and the minimal counterintuitiveness (MCI) theory. The chapter finally touches on the development of the Abrahamic traditions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

This concluding chapter summarizes the main argument and the central findings of the investigation. We then conclude by offering a re-appraisal of Richard Dawkins’ biting and often ridiculed criticism of religion. I argue that, ignoring the vitriol and the rhetoric, in principle, the strategy Dawkins applies aids advocacy for atheism. This strategy is to attack arguments in favor of religion and to appeal to cognitive and evolutionary research to explain why people hold allegedly false religious beliefs. For an atheist advocate employing this strategy, such research is analogous to “geocentric psychology”, an explanation of why people in some contexts widely (and falsely) believed that the sun orbits the earth. Such psychology does not establish heliocentrism by providing conclusive evidence that the earth orbits the sun. But it helps the heliocentric advocate by explaining why people would widely believe the opposite. Similarly, the chapter argues, CSR helps the atheist respond to the challenge of explaining why people would widely and falsely believe in God.

This chapter discusses the claim that given the focus in CSR on the ultimate origin of religion, this field fails to explain how religious beliefs arise in individuals. I argue that this is wrong. Answers to general proximate questions about religion can be brought to bear on individual cases. The ethologist Nico Tinbergen describes two proximate questions. The first is about how a behavioral trait develops in the individual. The second is about factors that trigger a behavior to occur on a given occasion. I relate these questions to how people become theists and how theistic beliefs arise. I firstly argue that CSR in principle can explain how people become theists. In short, to be a theist is to have a doxastic habit by which one frequently forms beliefs about God. This account answers the first proximate question. I then discuss situational factors that trigger theistic beliefs to arise. I thus show how CSR also can answer Tinbergen’s second proximate question. The chapter in this way refutes the externalist argument for the neutrality thesis, which maintains that CSR is epistemically neutral with respect to theistic beliefs.

It has been argued that findings in CSR concerning the cognitive naturalness of religion provide evidence for the god-faculty or Sensus Divinitatis described by reformed epistemology, which provides immediate and non-inferential knowledge of God. If CSR provides evidence for this faculty, then that supports a positive relevance model for science and religion, where the former supports the latter and there is harmony. But this is problematic. Careful scrutiny of reformed epistemology and of recent findings in CSR indicates that they importantly diverge. The chapter argues that there is a dilemma involved in relating CSR to reformed epistemology: If one accepts the god-faculty thesis in reformed epistemology, then conflict with CSR arises. If one instead reinterprets the god-faculty to accommodate CSR, then one departs from reformed epistemology. The chapter also argues that a response to this dilemma whereby one appeals to the noetic effects of sin does not work. The dilemma established in this chapter thus undermines the positive relevance model for science and religion.

One strategy to debunk religious beliefs is to argue that cognitive faculties associated with religion fail to track religious truths. Another strategy is to argue from the falsity of religious beliefs to an epistemically damaging unreliability. In these discussions, research in CSR is frequently discussed. However, the underlying epistemological principles that support debunking are less frequently theorized. Debunking might look different depending on what normative framework the debunker chooses. Furthermore, how one describes the formation of religious beliefs also matters. Consequently, the chapter presents a promising normative framework and reveals how it opens up for defending a novel case for debunking. This case is based on the view that to be a theist is not merely to believe that God exists but to have a theistic disposition, a doxastic habit whereby one frequently forms beliefs about God. I argue that virtue epistemology is a promising normative framework for working out debunking based on this empirical view, since virtue epistemology distinguishes stable belief-forming traits from specific doxastic outcomes and has sufficiently broad scope to evaluate both.

According to theistic evidentialism, the justification of belief hinges on the balance of the evidence. Furthermore, theistic belief is justified by the balance of the evidence for the existence of God. According to the internalist argument for the epistemic neutrality thesis, only internal factors like reasons, arguments, and evidence have epistemic relevance to theistic belief, but CSR fails to be relevant to these factors. Hence, it fails to be epistemically relevant. This chapter sets out to refute the internalist argument and to establish that CSR is relevant to theistic evidentialism. The chapter first criticizes internalism and then shows how CSR is relevant to theistic arguments. In short, CSR bolsters an argument from evil against the existence of God and it to some extent undermines moral arguments for the existence of God. This shows that the internalist argument is wrong in denying CSR relevance and indicates that CSR is negatively relevant to theistic evidentialism by undermining its second claim.