Hanoch Sheinman

This chapter proposes a general account of agreements within a largely individualistic framework. According to this account, making an agreement is an essentially _joint action_, one the parties perform together as one. The action of agreement making, which can only be performed jointly, can nevertheless be explained in terms of another action, which can also be performed individually, namely _promising_. Agreement making on this view is a matter of joint promising. Two promises add up to an agreement—i.e. joint promise—just when they are exchanged—or _interdepend_—in the right way. On the current proposal, the interdependence of agreement promises is _not_ a matter of the promises being conditional in content (or made under an assumption—indeed, each party promises the other to do her part of the agreement, just like so. Instead, the interdependence of agreement promises is _causal-motivational_. Specifically, each party's belief that (she will promise later to do her part if an only if the other party promises later to do his) causes and motivates that very party to promise the other later; and each party is aware of this causal-motivational fact.

Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in its own right. Promises are individual _acts_ as well as social _practices_. To understand promises, then, is to understand individual acts of promising, practices of promising, and the relation between them. Philosophical accounts of promises are best regarded as packages of answers to several different questions (this chapter will mention twelve). Closely—indeed, conceptually—related to promises are _agreements_, so a philosophical account of promises should explain the relation between promises and agreements. Also closely—and conceptually—related to promises are _contracts_ (and treaties). Arguably, contracts just _are_ legally binding agreements or promises. If this is right, then understanding promises and agreements is a precondition on understanding contracts (and treaties). This chapter broaches some of the more interesting issues in the growing philosophical literature on promises. It closes with an overview of the collection.

Developments in contract law over the past century have led to the proliferation of interpretive theories according to which contract law is no longer a sui generisi legal branch. It is widely accepted that if there is a sui generis contractual obligation, it must somehow be based on the wills of the parties. But a new orthodoxy in contract theory claims that the role of the will of the parties in contract law has been progressively shrinking due to judicial doctrines within the law of contract and also to general statutory provisions. It is no longer apparent that there is any interesting sense in which contractual liability is based on the will of the parties. Hence, so it is claimed, contract law has lost its sui generis nature. The article challenges this new orthodoxy. But rather than reverting to the old orthodoxy—the will theory of contracts (or its contemporary rendition, contract as promise)—it argues that we should resist being forced to choose between them. The article argues that the purpose of contractual liability is to support the practice of voluntary obligations. This view preserves an important connection between contractual liability and voluntary undertakings and meets the objections that beset the will theory

Unrejectability is the property shared by things no one could reasonably reject. Following the lead of T. M. Scanlon, modern contractualists hold Principle Contractualism: An act is obligatory when conformity to unrejectable principles requires its performance. This article entertains Act Contractualism: An act is obligatory when its performance is unrejectable. The article hypothesizes that Principle Contractualism owes its initial plausibility to the assumption that following it somehow realizes unrejectability, if only indirectly. The article then argues that, whereas following Act Contractualism realizes unrejectability, following Principle Contractualism realizes a convoluted, principle-mediated, non-causal conformity relation between acts and unrejectability. But then the notion that this relation is what matters ultimately in action does not seem to enjoy independent plausibility. After interrogating Scanlon's objection that the challenge to the principle-based nature of contractualism is , I conclude that Act Contractualism is the more fitting contractualist theory of obligation

To promise someone to do something is to commit oneself to that person to do that thing, but what does that commitment consist of? Some think a promissory commitment is an obligation to do what’s promised, and that while promising practices facilitate the creation of promissory obligations, they are not essential to them. I favor the broadly Humean view in which, when it comes to promises (and so promissory obligations), practices are of the essence. I propose the Practice Reason Account of promises, according to which a promise is basically to give oneself a self-interested practice reason to do what’s promised. One achieves this feat by invoking self-enforcing independent practice rules thanks to which one’s doing what’s promised preserves one’s promissory trust(worthiness) and promising power. However, nothing in this account supports the Hume-Rawls claim that promise-keeping or promise-breaking is right just when and because it conforms to practice rules that are justified by their good- or right-making properties.

Justice, you might think, is the first virtue of the law. After all, we call our judges justices, the administration of law the administration of justice, and the government's legal department the Justice Department. We should reject this Priority of Justice for the Law in favor of the more moderate Priority of Justice for the Courts, the view that justice is the first virtue of the law courts. Under its comparative conception, justice is distinguishable by its concern with the relative positions of subjects. I claim that legal duties divide into primary and secondary, that primary legal duties are not essentially comparative, and that this impugns the Priority of Comparative Justice for the Law. Still, the bipolar structure of litigation appears to suggest that comparative justice is the first virtue of the courts. I explain why that is not so. I then introduce a desert-based conception of justice I dub requitative justice. I argue that the Priority of Justice for the Law cannot draw succor from this conception of justice because primary legal duties are no more requitative than they are comparative. However, the special affinity between law courts and secondary legal duties suggests that requitative justice is the first virtue of the courts. Finally, I concede that the Priority of Justice for the Courts gives us reason to accept the Priority of Justice for the Law after all, if we accept the common Priority of Courts for the Law, the view that the courts are the first institution of the law. We should not do so, however

Reason and Value collects fifteen brand-new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics--including especially his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value--make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. The volume honors Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and will contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject.

This article offers a refutation of the corrective justice interpretation of tort law – the view that it is essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary and secondary tort duties and claims that tort law is best understood as the union of its primary and secondary duties. It then advances two independent criticisms of the corrective justice interpretation. The article first argues that primary tort duties have nothing fundamentally to do with corrective justice and that, if one understands what is meant by ``primary tort duties,'' one is compelled to regard this fact as a decisive objection to the corrective justice interpretation. Second, it argues that, whatever relation there is between secondary tort duties and corrective justice, that relation also holds between corrective justice and secondary duties of other legal branches. In sum, the concept of corrective justice is neither capable of unifying tort law nor of demarcating it from other legal branches.The article also offers a general alternative interpretation of tort law. Rather than being essentially corrective, tort law is essentially protective. Under this picture, if tort law has a most important point, it is the protection of legal subjects and valuable social interests from harm. This is the overarching ambition that unifies primary and secondary tort duties. It does not, however, demarcate tort law from other legal branches.