Hassan Amiriara

Some philosophers have attempted to show that the thesis according to which the one-way velocity of light cannot be empirically determined (a thesis referred to in this paper as the IOV) opens a possibility for defending some A-theoretic ontologies of time in the context of relativistic physics, for, as they suggest, it can make a crucial contribution to developing an argument in favor of the definability of absolute simultaneity. Other authors, however, have taken the same thesis, i.e., the IOV, as pointing to the conclusion that some form of B-theory is the true metaphysical view of reality. In this paper, I first attempt to show how these two lines of reasoning can be traced back to two different assumptions regarding the IOV—construing this indeterminacy as either an epistemic or an ontic restriction—and I suggest that as long as each side takes one of these assumptions for granted, without providing further justification for their respective position, no decisive metaphysical conclusion can be reached. I then argue that a more promising avenue emerges when we consider a reverse line of reasoning. Rather than deducing a metaphysical view of time given a preferred assumption regarding the IOV, one can consider defending an assumption regarding the IOV given a preferred metaphysical view of time. This route can be expressed in terms of inference to the best explanation. Finally, I argue that the B-theory offers a better explanation of the IOV.

This volume features new essays on the application and role of naturalism in philosophical inquiry. It serves as an important update on current controversies about naturalism. The contributors include leading figures who have written on naturalism and its relevance to a wide range of issues across philosophical subdisciplines. The chapter discuss how naturalism can be properly employed in different philosophical areas such as epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, philosophy of time, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of memory, cognitive science, ethics, meta-ethics, and normativity. Naturalism and Its Challenges will be of interest to scholars and advance students working in a wide range of philosophical disciplines.

It has been argued that the standard formulation of the Special Theory of Relativity is not only incompatible with presentism, but also strongly indicates the truth of eternalism. We should, however, distinguish two claims concerning the ontological implications of STR: STR is inconsistent with every ontology which requires an absolute relation of simultaneity; and STR implies that eternalism is the only possible ontology of time. There have been a wide range of responses designed to reject these claims, both jointly and independently. For example, one way of rejecting claim is by rejecting claim : thus, one would argue that STR can be revised or interpreted in such a way that it allows an absolute relation of simultaneity. Another way of rejecting claim is by questioning the equivalency of the relation ‘being real as of’. The main purpose of this paper is to raise a new line of objection against concluding eternalism from the relativity of simultaneity. I argue that there is a way to deny claim without denying claim and also without denying the equivalency of relation R. The argument which I present rests on a metaphysical assumption concerning the relation of simultaneity : the assumption that the SIM holds basically between space–time points as opposed to holding basically between events.

There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry”, the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality of the present, past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well.