Henrique Ribeiro

The aim of this paper is to develop further a model of reduction derived from Nagel’s model and from the deductive-nomological model of explanation. We propose this development by examining its consistency with the history of physics, in particular, with Nagel´s further account of the history of physics. In the first part, we introduce the issue of intertheoretical reduction. In the second, we examine the partial consistency of the derived D-N model of reduction with Nagel’s further considerations on reduction. As a conclusion, we argue that, in agreement with Nagel´s theory, the full consistency with history of science is a criterion needed for any purported theory of reduction and that the autonomy of the reducing science is to be preserved.

O autor analisa atentamente o ensaio de Karl Popper intitulado “The Myth of the Framework”, reenquadrando-o histórica e filosoficamente na época em que foi publicado. Mostra que a problemática do relativismo é o tema fundamental desse ensaio e que a mesma está na origem de uma importante viragem para a metafísica por parte do respetivo autor, a qual deve ser vista em contaste com os objetivos iniciais da sua filosofia da ciência. Deste ponto de vista, procede ao confronto entre as conceções de Popper e as de alguns filósofos seus contemporâneos, como é o caso de Feyerabend, Quine e Kuhn.

O autor ocupa-se dos pressupostos histórico-filósoficos da ideia de um fim da filosofia da ciência, defendida por Rorty e Feyerabend nos últimos vinte anos. Em especial, mostra-se que essa ideia foi, de diversas formas, explicitamente sugerida ao longo da evolução do movimento analitico quer entre os positivistas lógicos vienenses quer na filosofia inglesa da linguagem ordinária. A justificação desta perspectiva passa, neste trabalho, por uma reformulação do conceito corrente de história da filosofia analítica, que sugere-se estar na origem, enganadoramente, da noção igualmente corrente, mas falsa de um modo geral, de que esse fim da filosofia da ciência é algo característico apenas da filosofia analítica contemporânea. Em contraste, o autor sugere que Rorty e Feyerabend não são, na realidade, os verdadeiros autores dessa morte da filosofia da ciência, mas, antes, os seus agentes mais visíveis na história da filosofia analítica. /// The author deals with the historical and philosophical pressupositions of the idea of the end of philosophy of science supported by both Rorty and Feyerabend over the last twenty years. It is particularly stressed that such an idea has been, in different ways, explicitely suggested throughout the evolution of the analytic movement, both by the logical positivists of Vienna, and by the english philososophers of ordinary language. In the present essay, the justification of this perspective is based upon a reformulation of the commonly accepted concept of the history of analytic philosophy, which, it is suggested, is wrongly believed to be at the origin of the also commonly accepted but, generally speaking, equally false, notion that that end of analytic philosophy is characteristic only of the contemporary analytic philosophy. On the contrary, the author suggests that neither Rorty nor Feyerabend are the authors of the philosophy of science's death, but rather his historical and more visible agents in the history of analytic philosophy.

Neste artigo, procura-se enquadrar na perspetiva da retórica e da argumentação a problemática do chamado “negacionismo” da COVID-19, entendendo-se por um tal conceito não tanto ou simplesmente a rejeição da identificação médica dessa doença, mas, fundamentalmente, quer a negação da sua gravidade e a da sua amplitude pandémica como matéria de saúde pública, quer a negação das medidas adotadas para a combater, de maneira geral, pelas autoridades competentes. As posições defendidas sobre o assunto por uma autoridade médica especializada, mas rotulada e estigmatizada como “negacionista” (Fernando Nobre, médico, ex-Professor catedrático convidado da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de Lisboa e doutor honoris causa pela mesma Universidade), servem de caso em estudo.

This volume includes a collection of eighteen essays that provide a decisive input to the study of logic and argumentation theory by some of the finest specialists in these areas, covering the main schools of thought and contemporary trends at the beginning of the 21st century. In these essays, the authors clarify the status of what we currently call, ambiguously and problematically, “logic” and “argumentation theory”, and discuss the no less controversial issue of the relationship between these two concepts when applied to the study of argumentation and its problems. At the same time, they take stock of the most recent developments of argumentation theory considered as an ongoing research subject. It is the first time in the last few decades that a work this comprehensive and up-to-date on such matters has been published. This volume is an essential tool for all of those interested in the study of the relations between logic and argumentation, particularly at the university level. It provides not only an introduction to these subjects, but also the necessary framework for further specialised research development in the future.

