My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes Depends on one's theory of what we can get from experience. If it's spare, then I think there is indeed a priori knowledge. On the other hand, if we have a richer notion of experience, maybe not.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: nominalism Supposing that term "object" has some meaning to the effect of applying only to those things that can be objectively individuated by spatio-temporal location, the term "abstract object" is an oxymoron.
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective Since defenses of moral objectivism would, I suppose, apply in a similar manner to any value-laden judgments, including aesthetic judgments, I don't see why if I accept the former, I shouldn't accept the latter, even though, I feel, as a matter of "intuition," that moral objectivism has more warrant. I fear, however, that any objections to defenses of the objectivity of aesthetic value would also degrade defenses of moral objectivism. Since I can't find a rational basis for my intuition that there is a difference between the two, prudence requires that I accept aesthetic objectivism. Though, I admit, I haven't been keeping up with the literature on this topic.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Agnostic/undecided
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Agnostic/undecided See my answer to (1)
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view In this case, I do feel that the debate has taken on the characteristics of typical debates between religious extremists. Also, I don't see why Burge's article on mental content didn't conclusively muddy the waters here.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism Admittedly, I am uncertain about what the contrast between these two positions is supposed to be. However, if being a naturalist means something like what Quine suggests in "Epistemology Naturalized," then I suppose we should all quit our jobs and take up scientific investigation, whatever that means. At least Rorty, having come to the conclusion that traditional philosophy is hopelessly confused, put his money where his mouth was and left.
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box If the predictor is infallible and knows what will happen, it also knows what you will be thinking, your decision process and cetera. So one box is the right answer.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: disjunctivism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept another alternative While I accept Parfit's conclusion that identity is not what matters in survival, I do not reject it based on considerations about fission.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Other If we're talking which theory is morally ideal here, then I don't see how one could fail to accept some form of egalitarianism as an over-arching value, given some plausible definition of "equality." The real question is which policies would have the consequence of producing that equality, and these might not necessarily directly reflect our moral commitment to equality. I honestly don't know how to assess this question given my training.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept another alternative A shameless plug: see my recent paper in AJP on the topic :)
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Other
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch On pain of inconsistency when considering other similar cases that don't require my active participation. The killing/letting die distinction doesn't do it for me.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Agnostic/undecided Intuitively, I suppose they *must* be conceivable, though I am uncertain what counts as conceivable, and I suppose I might be a skeptic about this.