Heng Ying

In contemporary studies of moral change, philosophers identify psychological and socio-structural conditions and explain how they cause changes in people’s moral views. However, empirical studies show that the conception of moral agency implied in the existing accounts—that individuals are the function of pre-existing psychological and social structures—should be reexamined. Many people change their moral views based on their core values and concerns. In this paper, I set out to develop the idea of “second-order moral reasoning” to highlight a currently underexplored conception of moral agency and introduce a new model for explaining moral view change. This model recognises individuals’ ethical freedom—the fact that no single moral system can fully determine one’s morality. Instead of responding directly to the information they receive, many individuals engage in second-order moral reasoning and determine, in light of their values and concerns, whether they should adjust their views. Finally, using the case of honour killings in Pakistan, I demonstrate how the idea of second-order moral reasoning can inspire a new approach to moral intervention—one that facilitates the eradication of harmful practices and the development of a tolerant society.

Philosophers who study moral progress often hold a largely unacknowledged conception of moral history, which one may call the problem-solving conception of moral progress. This conception pictures humans as problem solvers, who make progress by advancing morally significant values in society. This conception, however, overlooks the conflict of values. In response, this paper proposes the dual-character conception of moral change to guide the study of the historical change of morality. This conception tracks a self-limiting structure of moral change— since not all values are compatible and combinable, our efforts to actualize certain values entail our neglect and sacrifice of alternative values. In consequence, the “progress” we make actually limits us from experimenting with other ideal forms of life and society. As calling a change process progress keeps us in a state of neglecting alternative values, we should discard the moral-progress thinking and stay aware of the limitations of our moral efforts.

In this project, I raised three methodological issues regarding contemporary studies of moral change and moral progress. The first concerns how philosophers typically think about moral history. The second focuses on the explanatory model of the shift of morality, and the last deals with the prescriptions for moral intervention. Based on the three criticisms, I propose the “person-centric” model as the new paradigm for studying the historical shift of morality. Different from current accounts that follow a knowledge-centric model, the person-centric model requires that we identify the moral values, struggles, and dilemmas crucial to people’s moral life, and develop new perspectives from them to further the study of moral change.