Hans Flohr

This paper reviews a theory on the physiological conditions of consciousness. The theory consists of four hypotheses: (1) The occurrence of states of consciousness depends on the formation of higher-order representations that represent the internal state of the brain itself. (2) Higher-order representations are instantiated by the spatio-temporal activity pattern of large-scale neuronal assemblies. (3) The N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) synapse plays a crucial role in the generation of conscious states by implementing the binding mechanism that the brain uses to produce large-scale assemblies. (4) The activation state of the NMDA receptor determines the rate at which representational structures can be built up. Unconsciousness or altered states of consciousness occur if, and only if, NMDA-dependent binding processes are inhibited.

A theory of anaesthesia is presented. It consists of four hypotheses: (1) The occurrence of states of consciousness causally depends on the formation of transient higher-order, self-referential mental representations. The occurrence of such states is identical with the appearance of conscious phenomena. Loss of consciousness will occur, if and only if the brain's representational activity falls below a critical threshold. (2) Mental representations are instantiated by neural cell assemblies. (3) The formation of assemblies involves the activation of the NMDA receptor channel complex. The activation state of this receptor determines the rate at which assemblies are generated. (4) General anaesthetics have a common operative mechanism: they directly or indirectly affect the function of the NMDA system.

A hypothesis on the physiological conditions for the occurrence of phenomenal states is presented. It is suggested that the presence of phenomenal states depends on the rate at which neural assemblies are formed. Unconsciousness and various disturbances of phenomenal consciousness occur if the assembly formation rate is below a certain threshold level; if this level is surpassed, phenomenal states necessarily result. A critical production rate of neural assemblies is the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of phenomenal states.

A hypothesis on the physiological conditions of consciousness is presented. It is assumed that the occurrence of states of consciousness causally depends on the formation of complex representational structures. Cortical neural networks that exhibit a high representational activity develop higher-order, self-referential representations as a result of self-organizing processes. The occurrence of such states is identical with the appearance of states of consciousness. The underlying physiological processes can be identified. It is assumed that neural assemblies instantiate mental representations; hence consciousness depends on the rate at which large active assemblies are generated. The formation of assemblies involves the activation of the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor channel complex which controls different forms of synaptic plasticity including rapid changes of the connection strengths. The various causes of unconsciousness (e.g., anaesthetics or brain stem lesions) have a common denominator: they directly or indirectly inhibit the formation of assemblies