Hana Samaržija

This paper proposes four comprehensive institutional measures for countering epistemic injustice. Driven by the distinction between transactional and structural injustice, we argue that approaches which call for individual virtue overlook the social inequalities that reproduce unjust epistemic relationships. The task of remedying epistemic injustice, therefore, falls upon institutions. First, we review recent empirical research to show why the virtue theoretical model fails to address even transactional instances of epistemic injustice. We then argue that, due to unequal access to education, seemingly justified ascriptions of trust can entrench differential epistemic development. We have limited our proposal to four measures that shield vulnerable groups against injustice and improve the epistemic environment. Institutional epistemic justice demands that, first, all groups enjoy fair and equal access to education and the opportunity to acquire the socially recognized markers of credibility. Second, epistemic justice requires that marginalized groups have access to the relevant public platforms, such as politics and journalism, for voicing their social perspectives. Third, fair access to public positions can aid vulnerable groups in attaining rewarding careers, publicly affirming their epistemic resources, and rupturing the cycle of epistemic disadvantage. As our fourth and final measure, we propose institutional mechanisms for eliminating identity markers from formal epistemic exchanges.

This article argues that all economic theory presupposes implicit political premises, and that these affect its scientific conclusions. More specifically, I will argue that neoclassical economics trades the epistemic values of predictive accuracy and explanatory strength for an image of the capitalist economy as sustainable, which renders it unequipped to analyze its crises. Echoing Anwar Shaikh’s analysis, I will show that neoclassical economics, by constructing idealized settings and misleading metrics, obscures the inherent conflicts of capital accumulation. As this tendency leads to an incomplete understanding of the current system, I will argue that neoclassical economics cannot inform effective economic policy. To explain the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic values, I will begin with a brief historical overview of the role of values in science. I will then, by analyzing economic metrics and the basic assumption of perfect competition, proceed to show that neoclassical economics is both empirically and logically underdetermined. Once I have shown there is no epistemic argument in favor of neoclassical economics, I will argue that this choice of theoretical framework was mandated by underlying political concerns. I will end by discussing the relationship between engaged philosophy and public policy in times of crisis.

This paper proposes four comprehensive institutional measures for countering epistemic injustice. Driven by the distinction between transactional and structural injustice, we argue that approaches which call for individual virtue overlook the social inequalities that reproduce unjust epistemic relationships. The task of remedying epistemic injustice, therefore, falls upon institutions. First, we review recent empirical research to show why the virtue theoretical model fails to address even transactional instances of epistemic injustice. We then argue that, due to unequal access to education, seemingly justified ascriptions of trust can entrench differential epistemic development. We have limited our proposal to four measures that shield vulnerable groups against injustice and improve the epistemic environment. Institutional epistemic justice demands that, first, all groups enjoy fair and equal access to education and the opportunity to acquire the socially recognized markers of credibility. Second, epistemic justice requires that marginalized groups have access to the relevant public platforms, such as politics and journalism, for voicing their social perspectives. Third, fair access to public positions can aid vulnerable groups in attaining rewarding careers, publicly affirming their epistemic resources, and rupturing the cycle of epistemic disadvantage. As our fourth and final measure, we propose institutional mechanisms for eliminating identity markers from formal epistemic exchanges.

This is the first edited scholarly collection devoted solely to the epistemology of democracy. Its 15 chapters, published here for the first time and written by an international team of leading researchers, will interest scholars and advanced students working in democratic theory, the harrowing crisis of democracy, political philosophy, social epistemology, and political epistemology. The volume is structured into three parts, each offering five chapters. The first part, Democratic Pessimism, covers the crisis of democracy, the rise of authoritarianism, public epistemic vices, misinformation and disinformation, civic ignorance, and the lacking quantitative case for democratic decision-making. The second part, Democratic Optimism, discusses the role of hope and positive emotions in rebuilding democracy, proposes solutions to myside bias, and criticizes dominant epistocratic approaches to forming political administrations. The third and final part, Democratic Realism, assesses whether we genuinely require emotional empathy to understand the perspectives of our political adversaries, discusses the democratic tension between mutual respect for others and a quest for social justice, and evaluates manifold top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy making.