Hin Sing Yuen

Contemporary technologies increasingly connect people, knowledge systems, values, institutions, and normative traditions across cultural boundaries, while the ethical infrastructures used to evaluate them can remain comparatively bounded. We argue that the resulting challenge is not simply insufficient diversity, but how differences are related, authorized, and transformed. We develop hybridity as a second-order concept for examining these processes in ethics of technology. Distinguishing hybrid configurations, processes of hybridization, and the act of naming something hybrid, we inquire when hybridity becomes ethically salient and under what conditions it can be good. We propose five dimensions—ontological, epistemological, socio-political, methodological, and institutional—and five provisional criteria for good hybridity: visibility, interpretive authority, revisability, reciprocity, and accountability. Good hybridity, on our account, requires more than the presence or consultation of different perspectives. Relevant differences must become consequentially related, encounters must have the capacity to transform the frameworks through which problems are understood, and the resulting configuration must remain open to contestation and answerability. This paper invites ethicists of technology and intercultural-comparative ethicists to contribute to the topical collection Towards a Hybrid Ethics of Technology. Bridging Ethics of Technology and Intercultural-Comparative Ethics and to its transformative research agenda.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

Compersion ist ein affektiver Zustand, der häufig im Zusammenhang mit Polyamorie und allgemein nicht-monogamen Beziehungen diskutiert wird. Er wird in der Regel als eine positive emotionale Reaktion darauf beschrieben, dass die*der Partner*in Zeit und/oder Intimität mit anderen genießt, gewissermaßen als ‚das Gegenteil von Eifersucht‘. Wir argumentieren dafür, dass eine buddhistische Perspektive dazu beitragen kann, die Natur dieser bislang schlecht verstandenen Emotion zu erschließen. Indem wir eine buddhistische Perspektive auf Compersion einnehmen, die auf den sogenannten ‚vier göttlichen Verweilzuständen‘ basiert, d. h. auf nicht-egozentrischen Zuständen, die Buddhist*innen zufolge ein gelingendes Leben erlauben, beschreiben wir (auch moralpraktisch) wichtige Facetten dieser Emotion, die sonst leicht übersehen werden. Ein solcher Ansatz, so argumentieren wir, bereichert nicht nur unser Verständnis von Compersion, sondern trägt auch zum Gelingen aller Arten von Beziehungen bei.

Compersion is an affective state commonly discussed in the context of consensually non-monogamous relationships. It is typically described as a positive emotional reaction to one’s partner’s enjoying time and/or intimacy with another person, sort of ‘the opposite of jealousy’. Recent years have seen an increased interest in this seemingly startling emotion. Part of what makes understanding compersion so difficult is the mononormative expectations of our culture. We suggest that a non-Western, in particular Buddhist, perspective might be more helpful to understand that love and/or intimacy need not be an affair between two people only. We approach compersion through a Buddhist lens based on the ‘four immeasurables’, i.e. non-egocentric states that Buddhists take to promote well-being, and their ‘near enemies’, i.e. states which are easily conflated with them, but egocentric and harmful. Our goal is not to formulate a definition of compersion, nor to raise a normative bar for anyone who feels compersion, but to describe important facets of it that stand out more clearly against a Buddhist background than they might otherwise do. Such an approach not only enriches our understanding of compersion but contributes to people’s flourishing in all kinds of relationships and shows that non-monogamous relationships might be compatible with some forms of Buddhist practice.