•  207
    This chapter provides a historical reconstruction of how Alfred Schutz’s American writings were critically engaged by the feminist sociologists Dorothy E. Smith and Patricia Hill Collins. Schutz’s articulation of a phenomenological sociology in relation to, among others, the sociology of Talcott Parsons and the philosophies of science of Ernest Nagel and Carl G. Hempel proved fruitful to Smith in the development of her feminist standpoint theory in her 1987 The Everyday World as Problematic: A F…Read more
  •  258
    Een fenomenologie van het habituele en actieve karakter van onwetendheid
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 114 (3): 317-335. 2022.
    [Title: A phenomenological account of the habitual and active character of ignorance] A number of critical social epistemologists have argued that a form of ignorance makes up the epistemic dimension of existing relations of oppression based on racial and/or gender identity. Recent phenomenological accounts of the habitual nature of perception can be understood as describing the bodily, tacit, and affective character of this form of ignorance. At the same time, as I aim to show in this article, …Read more
  •  280
    A Phenomenology of the Work of Attention
    Journal of Speculative Philosophy 36 (2): 264-276. 2022.
    ABSTRACT With the aim of showing what it takes to see the world and others as they are, this article provides a phenomenological account of what Iris Murdoch has memorably called “the work of attention.” I first show that Aron Gurwitsch’s analyses of attention provide a basis on which to reject a voluntaristic account of attention according to which seeing things as they are is as simple as directing one’s attention to something. Then, in order to elucidate the work that is involved in paying at…Read more
  •  167
    In this chapter I aim to show that Husserl’s descriptions of the nature and role of activity in the epistemic economy of our conscious lives imply a nondeflationary account of epistemic agency. After providing the main outlines of this account, I discuss how it compares to contemporary accounts of epistemic agency and respond to some potential objections. In concluding I indicate that according to this Husserlian account of epistemic agency we can be said to be intrinsically responsible for hold…Read more
  •  498
    Husserl, the active self, and commitment
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2): 281-298. 2020.
    In “On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem” (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations of Husserl’s account of the person and personal identity by noting that they lack a phenomenological elucidation of the self as commitment. In this article, in response to Crowell, I aim to show that such an account of the self as commitment can be drawn from Husserl’s work by looking more closely at his descriptions from the time of Ideas and after of the…Read more
  •  17
    The Husserlian Mind (edited book)
    Routledge. 2021.
    "Edmund Husserl is widely regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology, one of the most important movements in twentieth-century philosophy. His work inspired subsequent figures such as Martin Heidegger, his most renowned pupil, as well as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, all of whom engaged with and developed his insights in significant ways. He also made important contributions to logic and philosophy of mathematics and his work on fundamental problems such as intentionality, …Read more
  •  32
    Phenomenology of Consciousness
    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.
  • Die Idee der Phänomenologie
    In Sebastian Luft & Maren Wehrle (eds.), Husserl-Handbuch Leben – Werk – Wirkung, J.b. Metzler. pp. 125-134. 2017.
    Betrachtet man die Geschichte des Begriffs ‚Phänomenologie‘, ist nicht auf den ersten Blick klar, was darunter zu verstehen ist. Wie Schuhmann (1984 ) herausgearbeitet hat, tritt dieser Begriff in der Philosophiegeschichte auf, noch lange bevor Edmund Husserl sich ihn zu Eigen machte, um sein eigenes philosophisches Projekt zu beschreiben. Auch hinderte Husserls Versuch, diesen Begriff für die Beschreibung seines eigenen einmaligen Projekts zu beanspruchen, seine Zeitgenossen (z.B. Pfänder, Rein…Read more
  • Phänomenologie als Lebensform. Husserl über phänomenologische Reflexion und die Transformation des Selbst
    In Thomas Jürgasch, Tobias Keiling, Thomas Böhm & Günter Figal (eds.), Anthropologie der Theorie, Mohr Siebeck. 2017.
