Harrison P. Frye

Critics of the market sometimes argue that market competition damages our relations with one another. We should care about this, on one telling, because of how this undermines community that undergirds equal social recognition and esteem. Rather than rebut this challenge to markets, this paper considers whether this problem is solved by an economy explicitly dedicated to community. I develop an informal model of when community can be self-defeating. Drawing on a neglected remark by Robert Nozick, I claim that the effort to contribute to the common good can become a metric of status. This creates a different kind of competition that can undermine the very social recognition and esteem some theorists of community hope to achieve. I support this theoretical claim with a brief foray into real-life cases of economies explicitly dedicated to a principle of community and how status competition emerges even in these settings. The competition complaint, in this light, may be less a condemnation of markets than a reflection of the human condition.

Many accept some inequality as a price for efficiency—by paying some more than others, we incentivize socially productive behavior. G. A. Cohen famously criticized this argument for being overly uncritical of the motives of those who receive such incentives. Cohen’s argument and the debate it has generated implicitly rely on a class-based analysis of how inequality-creating incentives arise: there are the “least advantaged” and the “more advantaged,” and inequality is the result of the more advantaged holding out for more. In contrast, this chapter argues that inequality can be a solution to a problem of cooperation that faces equal sharing schemes: shirking. The temptation to shirk does not just plague the more advantaged, but everyone in an equal sharing scheme. If this is true, inequality is not some tribute we pay to the more advantaged. Instead, it is a solution to a problem of cooperation generated by all of us.

Envy poses a threat to the stability of cooperative institutions. John Rawls advances a provocative articulation of how this could be, arguing that increasing inequality generates sufficient envy to threaten stability. I contend that this perspective is mistaken due to a faulty understanding of the psychology of envy. However, rather than dissipating the problem of envy, as some suggest, a proper understanding of the psychology of envy should lead us to believe that the problem of envy is harder to deal with than it initially seems. I argue that the opacity of market processes provides fertile grounds for potentially destabilizing envy. This, I assert, is the real problem of envy. The upshot is that addressing this issue suggests more attention to cultural practices than to principles of justice or formal institutions.

A prominent position in the scholarly literature is that there is no duty to obey the law or political obligation. This is in contrast with lay opinion, which suggests widespread acceptance of political obligation. When confronted with this tension, skeptics of political obligation sometimes raise the possibility that lay belief is the product of sinister interests. Against this, I argue that, even if such a belief is false, belief in political obligation may operate as a useful fiction that advances people’s interests. Drawing on empirical work in the social sciences, I suggest a belief in political obligation may contribute to effective governance. Even if political obligation skeptics are correct that there is no such duty to obey the law, lay belief in political obligation may play a valuable ideological function in society.

This essay argues that online public shaming can be productively understood as a problem of technology. In particular, the technology of public shaming is ambiguous between two senses. On the one hand, public shaming depends on various technologies, such as social media posts or, more historically, pillories. These are the artifacts of shame. On the other hand, public shaming itself is a social technology. In particular, public shaming is a way for communities to promote cooperation. Ultimately, I claim there is a mismatch between the artifacts of shame and this important social technology of shame. Social media drifts toward disintegrative shame, which tends to corrode cooperation. This suggests that we must either realign the technology of public shame or reject shame as a legitimate option.

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 228-244, May 2022. Private property rights involve coercion against non-owners in their enforcement. As critics of private property point out, this coercion involves a restriction on freedom. Sometimes, such critics suggest that collective property expands rights of access, and therefore expands freedom relative to private property. Does this follow? This paper argues no. To make this argument, I look at two particular forms of collective property: open-access commons and closed-access communes. Both may give rise to potential threats to freedom. This does not mean that collective property never expands freedom relative to private property. It only means we cannot infer from the fact that collective property rules extend rights of access that collective property expands freedom. The upshot is a need to pay more attention to how different property rights work in practice.

