Hannah Peaceman

In classical German philosophy, there are diverse and sometimes contradictory references to “Judaism” and “the Jews.” Their context are political and theological debates surrounding the so-called Jewish question which shaped the transition from late feudal society to early bourgeois society. Compared to the reflections on this topic we find in philosophical writings of this period, the “Jewish question” plays a marginal role in their systematic interpretation. The aim of this essay is to identify a specific structural aspect of Antijudaism in texts of this period and its transformation: Subject of inquiry are contradictory references to Judaism in philosophical texts in which it is simultaneously honored and devalued. From a socio-analytical perspective, building on Adorno’s “models” and Horkheimer’s reflections on a critical historiography of philosophy, this essay examines two passages from Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” and Hegel’s “Principles of the Philosophy of Right” in which the contradictory reference to Judaism comes to light.The claim is that an underlying dialectic between Christianity and Judaism can be identified in both Kant’s and Hegel’s references to “Judaism”. It reveals a Christian-Protestant problem of legitimacy: on the one hand, Christianity has its roots in Judaism; on the other hand, it must distinguish itself from Judaism to demonstrate its autonomy. This dialectic makes visible the Protestant framing of the perspective on Judaism that shapes Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies. It leads to an inclusive exclusion of Judaism which has a place only in its function in relation to Christianity, but not in its autonomy. From a socio-analytical perspective, it is argued that Kant’s and Hegel’s references to Judaism lend plausibility to their respective ideas of progress: Judaism and the Jews, serve as a contrasting construct, regressive in comparison to Christianity. This serves to highlight the compatibility of Christianity with Enlightenment and bourgeois society. By linking this hierarchy to abstract concepts that appear neutral — such as the imagination of morality (Kant) and religion (Hegel)—the idea of progress, and thus the hierarchization of religions, gains philosophical legitimacy.

This text examines the significance of the late absolutist Ständegesellschaft in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. It aims to reveal how social inequality, exclusion, and societal hierarchies are embedded within philosophical concepts and arguments. The text emphasises the historicity of philosophical terms as a methodological approach to analysing conditions of participation and exclusion. Kant’s concept of Enlightenment primarily addresses the “civilised estates” – nobility, civil servants, and bourgeoisie. Through close readings of Kant’s texts, especially “What is Enlightenment?” and “On Pedagogy”, the analysis shows how education, public discourse, and morality are framed in a way that reinforces social exclusion. Rather than criticising structural inequality, Kant individualises it through perceived educational shortcomings. The text advocates for a historically grounded philosophical analysis that examines concepts like morality (Sittlichkeit) as constructs shaped by historical power structures.

In this paper we present a comparison of Immanuel Kant’s and Moses Mendelssohn’s essays on Enlightenment with respect to the Prussian late absolutistic estate-based society and the so-called “Jewish Question”. Our comparison consists of three aspects: firstly, the relation between theory and practice, secondly, the relation between state and Enlightenment and thirdly, the relation between progress and the dangers of Enlightenment. We argue against an individualising and ahistoric reading of philosophical texts and the focus on philosophers as individual geniuses. Instead, we show that the content of terms like “the public” (Kant) and “education” (Mendelssohn) only becomes comprehensible when the correlation of context and systematicity is reflected.