Heinrich Watzka

Transhumanism as a Symptom of Symbolic Misery. The Anthropological Challenge of the Digital Revolution. This essay provides a concise reappraisal of the philosophical discussion on technology of the last 30 years in the light of the technologically induced political and cultural crisis of our present time. It starts with a philosophical assessment of popular discussions on transhumanism and interprets the more backwards-oriented mindset of this movement as a symptom of the cultural decline of liberalism. After a short genealogy of this decline, it concludes with an outline of the real anthropological challenges of the digital revolution and its implications for the Christian image of man.

We have always been Cyborgs … Computers are becoming smaller and penetrating our bodies so that we can become upgraded people who can interact efficiently with their environment in smart cities and have the means to cope with aging, the world’s worst mass murderer. This development is accompanied by new challenges related to digitisation, with the emergence of the Internet Panopticon being the most serious of all. I will show that by promoting freedom as a moral, social and legal norm, we can benefit from the advantages of the digital age, while its problematic aspects do not unfold their potentially disastrous implications.

Thinking Aesthetically as an Objection to Transhumanistic Arguments. The following reflections are concerned with inconsistencies and contrary expectations. They all come down into an aesthetical thinking without the mistake of trying to define itself or the Aesthetics. The appearance of beauty will be admitted likewise to technology, art or nature. But that is not the point, what matters is the specific way of thinking and gaining knowledge. After an introduction referring to transhumanistic obscurities, the paradoxical and ambiguous essential of the problem will be vivified by selected literary texts of Stefan Zweig, Heinrich von Kleist and Christoph Martin Wieland. The justification for taking into account such literature lies in the strong and lasting impression they may cause, granting possible insight into the subtle human nature. It is straightforward the very human being in all his richness who is negotiable in the mindset of Transhumanists, isn’t it? Finally, the epistemological way of aesthetical thinking, ignored and left aside by the Transhumanists, will be reflected philosophically, and paradigmatically exemplified by two ideas: the figure of a dancer and a laugher.

Descartes’ latest vengeance. Bodiless minds in the machine of the Transhumanists. Unlike carbon-based transhumanists, silicon-based transhumanists propagate technologies such as brain-computer interfaces, whole brain emulation and mind-uploading, aiming at the creation of extended mind-world circuits (cyborgs) and substrate-independent minds. Whereas carbon-based transhumanists are deeply committed to a naturalistic anthropology, silicon-based transhumanists sympathize with strong functionalism in the philosophy mind, Neo- Lockeanism about persons, and active externalism, allowing for biologically and phenomenologically disembodied modes of existence, vastly extended cognition, and the resurgence of brain-in-the-vat scenarios. The paper focusses on some highly disputed metaphysical background assumptions of silicon-based transhumanists rather than on the technical feasibility of their visions.

Der Transhumanismus versteht sich als kulturelle Bewegung und als interdisziplinärer Forschungsansatz mit dem Ziel der umfassenden Verbesserung des Menschen, d.h. seiner kognitiven, emotionalen und moralischen Fähigkeiten, mit technischen Mitteln. Der Transhumanismus stellt lebensweltlich grundlegende Grenzziehungen in Frage, z.B. der Grenze zwischen Natur und Technik, Mensch und Tier, Mensch und Maschine, Personen und Sachen, Wachsen und Eingreifen, Therapie und enhancement. Primäres Ziel dieses Bandes ist eine Kritik des Transhumanismus. Die Beiträge diskutieren seine impliziten Metaphysik, Anthropologie und Ethik: Ist das vom Transhumanismus anvisierte Ziel metaphysisch möglich und auch technisch realisierbar? Ist die von ihm geforderte umfassende Technisierung der menschlichen Natur moralisch legitim und sozialethisch vertretbar? Ist die Selbstverbesserung des Menschen durch Überwindung seiner conditio humana überhaupt rational wünschenswert? Von der kritischen Durchleuchtung transhumanistischer Positionen soll eine aufklärerische Wirkung auf eine technikbegeisterte intellektuelle Öffentlichkeit ausgehen.

The conviction that philosophical problems are "problems of language" (Rorty) which may be solved, or dissolved, either by reforming language or by understanding more about the language we actually speak, forms the common ground of otherwise conflicting camps within 20th century analytic philosophy. The refusal of ordinary language philosophers to construct ideal languages stems from the prejudice that ordinary English satisfies all requirements for being an ideal language. If traditional philosophers would use words as ordinary speakers of English do they would not be able to formulate questions, and theses, they are apt to do. They are "misusing language" and "transgressing the bounds of sense" (Hacker). However, ordinary language philosophers like Austin have no theory of the origin of the "metaphysical", that means, the "human restlessness in the ordinary" (Cavell) and the drive to speak outside language-games. Wittgenstein can be said to have such a theory. The vision of language he sketches out in the Investigations reveals that skepticism is a permanent threat of communication and thought. A direct (flat) repudiation of traditional themes and modes of thinking is, properly speaking, beyond the reach of linguistic procedures, as Wittgenstein would understand them. /// A convicção de que os problemas filosoficos são "problemas de linguagem" (Rorty) passiveis de serem solucionados, ou dissolvidos, seja mediante a reforma da linguagem ou mediante uma melhor compreensão da linguagem que na realidade falamos, constitui a plataforma comum a vários compos, de outra forma em competição uns com os outros, dentro da corrente analítica defilosofia no século XX. A recusa por parte dos filósofos da linguagem ordinária em construir uma linguagem ideal deriva do preconceito segundo o qual a linguagem comum satisfaz todos os requisitos de uma linguagem ideal. Se os filósofos tradicionais usassem as palavras como os falantes ordinários da língua inglesa (ou outra) fazem não seriam capazes deformular questões, e teses, ted como se sentem capazes de fazer. Eles estão simplesmente a abusar da linguagem e a "transgredir as fronteiras do sentido" (Hacker). Apesardisso, osfilosofos da linguagem ordindria, tais como Austin, naopossuem uma teoria acerca da origem do "metafísico", ou seja, da "inquietude humana no ordinário" (Cavell) e do impulso a falar fora dosjogos linguisticos. O artigo defende que uma tal teoria se encontra precisamente em Wittgenstein. A sua visão da linguagem nas Investigações revela que o cepticismo constitui uma ameaca permanente a comunicação e ao pensamento. Assim sendo, uma repudiação directa dos temas e dos modos de pensar tradicionais é algo que está para aélm do alcance dos procedimentos linguisticos, tal como Wittgenstein os entende.