Helen Mussell

The paper investigates epistemic vices in the fiduciary. Building on existing work exploring the presence of epistemic injustice embedded in the fiduciary, the paper examines the presence of another vice - epistemic hubris - and suggests how epistemic injustice acts as a capital vice within the context of the fiduciary, facilitating hubris to flourish. Three interrelated arguments are advanced. The first focuses on how the asymmetrical leader-follower dynamic within the fiduciary results in hubris. The second builds on this exploring how the lack of consultation with the beneficiary alongside deployment of specific economic epistemic goods to interpret the fiduciary results in additional hubris. The third draws the two together, arguing that as epistemic injustice creates conditions for both examples of hubris to flourish, it serves as a capital vice within the context of the fiduciary. Finally, safeguarding suggestions are outlined for how these epistemic vices could be avoided.

Despite the omnipresence of the fiduciary in organisations, there is an omission of contemporary theorizations of this legal concept within the organisational theory literature. This is particularly surprising given the situation that the presence of ethics within the fiduciary is increasingly contested ground, with clear implications for managerial practice. This article addresses the lacuna by theorizing the fiduciary using an original ontological analysis, alongside identifying a suitable ethical framework. It argues on two grounds that the ontology of the fiduciary is inherently relational. The fiduciary’s process-oriented focus is shown to indicate an open, emergent, and relational ontology at work. Secondly, historical investigation of the development of the fiduciary highlights its core relationship structure, and the interdependency and power dynamic embedded in the fiduciary are revealed. The argument is advanced that by bringing this inherent relational ontology to the fore, we can see how a relational ethical framework - the Ethics of Care - is best placed to explicate the ethics at work. The article concludes with a discussion outlining how the ontological theorization offers utility in steering future practice of the fiduciary.

The legal concept of fiduciary, from the Latin fīdūcia meaning trust, plays a fundamental role in all financial and business organisations: it acts as a moral safeguard of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary, ensuring that the beneficiaries' best interests are met. It is often referred to as a duty of care. This paper focuses on the ethics of the fiduciary, but from a unique and historical perspective, going back to the original formulation of the fiduciary within a familial context, to reveal not only why care plays a central role in the fiduciary, but to also uncover key foundational presuppositions regarding agential capabilities embedded in the trustee-beneficiary relationship. In doing so, the paper uncovers ethical issues of an epistemological kind at the core of the fiduciary. By using Miranda Fricker's theory of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, the analysis helps shed light on shareholder activism and explains limited engagement to date.

Despite the omnipresence of the fiduciary in business organisations, there is an omission of theorisations of this legal concept within business ethics literature. This is surprising considering its widespread and embedded use, but even more so given that the presence of ethics within the fiduciary is increasingly contested ground. This article addresses both issues by theorising the fiduciary using an ontological analysis—one which subsequently helps identify a suitable ethical framework. The article argues on two grounds that the ontology of the fiduciary is inherently relational; it renders the fiduciary’s implicit ontology explicit. Firstly, the fiduciary is shown to be process-oriented, indicating an open, emergent, and relational ontology at work. Secondly, historical investigation of the development of the fiduciary highlights its core relationship structure, and the interdependency and power dynamic embedded in the fiduciary are revealed. The argument is advanced that by bringing this inherent relational ontology to the fore, we can see how a relational ethical framework—the Ethics of Care—is best placed to explicate the ethics at work in the fiduciary. The article concludes with a discussion outlining how this ontological theorisation offers utility in steering future practice of the fiduciary.

This article uses philosopher Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice to shed light on the legal concept of the fiduciary, alongside demonstrating the wider contribution Fricker’s work can make to business ethics. Fiduciary, from the Latin fīdūcia, meaning “trust,” plays a fundamental role in all financial and business organisations: it acts as a moral safeguard of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary. The article focuses on the ethics of the fiduciary, but from a unique historical perspective, referring back to the original formulation of the fiduciary within a familial context to investigate presuppositions regarding agential capabilities, whilst also paying attention to the power mechanism embedded in the trustee–beneficiary relationship. Using Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, the analysis elucidates the impact of cumulative beneficiary silencing in contemporary contexts, and the article uncovers ethical issues of an epistemological kind at the core of the fiduciary—of epistemic injustice.

Social responsibility initiatives within a corporate environment continue to be met with deep scepticism. My concern is with exploring this scepticism, which I argue is due to there being more to the underlying objectives of SR than has previously been investigated. I begin by outlining and substantiating my project as a social ontological enquiry, one in which I unpack key concepts to reveal the nature of SR. These ontological findings then underpin my argument that SR is problematically grounded in liberalist thinking, and CSR is in fact just one manifestation of SR. I advance the thesis that SR has emancipatory ends, of meeting human needs and flourishing, and that it is best explicated using feminist care ethics. The argument is then focussed on both shoring up and advancing the emancipatory project of SR. The scepticism of interest is revealed to be the incongruity between care and business; that businesses are deemed as being incompatible with SR, at least in their present capacity. Any claims to the contrary by the business community are branded inauthentic and the aforementioned scepticism ensues. The paper concludes with a brief discussion concerning implications for CSR initiatives and future changes and developments are considered.

Social responsibility initiatives within a corporate environment continue to be met with deep scepticism. My concern is with exploring this scepticism, which I argue is due to there being more to the underlying objectives of SR than has previously been investigated. I begin by outlining and substantiating my project as a social ontological enquiry, one in which I unpack key concepts to reveal the nature of SR. These ontological findings then underpin my argument that SR is problematically grounded in liberalist thinking, and CSR is in fact just one manifestation of SR. I advance the thesis that SR has emancipatory ends, of meeting human needs and flourishing, and that it is best explicated using feminist care ethics. The argument is then focussed on both shoring up and advancing the emancipatory project of SR. The scepticism of interest is revealed to be the incongruity between care and business; that businesses are deemed as being incompatible with SR, at least in their present capacity. Any claims to the contrary by the business community are branded inauthentic and the aforementioned scepticism ensues. The paper concludes with a brief discussion concerning implications for CSR initiatives and future changes and developments are considered.

Feminist standpoint theory has a troubled history that has limited its use and development as a core feminist epistemological project. This article revisits debates from its past, and re-examines an apparent central problem: that of the realism identifiable in FST. Looking closely at the criticism leveled against one particular standpoint theorist—Nancy Hartsock—I show the criticism not only to be unfounded, as has previously been argued, but also unnecessary. I demonstrate that the accusations of supposedly realist contradictions in Hartsock's work are easily resolvable by engagement with critical realism. I argue that CR not only accommodates Hartsock's conception of realism, and so dissolves any contention, but that CR complements and shores up FST's central claim: that situated knowledge carries with it an epistemic privilege. Another contemporary conception of realism is being developed—New Materialism —that, it could be argued, would also be a suitable ontology with which to develop FST. I show how NM could present problems for FST as a fundamentally political project, and conclude that CR offers a more fruitful future collaboration for FST.