ABSTRACTNoncompete clauses, or agreements by employees to not work for a competitor or start a competing business, have recently faced increased public scrutiny and criticism. This article provides a qualified defense of NCCs. I focus on the argument that NCCs should be banned because they unfairly restrict the options of employees. I argue that this argument fails because it neglects the economist Thomas Schelling’s insight that limiting exit options can be beneficial for a person. This employee-based defense of NCCs does not absolve all their uses, but it does give us a rough test for evaluating the permissibility of NCCs. With this test in hand, I turn to some of the more controversial uses of NCCs. For those who weigh heavily the interests of employees, the question is not whether NCCs, but when.

In a recent essay in this journal, Tom O’Shea defends socialist republicanism, marrying the value of freedom as nondomination to public ownership of the means of production. In this reply, I argue that the efficiency costs that often attach to public ownership may undercut the ability of the socialist republic to combat domination by public agents. I provide two reasons in support of this claim. First, the economic gains provided by efficiency can insulate individuals from the discretionary power of other agents. Put briefly, the more wealth you have, the less the discretionary power threatens your basic interests. Second, the efficiency costs of public ownership also make it more difficult to hold accountable the managers of economic organizations. This shortcoming of O’Shea’s argument reveals a point hitherto neglected in the republican literature—caring about nondomination implies caring about efficiency.

I argue social and political freedom is not primarily about the absence of constraints, whether those constraints be in the form of interference or domination. Instead, social freedom is centrally about what makes us free. That is, the question of social freedom is first and foremost about determining the positive preconditions of being a free person within society. Social freedom is about what I call the social bases of freedom, or those features of our social world that we have a reason to rely on in making plans or going about our business.

Untangling the relationship of law and liberty is among the core problems of political theory. One prominent position is that there is no freedom without law. This article challenges the argument that, because law is constitutive of freedom, there is no freedom without law. I suggest that, once properly understood, the argument that law is constitutive of freedom does not uniquely apply to law. It also applies to social norms. What law does for freedom, social norms can do too. Thus, I claim the question facing us is not the easy one of either law or social norms. Respecting this draws attention to the unique risks to our freedom introduced by both sets of norms.

In recent years, scholars have argued that democratic provenance of law establishes moral requirements to obey it. We argue against this view, claiming that, rather than establishing moral requirements to obey the law, democratic provenance grounds only requirements to respect it. Establishing what we view as this more plausible account makes clear not only exactly what democracy itself contributes to requirements to obey the law but also important difficulties proponents of democratic authority must overcome in order successfully to make their case. To establish our claims, we focus on Thomas Christiano’s book, The Constitution of Equality, and a recent article by Daniel Viehoff.

:A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. G. A. Cohen famously criticizes this argument for not questioning the behaviour and attitudes that make those incentives necessary. I defend the communal status of incentives against Cohen's challenge. I argue that Cohen's criticism fails to appreciate two different contexts in which we might grant incentives. We might grant unequal payment to someone because they demand it. However, unequal payment might be an offer instead. I claim that incentives as offers promote the ideal of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.

Richard Penny argues that Rawls’s commitment to self-respect puts him at odds with his endorsement of unequalizing incentives. Penny draws on G.A. Cohen’s distinction between ‘lax’ and ‘strict’ readings of the difference principle to make this point. Given this, Penny concludes that Rawls faces a dilemma: either Rawls weakens his endorsement of unequalizing incentives or weakens his commitment to self-respect. By taking the difference principle in isolation, Penny creates a false dilemma. I will argue that once we place the difference principle in the context of Rawls’s theory as a whole, we find that unequalizing incentives pose no danger to the self-respect of the least advantaged. Moreover, I will argue that a strict reading of the difference principle is incompatible with the self-respect of all citizens in a well-ordered society given the fact of reasonable pluralism. My arguments reveal the importance of seeing self-respect as a threshold good, rather than a relative one

An old conservative criticism of egalitarianism is that it is nothing but the expression of envy. Egalitarians respond by saying envy has nothing to do with it. I present an alternative way of thinking about the relation of envy to distributive justice, and to Rawlsian justice in particular. I argue that while ideals of justice rightly distance themselves from envy, envy plays a role in facing injustice. Under nonideal circumstances, less attractive features of human nature may play a role in motivating the action necessary to push an unjust society in a more just direction.