This paper examines temporal externalism, a theory asserting that facts about what happens in the future can retrospectively determine the meaning of words, setting it in contrast with traditional forms of externalism (e.g. Kripke, Putnam, Burge). I critique Ball's, D. 2024 (Definition and Dispute: A Defense of Temporal Externalism. Oxford University Press) abductive argument supporting temporal externalism, challenging the necessity of temporal externalism by showing that traditional externalis…
Read moreThis paper examines temporal externalism, a theory asserting that facts about what happens in the future can retrospectively determine the meaning of words, setting it in contrast with traditional forms of externalism (e.g. Kripke, Putnam, Burge). I critique Ball's, D. 2024 (Definition and Dispute: A Defense of Temporal Externalism. Oxford University Press) abductive argument supporting temporal externalism, challenging the necessity of temporal externalism by showing that traditional externalist theories can similarly explain definitional disputes through epistemic deference without invoking retrospective determination. Additionally, I argue that temporal externalism introduces a metaphysical indeterminacy specific to its framework – an indeterminacy not encountered by other externalist theories – presenting a dilemma for temporal externalists who seek to avoid collapsing into social externalism. Together, these two lines of critique provide compelling reasons to reject temporal externalism.
