The ground of human dignity constitutes a core problem in metaethics. Traditional conceptions of dignity—whether religious, rational, recognition-based, or capability-based, all depend on moral attribute presuppositions, and each exhibits explanatory fractures in marginal cases. This paper proposes an entirely new theory of dignity grounded in a disciplinary postulate and objective facts: Pre-structural dignity. The argument proceeds from that “civilization ought to advance” and the advancement …
Read moreThe ground of human dignity constitutes a core problem in metaethics. Traditional conceptions of dignity—whether religious, rational, recognition-based, or capability-based, all depend on moral attribute presuppositions, and each exhibits explanatory fractures in marginal cases. This paper proposes an entirely new theory of dignity grounded in a disciplinary postulate and objective facts: Pre-structural dignity. The argument proceeds from that “civilization ought to advance” and the advancement of civilization (generating increments rather than maintaining the status quo) depends on the continuous discovery and creation; that the individuals who will bring about such discovery and creation cannot be identified in advance at birth. Therefore the process of civilizational advancement must therefore maintain a pool of possibility covering all who are born; that every newborn is structurally incorporated into this pool, objectively functions as a possibility-bearer which might bring about discovery and creation; and that birth is an irreversible physical fact—to derive the conclusion that each individual, by virtue of functioning as a possibility-bearer in the operation of the civilizational advancement system, possesses a corresponding structural value. This structural value, which cannot be objectively revoked, while can only be subjectively denied, is precisely the ground of human dignity. Pre-structural dignity requires no moral presuppositions, religious beliefs, or social recognition, and possesses four attributes: innateness, universality, stability, and finitude. It is capable of explaining the marginal ethical cases that traditional theories cannot cover, thereby providing a more solid philosophical foundation for modern human rights and judicial ethics.