The ground of human dignity constitutes a core problem in metaethics. Traditional conceptions of dignity—whether religious, rational, recognition-based, or capability-based—all depend on moral attribute presuppositions, and each exhibits explanatory fractures in marginal cases. This paper proposes an entirely new theory of dignity grounded in a foundational postulate of ethics and objective facts: Pre-structural dignity. The argument proceeds from a disciplinary postulate and indisputable object…
Read moreThe ground of human dignity constitutes a core problem in metaethics. Traditional conceptions of dignity—whether religious, rational, recognition-based, or capability-based—all depend on moral attribute presuppositions, and each exhibits explanatory fractures in marginal cases. This paper proposes an entirely new theory of dignity grounded in a foundational postulate of ethics and objective facts: Pre-structural dignity. The argument proceeds from a disciplinary postulate and indisputable objective facts—that the advancement of civilization (generating increments rather than maintaining the status quo) depends on a small number of decisive breakthrough contributors; that such contributors cannot be identified in advance at birth; that the process of civilizational advancement must therefore maintain a pool of possibility covering all who are born; that every newborn is structurally incorporated into this pool, objectively functions as a possibility-bearer for becoming such a contributor; and that birth is an irreversible physical fact—to derive the conclusion that each individual, by virtue of functioning as a possibility-bearer in the operation of the civilizational advancement system, possesses a corresponding structural value. This structural value, which cannot be objectively revoked, while can only be subjectively denied, is precisely the ground of human dignity. Pre-structural dignity requires no moral presuppositions, religious beliefs, or social recognition, and possesses four attributes: innateness, universality, stability, and finitude. It is capable of explaining the marginal ethical cases that traditional theories cannot cover, thereby providing a more solid philosophical foundation for modern human rights and judicial ethics.