Helena R. Slanickova

Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science-policy interface. We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.

Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because they focus on “what works,” or because they “follow the rules.” We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy.

When evidence‑based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence‑based policymaking, which we call transparency of reasoning. Such transparency is critical to the success of the evidence‑based policy movement, as without it, we will be unable to tell whether in any instance a policy was in fact based on evidence.

Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choosing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy‐making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value‐based considerations.

Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence-based—cannot be decided without appeal to value-based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy-making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choos¬ing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy-making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value-based considerations.

Determining appropriate mechanisms for transferring and translating research into policy has become a major concern for researchers (knowledge producers) and policymakers (knowledge users) worldwide. This has led to the emergence of a new function of brokering between researchers and policymakers, and a new type of agent called Knowledge Broker. Understanding these complex multi-agent interactions is critical for an efficient knowledge brokering practice during any given policymaking process. Here, we present (1) the current diversity of knowledge broker groups working in the field of biosecurity and environmental management; (2) the incentives linking the different agents involved in the process (knowledge producers, knowledge brokers and knowledge users); and (3) the gaps, needs and challenges to better understand this social ecosystem. We also propose alternatives aimed at improving transparency and efficiency, including future scenarios where the role of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies may become predominant in knowledge-brokering activities.

Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they “follow the science,” because they focus on “what works,” or because they “follow the rules.” We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy.

When evidence-based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence-based policymaking, which we call transparency of reasoning. Such transparency is critical to the success of the evidence-based policy movement, as without it, we will be unable to tell whether in any instance a policy was in fact based on evidence.