Hamish Russell

Shai Agmon distinguishes between frictional competitions, in which competitors are permitted and encouraged to interfere with each other’s moves, and parallel competitions, which place competitors on separate, non-interacting tracks. He argues that the market economy is a parallel competition, making it importantly different from frictional competitions like the adversary legal system. Here I challenge this argument: it relies too much on general equilibrium theory for real-world applicability. Yet I also defend Agmon’s reluctance to categorise the market as a frictional competition, for blatant interference with competitors is generally an impermissible business strategy. Agmon neglects a third category, strategic competitions, which do not permit interference but do involve a different kind of interaction, namely an iterated anticipation-and-response to competitors’ moves.

How does a role—whether in business, law, government, or some other institution—change what is morally permissible or obligatory? Here I present three options and argue for the third. On the balancing model, a role simply gives its occupant additional normative reasons, to be weighed against all other normative reasons. On the shielding model, a role comes with its own moral code, blocking the force of all role-external reasons. On the filtering model, a role selectively filters its occupant’s reasons for action, creating obligations or permissions to act on a narrowed range of considerations. I argue that the filtering model offers a superior analysis of the ethics of roles, including the concepts of professional integrity and discretion. I focus on three difficult cases: a nuclear safety regulator, a criminal defense lawyer, and a corporate lobbyist. I conclude by discussing the implications of the filtering model for business ethics.