    In diesem Beitrag möchte ich die Auswirkungen untersuchen, die die phänomenologische Reflexion und die Erlangung phänomenologischer Einsichten auf denjenigen haben, der Phänomenologie treibt. Husserl selbst gibt den Impetus für diese Untersuchung, indem er (wie in einer der Textpassagen, die diesem Artikel als Motto vorangestellt sind) behauptet, dass die phänomenologische Reflexion einen derart langanhaltenden Effekt auf denjenigen hat, der phänomenologisch reflektiert, dass eine Rückkehr zum b…Read more
  •  13
    L’article présente une reconstruction d’analyse husserlienne de l’éveil et démontre que, selon Husserl, seule une phénoménologie de l’attention est en mesure d’élucider les véritables caractéristiques de l’état d’éveil. Plus précisément, l’article démontre que, d’un point de vue husserlien, l’attention introduit une distinction entre thème et arrière-plan dans notre expérience et que cette différence est ce qui nous permettra de déterminer dans quelle mesure nous ne sommes jamais pleinement évei…Read more
  •  5523
    This chapter focuses on a number of respects in which Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the world differ, despite other significant commonalities. Specifically, I discuss how both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of our experience of the world challenge Husserl’s assertion of the possibility of a worldless consciousness; how Heidegger’s discussion of the world entails a rejection of Husserl’s claim that the world is at bottom nature; and how Merleau-Ponty puts press…Read more
  •  35
    According to a predominant view, reflection is constitutive of personhood. In this paper I first indicate how it might seem that such an account cannot do justice to the socially embedded nature ofpersonhood. I then present a phenomenologically-inspired account of reflection as critical stance taking and show how it accommodates the social embeddedness of persons. In concluding, I outline how this phenomenological account is also not vulnerable to a number of additional challenges that have been…Read more
  •  139
    In this article I consider whether and how Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological method can initiate a phenomenological way of life. The impetus for this investigation originates in a set of manuscripts written in 1926 (published in Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion) where Husserl suggests that the consistent commitment to and performance of phenomenological reflection can change one’s life to the point where a simple return to the life lived before this reflection is no longer possible. Huss…Read more
  •  67
    In this article, I develop how the phenomenological understanding of the intentionality of consciousness allows us to formulate a theory of personal identity that can at least account for the continuity of consciousness through time, provide an account of a certain aspect of what it means to be a person, namely to be able to appropriate one’s past as one’s own, and give an original answer to the question of personal identity and state in what the identity of a person through time consists. After…Read more
  •  2
    Transcendental Subjectivity and the Human Being
    In Sara Heinämaa Mirja Hartimo & Timo Miettinen (eds.), Phenomenology and the Transcendental, Routledge. pp. 87-105. 2014.
    This article addresses an ambiguity in Edmund Husserl’s descriptions of what it means to be a human being in the world. On the one hand, Husserl often characterizes the human being in natural scientific terms as a psychophysical unity. On the other hand, Husserl also describes how we experience ourselves as embodied persons that experience and communicate with others within a socio-historical world. The main aim of this article is to show that if one overlooks this ambiguity then one will misund…Read more
  •  114
    Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention
    Research in Phenomenology 46 (2): 257-276. 2016.
    This paper spells out Husserl’s account of the exercise of rationality and shows how it is tied to the capacity for critical reflection. I first discuss Husserl’s views on what rationally constrains our intentionality. Then I localize the exercise of rationality in the positing that characterizes attentive forms of intentionality and argue that, on Husserl’s account, when we are attentive to something we are also pre-reflectively aware of what speaks for and against our taking something to be a …Read more
  •  20
    Review van Ciano Aydin (ed.), De vele gezichten van de fenomenologie (review)
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 100 (2): 160-162. 2008.
  •  29
    Einleitung in Die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1916–1920 (edited book)
    with Edmund Husserl
    Springer. 2012.
    Der vorliegende Band, der außer Husserls Freiburger Einleitung in die Philosophie von 1919/20 auch die noch erhaltenen Teile seiner beiden ersten Freiburger Einleitungen in die Philosophie von 1916 und 1918 enthält, bietet eine sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Hinführung zur transzendentalphänomenologischen Philosophie auf dem Weg über die Ontologie und die Erkenntnistheorie. Im Ausgang von der Darstellung des Anstoßes durch die Sophisitk entwickelt Husserl ausführlich Platons…Read more
  •  54
    This volume is a broad anthology addressing many if not most major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general: from foundational and methodological ...
  •  25
    In the paragraphs immediately following the introduction of the method of phenomenological epoché (§§34-46) in Ideas, rather than applying this new method, Husserl provides a series of psychological descriptions on the basis of psychological reflection. This is surprising for at least two reasons. First, since Husserl has already distinguished phenomenology from psychology (both empirical and eidetic), it is not clear why he would engage in psychological reflection and description at this point …Read more
  •  17
    I Am Awake: Husserlian Reflections on Wakefulness and Attention
    Alter. Revue de Phénoménologie 18 (1): 183-201. 2010.
    In this article, I show how Husserl’s reflections on attentive or patent intentionality and on the differentiation between background and foreground that is brought about by attentive interest allows us to better understand the distinction between sleep within wakefulness and genuine sleep as well as the distinction between the intentionality that occurs while awake and when asleep. In this way it also becomes more clear what wakefulness amounts to.