Haris Psarras

This paper critically discusses an objection raised by Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice against the so-called patterned principles of distributive justice. The objection suggests that “patterned principles” treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere. The paper challenges the helpfulness of the schematic label “patterned principles”, shows that the objection raised by the entitlement theory flows from a misreading of the principles falling under that label and suggests that the entitlement theory would be exposed to the same objection, if read in the same light. Furthermore the paper criticizes a conception of the Lockean advocated by the entitlement theory in the course of its objection to “patterned theories of justice” and questions the capacity of the entitlement theory to honour Kant’s formula of the end in itself.

The contributions to this edited volume engage with John Gardner's philosophical work on private law. The content is divided into three parts. The first part gathers contributions on general theoretical issues that bear upon private law. The second part is concerned with Gardner's well-known views on responding to wrongs and the justification of reparative duties - an issue that spans all of private law. The third part turns to theoretical issues within particular areas of private law. Its focus is Gardner's focus: tort law, but it also includes chapters on contract law and equity. The primary aim of Private Law and Practical Reason is to facilitate a critical assessment of the private law thinking of one of the most important legal philosophers of the last fifty years. Gardner's contributions to private law theory are recognised to be amongst the most significant and philosophically rich. This work assembles a group of contributors with diverse theoretical commitments, many of whom have not directly engaged previously with Gardner's work, and is intended to act as a reference point for central debates in private law theory, such as the role of moral duties, the justification of reparative obligations, and, more broadly, the role of reasons in private law.