Henrik D. Kugelberg

A well-known debate in normative ethics is that between proponents of Act Consequentialism and Rule Consequentialism. Given the structural similarities between Rule Consequentialism and existing forms of Contractualism, one might expect a similar debate to arise among contractualists. However, this is not the case. Some, following T. M. Scanlon, even argue that this question is ‘misconceived’—that there is something deeply mistaken about considering the possibility of an act-based form of contractualism. In this paper, I challenge this claim. I start by showing that the structural similarities between existing contractualist views and Rule Consequentialism suggest that one could formulate an act-based version of Contractualism. This view—Act Contractualism—has received almost no attention so far. Part of the explanation why rests on the thought that justification must involve rules or principles. The idea is that, since justification involves the use of reasons, and since reasons are best expressed through general principles, there is something conceptually mistaken in thinking that a contractualist theory can do without principles. However, I contend that, even if we accept that one cannot talk about reasons without talking about principles, we can meaningfully formulate an act-based contractualist view that takes the role of principles into account. I show that this view is not extensionally equivalent to Rule Contractualism, and that it is better supported by the contractualist rationale. I conclude by calling for more work to be done on Act Contractualism.

The online dating application has in recent years become a major avenue for meeting potential partners. But while the digital public sphere has gained the attention of political philosophers, a systematic normative evaluation of issues arising in the ‘digital sexual sphere’ is lacking. I provide a philosophical framework for assessing dating app corporation conduct, capturing why people use these apps and their experience so often is unsatisfactory. Identifying dating apps as agents intervening in a social institution necessary for the reproduction of society, with immense power over people's lives, I ask if they exercise their power in line with individuals’ interests. Acknowledging that people have claims to non-interference, equal standing, and choice improvement relating to intimacy, I find that the traditional, non-digital, sexual sphere poses problems to their realisation, especially for sexual minorities. In this context, apps’ potential for justice in the sexual sphere is immense, but unfulfilled.