-
19Promoting inequality? Self-monitoring applications and the problem of social justiceAI and Society 38 (6): 2597-2607. 2023.When it comes to improving the health of the general population, mHealth technologies with self-monitoring and intervention components hold a lot of promise. We argue, however, that due to various factors such as access, targeting, personal resources or incentives, self-monitoring applications run the risk of increasing health inequalities, thereby creating a problem of social justice. We review empirical evidence for “intervention-generated” inequalities, present arguments that self-monitoring …Read more
-
15Moral teleology: a theory of progressRoutledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 2023.This book develops a unified theory of moral progress. The author argues that there are mechanisms in place that consistently drive societies towards moral improvement and that a sophisticated, naturalistically respectable form of teleology can be defended. The book's main aim is to flesh out the process of moral progress in more detail, and to show how, when the right mechanisms and institutions of moral progress are matched together, they create pressure for the desired types of moral gains to…Read more
-
36Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral JudgmentIn J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition, Routledge. pp. 105-114. 2023.Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-gen…Read more
-
77The ends of historyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write. Michel Fouc...
-
90The end of historyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.What credence should we assign to philosophical claims that were formed without any knowledge of the current state of the art of the philosophical debate and little or no knowledge of the relevant empirical or scientific data? Very little or none. Yet when we engage with the history of philosophy, this is often exactly what we do. In this paper, I argue that studying the history of philosophy is philosophically unhelpful. The epistemic aims of philosophy, if there are any, are frustrated by enga…Read more
-
66Another Brick in the Wall? Moral Education, Social Learning, and Moral ProgressEthical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1): 25-40. 2024.Many believe that moral education can cause moral progress. At first glance, this makes sense. A major goal of moral education is the improvement of the moral beliefs, values and behaviors of young people. Most would also consider all of these improvements to be important instances of moral progress. Moreover, moral education is a form of social learning, and there are good reasons to think that social learning processes shape episodes of progressive moral change. Despite this, we argue that ins…Read more
-
244Moral progress: Recent developmentsPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.Societies change over time. Chattel slavery and foot-binding have been abolished, democracy has become increasingly widespread, gay rights have become established in some countries, and the animal rights movement continues to gain momentum. Do these changes count as moral progress? Is there such a thing? If so, how should we understand it? These questions have been receiving increasing attention from philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and sociologists in recent decades. This survey provide…Read more
-
567Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive ControlPhilosophical Psychology 34 (7): 938-961. 2021.We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility of moral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over their moral judgments for moral progress to occur. Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving their moral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people…Read more
-
79Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionismPhilosophical Explorations 24 (2): 137-154. 2021.In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis of moral cognition supports a form of (moderate) moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of our moral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neither moral expertise, nor moral learning, nor the possibility of moral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form of mor…Read more
-
33Economic Exceptionalism? Justice and the Liberal Conception of RightsMoral Philosophy and Politics 7 (1): 151-167. 2020.Are political and economic rights equally basic? This is one of the main issues liberal egalitarians and classical liberals disagree about. The former think political rights should be more strongly protected than economic ones; classical liberals thus accuse them of an unjustified and politically biased ‘economic exceptionalism’. Recently, John Tomasi has developed a special version of this challenge, which is targeted against Murphy and Nagel’s account of the relationship between property right…Read more
-
102The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turnPhilosophical Psychology 33 (4): 569-591. 2020.In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical “moral signature” as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical appr…Read more
-
40Moral FailureJournal of Moral Philosophy 16 (5): 645-659. 2019.In his most recent book, Daniel Batson develops a psychological theory of moral motivation by looking at moral failure. Even under favorable conditions, Batson argues, people frequently behave immorally. In addition to defects of character or judgment and situational pressures, a lack of moral integrity plays an important role in explaining moral failure. Batson’s book sheds light on the most common sources of immoral behavior, providing moral philosophers with the resources to properly target t…Read more
-
31Moral Thinking, Fast and SlowRoutledge. 2018.In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficien…Read more
-
170The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realismRatio 32 (4): 339-352. 2019.The most popular argument against moral realism is the argument from disagreement: if there are mind‐independent moral facts, then we would not expect to find as much moral disagreement as we in fact do; therefore, moral realism is false. In this paper, I develop the flipside of this argument. According to this argument from agreement, we would expect to find lots of moral disagreement if there were mind‐independent moral facts. But we do not, in fact, find much moral disagreement; therefore, mo…Read more
-
69Butchering Benevolence Moral Progress beyond the Expanding CircleEthical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1): 153-167. 2019.Standard evolutionary explanations seem unable to account for inclusivist shifts that expand the circle of moral concern beyond strategically relevant cooperators. Recently, Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have argued that this shows that that evolutionary conservatism – the view that our inherited psychology imposes significant feasibility constraints on how much inclusivist moral progress can be achieved – is unjustified. Secondly, they hold that inclusivist gains can be sustained, and exclu…Read more
-
65The Cost of ConsequentializationMetaphilosophy 50 (1-2): 100-109. 2019.Consequentializers suggest that for all non‐consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within …Read more
-
584Metamorality without Moral TruthNeuroethics 12 (2): 119-131. 2018.Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that we need a metamorality to solve moral problems for which evolution has not prepared us. The metamorality that he proposes is a utilitarian account that he calls deep pragmatism. Deep pragmatism is supposed to arbitrate when the values espoused by different groups clash. To date, no systematic appraisal of this argument for a metamorality exists. We reconstruct Greene’s case for deep pragmatism as a metamorality and consider three lines of objection to it. …Read more
-
70Promoting inequality? Self-monitoring applications and the problem of social justiceAI and Society 1-11. 2018.When it comes to improving the health of the general population, mHealth technologies with self-monitoring and intervention components hold a lot of promise. We argue, however, that due to various factors such as access, targeting, personal resources or incentives, self-monitoring applications run the risk of increasing health inequalities, thereby creating a problem of social justice. We review empirical evidence for “intervention-generated” inequalities, present arguments that self-monitoring …Read more
-
34Debunking Arguments in EthicsCambridge University Press. 2018.In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also c…Read more
-
40Mark Alfano: Moral Psychology. An Introduction: Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016, €22.84. 213 pp (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2): 433-434. 2018.
