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Hans G. Herzberger

University of Toronto, St. George Campus
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    23
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    22

 More details
  • University of Toronto, St. George Campus
    Graduate Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
  • University of Toronto, St. George Campus
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1961
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Homepage
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
  • All publications (23)
  •  26
    Peirce's Remarkable Theorem
    In Leonard Sumner, John G. Slater & Fred Wilson (eds.), Pragmatism and Purpose: Essays Presented to Thomas A. Goudge, University of Toronto Press. pp. 41-58. 1981.
    Charles Sanders Peirce
  •  82
    Hans G. Herzberger. The truth-conditional consistency of natural languages. The journal of philosophy, vol. 64, pp. 29–35 (review)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1): 146-147. 1968.
  • Contextual Analysis
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1961.
  •  223
    The expressive capacity of non-translational languages
    Analysis 31 (6): 186-193. 1971.
    Translation
  •  88
    New Paradoxes for Old
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81. 1981.
    Hans G. Herzberger; VII*—New Paradoxes for Old, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 109–124, https://doi.org/10.1093.
  •  153
    Counterfactuals and consistency
    Journal of Philosophy 76 (2): 83-88. 1979.
    Possible-World Theories of CounterfactualsLogic of Conditionals
  •  86
    VII*—New Paradoxes for Old
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 109-124. 1981.
    Hans G. Herzberger; VII*—New Paradoxes for Old, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 109–124, https://doi.org/10.1093.
    Liar Paradox
  •  46
    Supervaluations without Truth-Value Gaps
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6 (n/a): 15-27. 1980.
    For a very long time truth-value gaps were under a cloud of suspicion because they were considered logically unmanageable. So Frege declared that:“as regards concepts we have a requirement of sharp delimitation; if this were not satisfied it would be impossible to set forth logical laws about them”.Three-valued logic promised to dispel the cloud but in the eyes of many it had promised more than it could deliver. So in response to Reichenbach's plea for a three-valued quantum logic Russell replie…Read more
    For a very long time truth-value gaps were under a cloud of suspicion because they were considered logically unmanageable. So Frege declared that:“as regards concepts we have a requirement of sharp delimitation; if this were not satisfied it would be impossible to set forth logical laws about them”.Three-valued logic promised to dispel the cloud but in the eyes of many it had promised more than it could deliver. So in response to Reichenbach's plea for a three-valued quantum logic Russell replied:“This is one of a number of questions as to which I am prevented from accepting a certain view by difficulties in carrying it out, but am prepared to alter my opinion if technical skill supplies an answer to my difficulties”.‘By now technical skill has supplied many alternative systems of three-valued logic, but few answers and numerous additional difficulties.’
    Truth-Value GapsSupervaluationism
  •  134
    Dimensions of truth
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4). 1973.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLiar Paradox
  •  73
    True, False, Etc
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (sup1): 1-14. 1980.
    Truth-ValuesTruth-Value GapsGottlob Frege
  •  197
    Naive semantics and the liar paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (9): 479-497. 1982.
    Liar ParadoxRevision Theory of Truth
  •  87
    Canonical superlanguages
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1). 1975.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  67
    Supervaluations without Truth-Value Gaps
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (sup1): 15-27. 1980.
    Theories of Vagueness
  •  28
    Editorial Announcement
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2): 1. 1974.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicEpistemic Logic
  •  161
    Hans G. Herzberger. The logical consistency of language. Langmage and learning, edited by Janet A. Emig, James T. Fleming, and Helen M. Popp, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York-Chicago-Burlingame1966, pp. 250–263
    with Janet A. Emig, James T. Fleming, and Helen M. Popp
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1): 147. 1968.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousLiar Paradox
  •  217
    Paradoxes of grounding in semantics
    Journal of Philosophy 67 (6): 145-167. 1970.
    Liar ParadoxOntology of Mathematics
  •  45
    Coordination Theory
    In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications, D. Reidel. pp. 163--204. 1978.
    Game Theory
  •  136
    The algebra of supervaluations
    Topoi 1 (1-2): 74-81. 1982.
    Value TheorySocial and Political Philosophy
  •  219
    Notes on naive semantics
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1). 1982.
    Liar ParadoxRevision Theory of Truth
  •  58
    Book review (review)
    Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2): 207-208. 1987.
  •  180
    The truth-conditional consistency of natural languages
    Journal of Philosophy 64 (2): 29-35. 1967.
    Languages, MiscLiar ParadoxTruth, MiscTruth-Conditional Theories
  •  71
    Presuppositional policies
    Philosophia 5 (3): 243-268. 1975.
    Presupposition
  •  89
    Double negation in Buddhist logic
    Journal of Indian Philosophy 3 (1-2): 3-16. 1975.
    Indian Philosophy
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