Hanna Metzen

Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science-policy interface. We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.

Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choosing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy‐making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value‐based considerations.

Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence-based—cannot be decided without appeal to value-based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy-making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choos¬ing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy-making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value-based considerations.

Value transparency is thought to promote trust in scientific expertise. Yet, transparency is a complex concept. I will argue that transparency requirements come with a varying extent of engagement: merely disclosing information, providing information that is publicly accessible, or having additional mechanisms for criticism in place. It is often not clear in which sense transparency requirements are to be understood in the context of trust in expertise. However, each sense can backfire in different ways. Merely talking about transparency in a general sense hides these possible trade-offs. This furthermore shows that requiring transparency may come with a greater regulatory force.

This paper investigates the value of trust and the proper attitude lay people ought to have towards scientific experts. Trust in expertise is usually considered to be valuable, while distrust is often analyzed in cases where it is harmful. I will draw on accounts from political philosophy and argue that it is not only public trust that is valuable when it comes to scientific expertise – but also public vigilance. Expertise may be distorted in different ways, which cannot be remedied by internal control mechanisms alone. This reveals the importance of some forms of democratic oversight. The proper attitude is vigilant trust in expertise. However, vigilant trust seems to be a contradictory notion: How can one be trusting and watchful at the same time? I will show that it is not, and that trust and vigilance can be compatible to a certain extent. I will do so by distinguishing between different levels of both trust and vigilance. Interestingly, this argument requires acknowledging the value of some forms of distrust in scientific expertise, even if that distrust targets trustworthy experts.

This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere reliance, not genuine trust. They draw on a distinction that philosophers of trust following Annette Baier have made with respect to interpersonal trust, where genuine trust has some normative element to it that is missing in cases of mere reliance. However, I will show that there are plural forms of trust in science: Both objectivity and shared values ground trust in science in a normative sense. I will link the trust in science debate to the literature on interpersonal trust. This is significant in that, beyond references to Baier, there is little connection between both areas of philosophy. In a pluralist reading, different trust accounts help to identify the normative elements involved in different kinds of trust in science.