Hayyan Sheikh

Largely assumed to be intrinsic, recent work in analytic theology suggests aseity might be an extrinsic property. This has most vividly been discussed in the literature on the Christian trinitarian doctrine of divine processions, which requires aseity to be extrinsic so as to avoid the ontological subordination worry. This paper argues that the existing literature ignores a crucial point, which is that divine aseity is distinct from mere aseity. Consequently, I point out that while mere aseity may be extrinsic, divine aseity is still probably intrinsic.

The ubiquity of science fiction has kindled an unparalleled enthusiasm in the general public with regards to the topic of aliens. Add to that various UFO sightings, mysterious abduction testimonies or strange occurrences in general and we find ourselves with some interesting philosophical questions that need answering. In this paper, I test the alien hypothesis for theoretical virtues. Simply put, I highlight the merits and demerits of appealing to aliens, i.e. technologically advanced intelligent extraterrestrials, to explain certain phenomena or observations. I shall compare the alien hypothesis to rival hypotheses and also argue that the jinn hypothesis is more preferable.

The ubiquity of science fiction has kindled an unparalleled enthusiasm in the general public with regards to the topic of aliens. Add to that various UFO sightings, mysterious abduction testimonies or strange occurrences in general and we find ourselves with some interesting philosophical questions that need answering. In this paper, I test the alien hypothesis for theoretical virtues. Simply put, I highlight the merits and demerits of appealing to aliens, i.e. technologically advanced intelligent extraterrestrials, to explain certain phenomena or observations. I shall compare the alien hypothesis to rival hypotheses and also argue that the jinn hypothesis is more preferable.

How far can we take Contingency Arguments? I intend the argument I present in this paper to be a minimal (or incomplete) version of a stage (II) contingency argument. I shall be demonstrating that one can argue from the existence of at least one merely modally necessary being to a being who is ontologically necessary (necessary in itself). Consequently, I shall be defending a dichotomy originally presented by Muslim philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who states that a modally necessary being is either ontologically necessary or its necessity is derived.

In recent times, William Lane Craig’s version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument has become one of the most, if not the most popular arguments for the existence of God. Consequently, it has also invited extensive criticism. One of the key modern objections to the Kalam has been made by Alex Malpass and Wes Morriston, who argue that on Aristotle’s definition of an actual infinite, the beginningless past is not an actual infinite, whereas, if one were to accept William Lane Craig’s definition of actual and potential infinites as well as his temporal ontology, then both the future and the past are either actually or potentially infinite, which is an undesirable consequence for Craig. In this paper I argue that one can argue for the finitude of the past even on Aristotle’s definition of an actual infinite.