The theme of this paper was inspired by studies related to the subject of my doctoral dissertation,1 and, more specifically, by the work of A. Richardson and M. Friedman on the same subject presented in their two recently published books.2 The material in these books which addresses the connection between Russell and Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt reveals the same basic perspective in both authors and, in fact, represents the first in depth enquiry of this connection, despite certain fairly essential limitations which I hope to reveal in this paper. The line of investigation I intend to take in the following may therefore be outlined as such; to examine, albeit briefly, the extent to which Richardson’s and Friedman’s perspective can offer us a correct historical and philosophical approach to the influence of Russell’s philosophy on the Aufbau, and, by confirming the existence of the limitations alluded to, to determine whether this perspective may be adequately reformulated independently of their existence, and to determine how, in general terms, it may in fact be reformulated. Thus, although my analyses and commentaries do not fall within a strictly historiographical framework, as is the case in the work developed by Richardson and Friedman, it is nevertheless possible to achieve certain objectives characteristic of this framework which, eventually, may become the subject of a future historiography of the philosophy of Russell and his influence on the Aufbau.3 In order to achieve these objectives my main aim is neither negative nor destructive but essentially philosophical; I see myself together with the authors in question as partners in the investigation and resolution of problems arising from the presentation, discussion and testing of competitive theories, an example of what occurs in the scientific enquiry. In these circumstances, and from this point of view, I see myself as a philosopher who points to certain difficulties and problems in the theory put forward by these authors to explain the Aufbau, and, with particular reference to Russell’s philosophy, concludes by suggesting an alternative theory

Starting from a recent ideological and political controversy regarding the devaluation of the concept of “nationalism” in relation to that of ‘patriotism”, the author – following his own years-long investigations on the subject – historically and philosophically reframes each of these concepts from the perspective of rhetoric and argumentation. It is shown, in this context, that the arguments in question are fallacious (and even, in some applications, clearly perverse) and a radical and provocative reformulation of the aforementioned concepts and the controversy involved is proposed – a reformulation which, eventually and at best, may give rise to a new historiography on the subject.

Virtually for the first time in the known historiography on the present impact of Karl Popper’s philosophy upon the theory of rhetoric and argumentation, this impact is scrupulously analysed and its most important dimensions are highlighted. The author shows how the above impact is crucial to understanding some contemporary schools within the scope of that theory, such as pragma-dialectics. The limitations of Popper’s philosophy are carefully analysed while, on the other hand, the limitations of the theory of rhetoric and argumentation itself are thoroughly discussed, in order to properly appreciate the contribution in question. Globally, it is concluded that Popper’s influence is inescapable.

In contrast to the vast literature on the relationships between philosophy and utopia, for which the latter is simply an object of the former, the author shows to what extent philosophy itself can be a matter of utopia, i.e., an essentially utopian discourse, while, on the other hand, being a discourse that can transform reality ideologically. The philosophy of science, from Descartes and Kant to the present, is the framework used to exemplify this new approach, starting with Karl Mannheim’s and Paul Ricoeur’s studies on utopia and its relationship with ideology. The central thesis is that the discourse on sciences has its seat in a “no-place” or a “nowhere”, which is the ideal laboratory for philosophic work, where sciences are reconstructed both epistemologically and ideologically.

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem. The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

Seguindo as suas próprias investigações sobre o assunto, o autor investiga o papel que o ecletismo pode desempenhar na história da filosofia e nas respetivas historiografias especializadas. Argumenta que o ecletismo pode ser original, de um ponto de vista filosófico, e que as historiografias tradicionais, que são basicamente historiografias de grandes autores, devem dar lugar a uma historiografia dos problemas filosóficos, época a época. Deste ponto de vista, e considerando o estado da arte na matéria, defende que a saída para os problemas com que nos confrontamos passa fundamentalmente por uma abordagem retórica da filosofia.

O autor estuda o impacto de Kant na filosofia analítica contemporânea e na respetiva historiografia, desde Frege, Russell e o positivismo lógico vienense, até a algumas reformulações mais recentes do problema kantiano sobre a distinção entre o analítico e o sintético, e a possibilidade do sintético a priori, como é o caso, entre outras, da de Quine e da de Kripke. Discute as razões que estão na origem do retorno a Kant na filosofia analítica desde os anos cinquenta do século passado até aos nossos dias, e mostra que esse retorno se centrou na atualidade do problema referido e das respetivas implicações.

Neste artigo, as filosofias de Rorty e de Popper são comparadas na perspetiva das suas implicações sociais, culturais e políticas. O autor foca‑se em dois conceitos nucleares: conversação e argumentação. Ele argumenta que o contexto histórico e filosófico dessas filosofias é basicamente o mesmo: a problemática das consequências do holismo, no que diz respeito à teoria da significação, para o estatuto da própria filosofia – uma problemática como aquela que Quine, Kuhn, e Popper estabeleceram desde os anos sessenta do século passado. Contudo, quando os dois conceitos são mais estreitamente comparados, eles parecem conduzir a conceções contrastantes da sociedade, da cultura e da política, que são cuidadosamente discutidas.