Hamed Movahedi

Adorno’s critical social theory is often accused of lacking a cogent account of its normative foundations. The problem of normativity arises when Adorno’s theory exhibits an inexorable commitment to both negativism and critique. Adorno’s negativism is usually taken as the unavailability of any conception of the good or right life, whereas his critique appeals to normative judgments that imply a certain grasp of the good. Thus, Adorno seems facing the dilemma that his critique involves normative connotations, whereas his negativism bans any form of normativity. This article argues that tackling this problem commands an elaborated account of Adorno’s dialectic of nature-history and its implied normativity. It connects Adorno’s idea of natural-history to his notions of suffering and experience as the structural moments of transience and transition. This reconstruction of concepts allows us to show that the idea of nature-history, weaved into suffering-experience, possesses the structure of ought, which then enables a new normativity tied to critique and negativism, without requiring to rely on transcendent or immanent norms.

In Cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness, the explanatory gap, following Joseph Levine, refers to the unintelligible link between our conscious mental life and its corresponding objective physical explanation; the gap in our understanding of how consciousness is related to a physical or a physiological substrate (Levine in Pac Philos Q 64(4):354–361, 1983). David Chalmers holds the explanatory gap as the evidence for a form of metaphysical dualism between consciousness and physical reality (Chalmers in The conscious mind: in search of a theory of conscious experience. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996). On the other hand, McGinn takes it as an epistemic rather than an ontological gap (McGinn in The problem of consciousness: essays towards a resolution. Blackwell Basil, Oxford, 1991). Considering the recent advances in neuroscience, however, the reductionist approaches have become replete, which attempt to reduce consciousness and subjectivity to neurobiological accounts (Crick in The astonishing hypothesis: the scientific search for the soul. Maxwell Macmillan International, New York, 1994; Metzinger in Being no one: the self-model theory of subjectivity. The MIT Press, London, 2006; Eagleman in The brain the story of you. Canongate, Edimbutgh, 2016). On this view, consciousness mirrors the brain mechanisms, and the self is formulated as an illusory product or construct of neuronal processes. Thomas Fuchs, who is committed to embodied and enactive approaches toward cognition, in Ecology of the Brain, espouses an enactive-ecological perspective concerning the problem of the explanatory gap. He develops an account of human’s life in its dual aspects of the living body and lived body which, on the one hand, defies the ontological dualism and, on the other hand, avoids drifting towards any form of reductionism. Often, the ontologically monistic approaches to the explanatory gap have inclined to a form of reductionism because they conceive consciousness as either identical with its physiological substrate or caused by it, where in both cases, consciousness is claimed to be explainable within the framework of physicalism. Fuchs, however, defends an ontological monism which remains irreconcilable with reductionism. In his account of dual aspects, there is no interaction or impact between the sphere of subjectivity and nature; however, these two aspects imply one another. In this essay, I will develop the philosophical justification of the above reformulation of the mind–body problem and employing the analogy of light will canvass the paradoxical relationship between dual aspects in a phenomenological framework.

This essay explores the possibility of a metaphysical concept of continuity, which seems to have an implicit though decisive presence in Deleuze’s thought. It exposes a peculiar continuity that animates the indiscernibility of borders without making its constitutive elements homogenous or convergent, a zone of indiscernibility, wherein the borders vanish between the virtual and actual, expressed and expression, incorporeals and corporeals, sense in the proposition and event in states of affairs. Continuity conditions a fundamental indiscernibility but a heterogeneous one, a disjunctive synthesis that does not compromise or negotiate the heterogeneity of its terms. This divergent continuity is explored in Logic of Sense, through a dialogue with Leibniz’s syncategorematic account of calculus and Dedekind cut.

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze evokes dramatization when he suggests that intensities must dramatize the Ideas to condition their actualization. This allusion to an artistic category, in the midst of his metaphysical inquiry, has remained obscure. It is not clear, despite its cruciality, why he employs dramatization to explain any actualization and not solely artistic actualization. This essay elucidates this ambiguity, while foregrounding a zone of torsional continuity, wherein intensity encounters the Idea and expresses it through dramatization. This process is at play in the actualization of the organic field, social field, and aesthetic field, where an intensive larval subject—embryo, free individual, artist—encounters the biological, social, or artistic Idea. While unraveling the structure of artistic experience, it is shown how dramatization is indispensable to actualize every Idea. Finally, through Tarkovsky and Blanchot, the notion of poeticization is formulated that, while complementing dramatization, unveils some of its tacit nuances.