-
113The Appropriateness of Emotions. Moral Judgment, Moral Emotions, and the Conflation ProblemEthical Perspectives 18 (1): 107-140. 2011.What is the connection between emotions and moral judgments? Neo-sentimentalism maintains that to say that something is morally wrong is to think it appropriate to resent other people for doing it or to feel guilty upon doing it oneself. But intuitively, it seems that there is no way to characterize the content of guilt and resentment independent from the fact that these emotions respond to morally wrong actions. In response to this problem of circularity, modern forms of sentimentalism have fav…Read more
-
160It’s the Knobe Effect, Stupid!: How to Explain the Side-Effect EffectReview of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4): 485-503. 2014.People asymmetrically attribute various agential features such as intentionality, knowledge, or causal impact to other agents when something of normative significance is at stake. I will argue that three questions are of primary interest in the debate about this effect. A methodological question about how to explain it at all; a substantive question about how to explain it correctly: and a normative question about whether to explain it in terms of an error or a legitimate judgmental pattern. The…Read more
-
40Nancy E. Snow and Franco V. Trivigno : The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness: Routledge, New York 2014. 314 pages Hardback: £ 85 ISBN 978-0-415-65614-6 (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2): 429-431. 2015.Do people have character traits? What is happiness? These two questions seem at best loosely related to each other, but The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness, edited by Nancy E. Snow and Franco V. Trivigno does a formidable job at showing how intimately connected they are, and how fruitful it can be to bring the concepts and theories developed in debates about the former to bear on issues concerning the latter, and vice versa.The present volume brings together some of the worl…Read more
-
111Chairmen, Cocaine, and Car Crashes: The Knobe Effect as an Attribution ErrorThe Journal of Ethics 17 (4): 305-330. 2013.In this paper, we argue that the so-called Knobe-Effect constitutes an error. There is now a wealth of data confirming that people are highly prone to what has also come to be known as the ‘side-effect effect’. That is, when attributing psychological states—such as intentionality, foreknowledge, and desiring—as well as other agential features—such as causal control—people typically do so to a greater extent when the action under consideration is evaluated negatively. There are a plethora of mode…Read more
-
63The Wrong Kind of Mistake: A Problem for Robust Sentimentalism about Moral JudgmentJournal of Value Inquiry 48 (2): 247-269. 2014.IntroductionIn a 1971 interview broadcast on Granada TV Manchester, Woody Allen made one of his trademark self-deprecating remarks about an early film of his: “It was a boring picture, as I recall.” The interviewer responded with surprise: “I rather enjoyed it.” To which Allen replied: “Yes, but you’re mistaken.” In the world of humor, Allen’s reply sounds odd – which is why it is funny. In the moral domain, an exchange like this would not sound weird at all. What is or is not funny is settled b…Read more
-
33Metabolizing cognitionAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (2): 179-182. 2016.Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
-
22Moral Judgments as Educated IntuitionsMIT Press. 2017.Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, ma…Read more
-
227Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1): 95-115. 2012.Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgm…Read more
-
116Can’t We All Disagree More Constructively? Moral Foundations, Moral Reasoning, and Political DisagreementNeuroethics 8 (2): 153-169. 2015.Can’t we all disagree more constructively? Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in political partisanship: the 2013 shutdown of the US government as well as an ever more divided political landscape in Europe illustrate that citizens and representatives of developed nations fundamentally disagree over virtually every significant issue of public policy, from immigration to health care, from the regulation of financial markets to climate change, from drug policies to medical procedures. The e…Read more
-
187Morally irrelevant factors: What's left of the dual process-model of moral cognition?Philosophical Psychology 25 (6): 783-811. 2012.Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Gree…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Value Theory |
Moral Psychology, Misc |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
Moral Psychology, Misc |