Hans W. Blom

This introduction to the papers of the 2011 conference in Potsdam on De veritate aims to put the reception of the work during the (early) Enlightenment into perspective, while introducing the several articles and their distinctive takes on Grotius and his theology. The importance of early-modern apologetics, its relations to natural theology, to rationalism and Deism, as well as to the changing self-image of Calvinism, are discussed. De veritate has been – and maybe still is – a mirror to reflect important issues of Enlightenment and religion.

Dutch decline is usually studied as a topic in economic history: when did it really start, what shape did it take? In this article an attempt is made to show the actual awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch economy, in the terms used by participants in three public debates. The classical Dutch discourse of decay and decline evolved in response to national and international political reality. The Bickerse Beroerten debate of 1650 shows the conflict between neo-Roman and neo-Athenian tendencies. Subsequently, the explanation of Dutch decline (the effect of luxury) by the Anglo-Dutch pamphleteer Bernard Mandeville is shown to be markedly different from his advice to the English (to allow luxury). Finally, the 1630s Dutch debate between Lieven de Beaufort and his critics represents the maturing of the Dutch vocabulary of decline, including its failure to take into account the organisational preconditions of modern society.

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 1 - 18 This introduction to the papers of the 2011 conference in Potsdam on De veritate aims to put the reception of the work during the Enlightenment into perspective, while introducing the several articles and their distinctive takes on Grotius and his theology. The importance of early-modern apologetics, its relations to natural theology, to rationalism and Deism, as well as to the changing self-image of Calvinism, are discussed. De veritate has been – and maybe still is – a mirror to reflect important issues of Enlightenment and religion.

SummaryGrotius has a rudimentary theory of sociability. Only with hindsight has a remark about appetitus societatis been promoted to the starting point of a theory that flourished in the writings of later natural jurists. In this article, I address the issue of the appearance in Grotius's natural law of sociability [as the 1715/38 English translation of John Morrice renders appetitus societatis, following Barbeyrac's sociabilité]. Writing in the just war tradition, Grotius is first of all interested in finding out the conditions for peace, and although injustice is a condition of war, it is not per se true that injustice is a perversion of society. Apparently, not all societies are perfect and the violence of war and the legal actions of peace are both instruments for achieving a greater modicum of justice in this world. Yet appetitus et custodia societatis is called the foundation of justice. Grotius achieved this context for sociability in phases, through a series of writings from c. 1600 until De iure belli ac pacis of 1625, and its revision of 1631. In this development the notion of fides plays an intriguing role, through which we can obtain a better understanding of the meaning of appetitus societatis in the later work. The present article is a sequel to a previous publication, on fides in De iure praedae. Analysing the genesis of appetitus societatis in De iure belli ac pacis, I argue that Grotius was changing his strategy over the years, without however arriving at a definitive solution to the question of what commits men to the pursuit of justice.