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104Proper Functions are Proximal FunctionsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.This paper argues that proper functions are proximal functions. In other words, it rejects the notion that there are distal biological functions – strictly speaking, distal functions are not functions at all, but simply beneficial effects normally associated with a trait performing its function. Once we rule out distal functions, two further positions become available: dysfunctions are simply failures of proper function, and pathological conditions are dysfunctions. Although elegant and seemingl…Read more
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42What we argue about when we argue about diseasePhilosophy of Medicine 4 (1): 1-20. 2023.The disease debate in philosophy of medicine has traditionally been billed as a debate over the correct conceptual analysis of the term “disease.” This paper argues that although the debate’s participants overwhelmingly claim to be in the business of conceptual analysis, they do not tend to argue as if this is the case. In particular, they often show a puzzling disregard for key parameters such as precise terminology, linguistic community, and actual usage. This prima facie strange feature of th…Read more
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38Medical Disorder Is Not a Black Box Essentialist ConceptPhilosophy of Medicine 4 (1). 2023.Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics, edited by Denis Forest and Luc Faucher, is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of medicine whose work is informed by that of Jerome Wakefield, or the disease debate in general. If you are anything like me, this book will open the door to a new depth of understanding of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) and its methodical underpinnings, and an enriched appreciation of what is at stake in defining medical dis…Read more
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45Brain dysfunction without functionPhilosophical Psychology 1 (3): 570-582. 2023.In an important and timely book, Anneli Jefferson outlines a view according to which a given mental disorder is a brain disorder if it is a (harmful) mental dysfunction realised by a brain dysfunction. Prima facie, Jefferson’s book is a study in the metaphysics of dysfunction: how does mental dysfunction relate to brain dysfunction, and what does this imply for the status of mental disorders and brain disorders? In what follows, I shall argue that Jefferson’s contribution to this debate is bette…Read more
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282Against the generalised theory of functionBiology and Philosophy 37 (4): 1-25. 2022.Justin Garson has recently advanced a Generalised Selected Effects Theory of biological proper function. According to Garson, his theory spells trouble for the Dysfunction Account of Disorder. This paper argues that Garson’s critique of the Dysfunction Account from the Generalised Theory fails, and that we should reject the Generalised Theory outright. I first show that the Generalised Theory does not, as Garson asserts, imply that neurally selected disorders are not dysfunctional. Rather, it im…Read more
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360Reactive Natural Kinds and Varieties of DependenceEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4): 1-27. 2022.This paper asks when a natural disease kind is truly 'reactive' and when it is merely associated with a corresponding social kind. I begin with a permissive account of real kinds and their structure, distinguishing natural kinds, indifferent kinds and reactive kinds as varieties of real kind characterised by super-explanatory properties. I then situate disease kinds within this framework, arguing that many disease kinds prima facie are both natural and reactive. I proceed to distinguish ‘simple …Read more
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607Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software BugsPhilosophy of Science 89 (4): 661-682. 2022.According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder, mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. This article argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by introducing the “natural dysfunction analysis” of disorder, before outlining the AAMD. I then analyze the necessary conditions for realizer autonomous dysfunction. Building on this, I show that software functions disassociate from hardwar…Read more
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Cambridge UniversityDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, Corpus Christi CollegePost-doctoral Fellow
Cambridge, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Biology |
Philosophy of Medicine |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |