Heikki Patomäki

When the social reality is changing, we need to know also the following: What exactly is changing and why? To what extent is reflexivity involved in changes that take part in making the future uncertain and open? For instance, an announced policy change can become a self-altering prediction, which is subject to contradictory and complementary determination, resulting either in net self-fulfilling or self-denying tendency. I approach these questions also by analyzing two significant real-world historical examples, the Euro crisis and global financial crises. Both examples involve reflexive predictions, reflexive feedback loops, and performativity. What I find particularly striking is how the capitalist market economy – with all the historical shifts and changes in its institutions, regulations, and political structures – has managed to retain at least some of its recurrent economic patterns. Further, I examine the general methodological problem of the absence of decisive tests between theories. This has consequences: normative and ideological positions evolve easily and tend to fortify themselves rapidly; and actors can modify, perhaps inadvertently, their public anticipations in line with their interests or normative aims. In the final section, I argue that the main aim of social sciences is not to predict accurately but to bring about desirable outcomes, explaining how to move from strategic actions and reflexive ideologies to emancipation.

Can the rise of nationalist-authoritarian populism be explained in terms of neo­liberalism and its effects? The frst half of this paper is about conceptual under­labouring: in spite of signifcant overlap, there are relatively clear demarcation criteria for identifying neoliberalism and nationalist-authoritarian populism as distinct entities. Neoliberalism has succeeded in transforming social contexts through agency, practices and institutions, with far-reaching efects. The prevailing economic and social policies have also had various causal efects such as rising inequalities, progressively more insecure terms of employment, and recurring economic crises. I argue that these have led to discontent with globalization and various political responses, including those of nationalist and authoritarian populisms. Finally, by juxtaposing constitutive and causal explanations, and by stressing the history of national-authoritarian populism, I raise questions about geo-historical specifcity of diferent formations. The standard Karl Polanyian interpretation of Trump, Brexit and such like phenomena is misleading, yet a partial historical analogy especially to the interwar era populism is valid if understood in a subtle, processual, and suffciently contextual way. The Polanyi-inspired historical analogy can be explored further. While the 19th and 20th century working class movement emerged from a variety of socio-economic conditions, socialists who believed in its world-historical role actively made it. Since the 1970s the working class has been largely unmade both as a result of impersonal processes and deliberate attempts to undermine it. Only a learning process towards qualitatively higher levels of refexivity can help develop global transformative agency for the 21st century.

Is anything like a global political community – and thereby ideals such as global democracy and justice – achievable? This is a key question not only for political theory but also for contemporary political practices. Many political realists believe that humans are essentially tribal beings, or at least will remain so in the foreseeable future. Post-structuralists main­tain that historical identities are based on contrasts and oppositions, on the play of negative differences, which is necessary for language to exist. Thus identities must always exclude something. My first point is that it is possible to define our shared identity as humans and earthlings in the context of a cosmic setting. Big History not only frames world history in cosmic terms and imagines a future world community but is also systematically critical of Eurocentrism and other forms of centrism. Second, otherness can also be located either in our own past or, alternatively, in our contemporary being, when seen from a point of view of a possible future position in world history. Third, utilizing the concept of a horizon of moral identification and developing further Todorov’s axis of self-other relations, I conclude by outlining a cosmic, geo-historical, relational and ethico-political conception of global identity that is based on both positive and negative elements.

All social phenomena, all social interaction, anything that exists in society, is temporal. Anticipation of futures is a necessary part of all social actions, and particularly so in the world of modern organisations. If social sciences are to be relevant they should also be able to say something about possible and likely futures. My paper articulates an ontology for futures studies and then, on that ontological basis, specifies the methodology of futures studies. Critical realist ontology explains why there are multiple possible futures. The actual is only a part of the real world, which also consists of non-actualised possibilities and unexercised powers of the already existing structures and mechanisms that are transfactually efficacious in open systems. Social sciences are also involved in envisaging better possible futures in terms of concrete utopias. However, building concrete utopias is not the only task of a futurologist. We are also interested in other possible and likely futures, and in determining the ways in which our actions and the actions of others contribute—sometimes via unintended effects and consequences—to making some of them real. Empirico-analytical models have a role to play, as do systematic modelling of geo-historical realities: embodied agency and actors; modes of action; rules and principles; resources, as competencies and facilities; practices; relational structures ; and self-organising social systems. However, scenario-construction should also be seen as self-reflective exercise in cultural studies, moral philosophy and creative ability.