The status of continuity in Deleuze’s metaphysics is a subject of debate. Deleuze calls the virtual, in Difference and Repetition, an Ideal continuum, and the differential relations that constitute the Ideal imply the continuity of this field. But, Deleuze does not hesitate to formulate the same field by the affirmation of divergence (incompossibility) that can be regarded as a form of discontinuity. It is, hence, unclear how these two ostensibly contradictory accounts might reconcile. This article attempts to reconstitute a Deleuzian theory of continuity through Leibniz, whose philosophy is equally subject to a tension between the law of continuity, prevalent in his mathematics and metaphysics, and the discontinuity or absolute individuality of monads. By reorienting The Fold around the motif of continuity a new conceptual space is opened for continuity qua heterogeneity-and-inseparability. Then, enfolding the conceptual personae of The Fold onto Difference and Repetition reveals the tacit though decisive presence of different types of continuity operational in Deleuze’s metaphysics that will be called divergent, intensive, torsional, and tenorsional continuities.

In The Fold, Deleuze regards Raymond Ruyer as the most recent of Leibniz’s great disciples. This claim is not self-evident, since Ruyer often criticises Leibniz and stresses the divergence of his theory from Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics. Therefore, while Ruyer does not seem to regard himself as indebted to Leibniz, and as his psychobiology is not always reconcilable with Leibniz’s philosophy, it is necessary to explore what is at stake in Deleuze’s recognition of Ruyer as a Leibnizian thinker. This essay foregrounds the tacit intertwining between Leibniz and Ruyer, which can, on the one hand, contribute to Leibniz’s scholarship and uncover the contemporaneity of his thought, and on the other hand, expose certain revealing Ruyerian moments in Deleuze’s immanent philosophy.

There is no consensus regarding whether Gilles Deleuze offers a cogent theory of the Other. Deleuze develops the notion of the Other-structure, but given his scarce remarks on this concept, his treatment of this issue is debated. This article argues that to elucidate Deleuze's philosophy of the Other, his notion of the Other-structure must be analyzed in parallel to Edmund Husserl's intersubjective theory. This comparison, made possible by Natalie Depraz's reading of the Husserlian alterity, reveals nuanced phenomenological traces in Deleuze's Other-structure and its implicated structural moments while substantiating his affirmation of the Otherless world, as an impetus to surpass phenomenology.

In Cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness, the explanatory gap, following Joseph Levine, refers to the unintelligible link between our conscious mental life and its corresponding objective physical explanation; the gap in our understanding of how consciousness is related to a physical or a physiological substrate :354–361, 1983). David Chalmers holds the explanatory gap as the evidence for a form of metaphysical dualism between consciousness and physical reality. On the other hand, McGinn takes it as an epistemic rather than an ontological gap. Considering the recent advances in neuroscience, however, the reductionist approaches have become replete, which attempt to reduce consciousness and subjectivity to neurobiological accounts. On this view, consciousness mirrors the brain mechanisms, and the self is formulated as an illusory product or construct of neuronal processes. Thomas Fuchs, who is committed to embodied and enactive approaches toward cognition, in Ecology of the Brain, espouses an enactive-ecological perspective concerning the problem of the explanatory gap. He develops an account of human’s life in its dual aspects of the living body and lived body which, on the one hand, defies the ontological dualism and, on the other hand, avoids drifting towards any form of reductionism. Often, the ontologically monistic approaches to the explanatory gap have inclined to a form of reductionism because they conceive consciousness as either identical with its physiological substrate or caused by it, where in both cases, consciousness is claimed to be explainable within the framework of physicalism. Fuchs, however, defends an ontological monism which remains irreconcilable with reductionism. In his account of dual aspects, there is no interaction or impact between the sphere of subjectivity and nature; however, these two aspects imply one another. In this essay, I will develop the philosophical justification of the above reformulation of the mind–body problem and employing the analogy of light will canvass the paradoxical relationship between dual aspects in a phenomenological framework.