Heather Kendrick

This paper’s goal is to defend Kant’s version of freedom, in spite of the confusing metaphysical issues that surround Kant’s rational being (who belongs both to the world of phenomena and the world of noumena). Contrary to a certain line of criticism, the author argues for how Kant’s agent manages to be free—how the noumenal agent can affect action in the sensible world. Kant does not believe that our noumenal selves cause the world our phenomenal selves act in. Some readers misunderstand him. And while to be sure, Kant’s theory gives rise to questions about how our noumenal self can account for changes in an agent’s moral behavior, Kant does not fall victim to logical absurdity. Kant’s goal is to give us freedom to act in a causally connected natural world, not to totally explain how a mysterious version of ourselves affects the entirety of the sensible world.

I take two approaches to discussing the status of animal minds in Kant's philosophy. First I explicate Kant’s discussion of animal minds in his written works, and thus determine his stated doctrine on the subject. Second I consider whether Kant’s conception of the intellectual faculties necessarily leads to his position on animal minds, or whether it is possible to hold Kant’s view of reason without coming to his conclusions about animals. I conclude that although Kant regarded animals as having sensibility, but not understanding or reason, it is possible, and largely consistent with Kant’s theory of mind, to ascribe understanding to animals. Furthermore, I conclude that it is at least possible that animals may possess some ability to employ reason, but only in certain lower employments.

I attempt to resolve the question of whether keeping animals as pets is akin to slavery by considering the significance of liberty to human beings and to nonhuman animals. I distinguish between two senses of liberty: preference liberty and autonomous liberty. Preference liberty is the freedom to satisfy the preferences that one in fact has. Autonomous liberty is the ability to satisfy the preferences that one might have regardless of whether one actually has those preferences. Preference liberty has a value for animals, but autonomous liberty is meaningless for them. As the core wrong of slavery is the restriction of autonomous liberty, I conclude that pet-keeping is not akin to slavery, though in practice it is often morally wrong for other reasons.

Kant claims that we have a duty to avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals because doing so damages our own humanity and hardens us to human suffering. I argue that this theory of indirect duties to animals is weak because it rests on an empirical claim that may not be true, and because it encourages us to exploit what Kant sees as a mistaken analogy between humans and animals, when it would be more consistent for Kant to advise us not to make this mistake at all. Since Kant's indirect-duty theory fails, Kant's followers must choose between accepting a theory which permits no duties with regard to animals at all or constructing a new theory within the Kantian framework. I attempt to do the latter. First, I analyze Kant's doctrine of animal minds, showing that although Kant regards animals as possessing sensibility, he denies that they have understanding or reason. I suggest that the evidence points to animals having at least understanding and possibly some prudential reason, but that they do not possess reason in the full sense required for moral agency. I argue that animals, although they do not set their own ends and thus cannot be regarded as ends-in-themselves, do have ends that are given to them by nature. As beings with ends, they stand between mere things that have no ends, and rational beings that are ends-in-themselves. I propose a broader version of Kant's kingdom of ends, in which rational beings respect the ends of all other beings that have them, including animals and other moral patients. The moral status of animals would still be dependent on the existence of rational beings , but our duty to take their ends into account would be a direct duty to them, rather than being a covert duty to human beings

Strangers to Nature challenges a reading public that has grown complacent with the standard framework of the animal ethics debate. Human influence on, and the control of, the natural world has greater consequences than ever, making the human impact on the lives of animals more evident. We cannot properly interrogate our conduct in the world without a deeper understanding of how our actions affect animals. It is crucial that the human-animal relationship become more central to ethical inquiry. This volume brings together many of the leading scholars who work to redefine and expand the discourse on animal ethics. The contributors examine the radical developments that change how we think about the status of non-human animals in our society and our moral obligations. Strangers to Nature will engage both scholars and lay-people by revealing the breadth of theorizing about current human/non-human animal relationships.

Kant claimed that human beings have no duties to animals because they are not autonomous ends in themselves. I argue that Kant was wrong to exclude animals from the realm of moral consideration. Animals, although they do not set their own ends and thus cannot be regarded as ends in themselves, do have ends that are given to them by nature. As beings with ends, they stand between mere things that have no ends, and rational beings that are ends in themselves. I propose a broader version of Kant's kingdom of ends, in which rational beings respect the ends of all other beings that have them, including animals. The moral status of animals would still be dependent on the existence of rational beings, but our duty to take their ends into account would be a direct duty to them, rather than being a covert duty to human beings