All social phenomena, all social interaction, anything that exists in society, is temporal. Anticipation of futures is a necessary part of all social actions, and particularly so in the world of modern organisations. If social sciences are to be relevant they should also be able to say something about possible and likely futures. My paper articulates an ontology for futures studies and then, on that ontological basis, specifies the methodology of futures studies. Critical realist ontology explains why there are multiple possible futures. The actual is only a part of the real world, which also consists of non-actualised possibilities and unexercised powers of the already existing structures and mechanisms that are transfactually efficacious in open systems. Social sciences are also involved in envisaging better possible futures in terms of concrete utopias. However, building concrete utopias is not the only task of a futurologist. We are also interested in other possible and likely futures, and in determining the ways in which our actions and the actions of others contribute—sometimes via unintended effects and consequences—to making some of them real. Empirico-analytical models have a role to play, as do systematic modelling of geo-historical realities: embodied agency and actors; modes of action; rules and principles; resources, as competencies and facilities; practices; relational structures (of power); and self-organising social systems (also as collective actors). However, scenario-construction should also be seen as self-reflective exercise in cultural studies, moral philosophy and creative ability (in the same way that research and development or the arts are creative).

While the transnational public sphere has existed in the Arendtian sense at least since the mid-19th century, a new kind of reflexively political global civil society emerged in the late 20th century. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and networks have limited agendas and legitimacy and, without the support of at least one state, limited means to realise changes. Since 2001, theWorld Social Forum (WSF) has formed a key attempt in forging links and ties of solidarity among diverse actors. Although the WSF may seem a party of opinion when defined negatively against neoliberal globalisation, imperialism, and violence, in more positive ideological terms it remains a rather incoherent collection of diverse actors; while itself defined as a mere open space. There is a quest for new forms of agency such as a world political party. Various historical predecessors of global political parties, real and imagined, provide conceptual resources, useful experiences for envisaging the structure, and function of a possible planetary partyformation. H.G. Wells’s ‘open conspiracy’ is a particularly important future-oriented leftdemocratic vision. Wells believed that only a mass movement of truly committed individuals and groups could have the power to transform the world political organisation, by creating a democratic world commonwealth. Recently, for instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have formulated similar ideas. I argue that transformative political agency presupposes a shared programme, based on common elements of a wider and deeper world-view, and willingness to engage in processes of collective will-formation in terms of democratic procedures. From this perspective, I outline a possible organisation and some substantial directions for a global political party. The point is also to respond to the criticism of existing parties and cultivate the critical-pluralist ethos of global civil society, but in terms of democratic party-formation. Keywords: Arendt; citizenship; civil society; participation; political party; republicanism; rotation; Wells; world parliament; World Social Forum (Published: 22 June 2011) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 4 , No. 2, 2011, pp. 81-102. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v4i2.7334

Politics in the 1990s was characterized by the state versus globalization dichotomy, but there are also other possible futures. Concrete initiatives such as the Tobin tax seem to promise a new phase in the politics of globalization. The idea of a low rate tax on financial transactions questions both the laissez-faire capitalism justified by mainstream economics and the laissez-faire globalization mystified and reified by an increasing number of philosophers and sociologists. The global financial markets have become an established, powerful structure. The Tobin tax may well be the political response that will make that structure vulnerable to collective conflict and deliberate revision. It is also innovative because it simultaneously defends the autonomy of states and opens up new, path-breaking global ethico-political problems of governance. Suddenly, politics of globalization seems to be also about authority, democracy, social responsibility and justice.

In response to Hostettler, I clarify the intended meanings of ‘After Critical Realism?’ My point is not to abandon critical realism but to develop it further and make it more self-reflexively critical. Bhaskar's journey through different stories about our place in the cosmos is a dialectical learning process from Althusserian scientist existentialism, via an all-encompassing dialectical philosophy as a theory of moral good grounded in every expressively veracious action or remark, to a pluralist notion of God. Bhaskar's questions are deep and his answers pertinent, but there are more hypothetical, scholarly and dialogical ways of telling ethico-political and cosmic stories.

While recent scientific discoveries and theories can be taken to provide additional evidence for some of the central critical realist claims, overall critical realism seems to be in need of reassessment, revisions and further developments. First, I argue that here has been an inclination among critical realists to prefer the language and model of philosophy to falsifiable science, creating a predisposition towards somewhat sectarian practices. These tendencies also account for the relative lack of substantive research based on, or inspired by, critical realism. Second, I make a case for radicalising the critique of anthropomorphism and applying it to critical realism itself. Third, and in some contrast to the second point, I argue for rethinking the subject-object relationship and the concept of the intransitive dimension of science. The critique of anthropocentrism has been taken too far. We are implicated in and are a part of the object of our study. It even seems that we humans are a part of the process of the cosmos becoming conscious of itself, also through science.